K-SHAP: Policy Clustering Algorithm for Anonymous State-Action Pairs

Learning agent behaviors from observational data has shown to improve our understanding of their decision-making processes, advancing our ability to explain their interactions with the environment and other agents. While multiple learning techniques have been proposed in the literature, there is one particular setting that has not been explored yet: multi agent systems where agent identities remain anonymous. For instance, in financial markets labeled data that identifies market participant strategies is typically proprietary, and only the anonymous state-action pairs that result from the interaction of multiple market participants are publicly available. As a result, sequences of agent actions are not observable, restricting the applicability of existing work. In this paper, we propose a Policy Clustering algorithm, called K-SHAP, that learns to group anonymous state-action pairs according to the agent policies. We frame the problem as an Imitation Learning (IL) task, and we learn a world-policy able to mimic all the agent behaviors upon different environmental states. We leverage the world-policy to explain each anonymous observation through an additive feature attribution method called SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations). Finally, by clustering the explanations we show that we are able to identify different agent policies and group observations accordingly. We evaluate our approach on simulated synthetic market data and a real-world financial dataset. We show that our proposal significantly and consistently outperforms the existing methods, identifying different agent strategies.Comment: ICML 202

Equitable Marketplace Mechanism Design

We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a marketplace typically charges fees for facilitating trade. The goal of this work is to design a dynamic fee schedule for the marketplace that is equitable and profitable to all traders while being profitable to the marketplace at the same time (from charging fees). Since the traders adapt their strategies to the fee schedule, we present a reinforcement learning framework for simultaneously learning a marketplace fee schedule and trading strategies that adapt to this fee schedule using a weighted optimization objective of profits and equitability. We illustrate the use of the proposed approach in detail on a simulated stock exchange with different types of investors, specifically market makers and consumer investors. As we vary the equitability weights across different investor classes, we see that the learnt exchange fee schedule starts favoring the class of investors with the highest weight. We further discuss the observed insights from the simulated stock exchange in light of the general framework of equitable marketplace mechanism design

ABIDES-Economist: Agent-Based Simulation of Economic Systems with Learning Agents

We introduce a multi-agent simulator for economic systems comprised of heterogeneous Households, heterogeneous Firms, Central Bank and Government agents, that could be subjected to exogenous, stochastic shocks. The interaction between agents defines the production and consumption of goods in the economy alongside the flow of money. Each agent can be designed to act according to fixed, rule-based strategies or learn their strategies using interactions with others in the simulator. We ground our simulator by choosing agent heterogeneity parameters based on economic literature, while designing their action spaces in accordance with real data in the United States. Our simulator facilitates the use of reinforcement learning strategies for the agents via an OpenAI Gym style environment definition for the economic system. We demonstrate the utility of our simulator by simulating and analyzing two hypothetical (yet interesting) economic scenarios. The first scenario investigates the impact of heterogeneous household skills on their learned preferences to work at different firms. The second scenario examines the impact of a positive production shock to one of two firms on its pricing strategy in comparison to the second firm. We aspire that our platform sets a stage for subsequent research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics

ATMS: Algorithmic Trading-Guided Market Simulation

The effective construction of an Algorithmic Trading (AT) strategy often relies on market simulators, which remains challenging due to existing methods' inability to adapt to the sequential and dynamic nature of trading activities. This work fills this gap by proposing a metric to quantify market discrepancy. This metric measures the difference between a causal effect from underlying market unique characteristics and it is evaluated through the interaction between the AT agent and the market. Most importantly, we introduce Algorithmic Trading-guided Market Simulation (ATMS) by optimizing our proposed metric. Inspired by SeqGAN, ATMS formulates the simulator as a stochastic policy in reinforcement learning (RL) to account for the sequential nature of trading. Moreover, ATMS utilizes the policy gradient update to bypass differentiating the proposed metric, which involves non-differentiable operations such as order deletion from the market. Through extensive experiments on semi-real market data, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our metric and show that ATMS generates market data with improved similarity to reality compared to the state-of-the-art conditional Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Network (cWGAN) approach. Furthermore, ATMS produces market data with more balanced BUY and SELL volumes, mitigating the bias of the cWGAN baseline approach, where a simple strategy can exploit the BUY/SELL imbalance for profit

Transparency as Delayed Observability in Multi-Agent Systems

Is transparency always beneficial in complex systems such as traffic networks and stock markets? How is transparency defined in multi-agent systems, and what is its optimal degree at which social welfare is highest? We take an agent-based view to define transparency (or its lacking) as delay in agent observability of environment states, and utilize simulations to analyze the impact of delay on social welfare. To model the adaptation of agent strategies with varying delays, we model agents as learners maximizing the same objectives under different delays in a simulated environment. Focusing on two agent types - constrained and unconstrained, we use multi-agent reinforcement learning to evaluate the impact of delay on agent outcomes and social welfare. Empirical demonstration of our framework in simulated financial markets shows opposing trends in outcomes of the constrained and unconstrained agents with delay, with an optimal partial transparency regime at which social welfare is maximal