36 research outputs found
Is Kantās Metaphysics Profoundly Unsatisfactory?: Critical Discussion of A. W. Mooreās Critique of Kant
In his recent book, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, Adrian W. Moore takes Kant to play a crucial role in the evolution of modern philosophy; yet, for him, Kantās metaphysics is ultimately and profoundly unsatisfactory. In this article, I examine several of Mooreās objections and provide replies. My claim is that Mooreās reading points to fundamental issues, yet these are not issues of Kantās transcendental idealism, but of the traditional idealism his view has often been taken to represent
Toleration and pragmatism: themes from the work of John Horton
John Hortonās work has been particularly influential in debates on specific topics related to toleration, political obligation, modus vivendi and political realism. More recently, he has synthesised these views in the form of a distinctive position in political philosophy, a position that has the potential to question much of the received wisdom in the field. The papers of this special issue engage with some of the most fundamental issues of Hortonās account, more exactly, the related issues of toleration and modus vivendi, Hortonās account of associative obligations, with a focus on the methodological assumptions which underpin his position more generally, and the metaphysical presuppositions of his account, in particular, the presupposition of contingency. I offer brief presentations of the papers in the special issue and of the ways they link with each other. In the discussion of the papers by Forst, Newey, Jones, Weale and Mendus, the emphasis will be on those arguments which question Hortonās position. Hortonās paper will then be presented with a focus on possible responses to these challenges. I will conclude with several remarks on an unexpected continuity between Hortonās realist view and a view realists usually criticise as idealising, namely, John Rawlsās theory of justice as fairness
Right's Complex Relation to Ethics in Kant: the limits of Independentism
The recent literature on the relation in Kant between duties of right and duties of virtue is dominated by a debate on whether duties of right can be derived from duties of virtue. According to one important argument, there is a tension or even a paradox in Kant between various claims concerning juridical norms, a paradox which can best be solved by assuming an āIndependentistā position, that is, the view that the Universal Principle of Right is independent from the Categorical Imperative and, hence, that duties of right are normatively independent from duties of virtue. My claim in this paper is that the paradox which supports the independentist reading affects Kantās claims only when the focus is on the subjective validity of duties. Once the focus is changed to objective validity, with which Kant is actually concerned, the paradox is dissolved and the Universal Principle of Right can appear as normatively dependent on the Categorical Imperative. In other words, in this paper, I argue that the scope of the paradox of juridical norms is confined to a specific focus and independentism (the view that duties of right are independent from duties of virtue) is confined in a similar way. Hence, the complexity of Kantās account makes it possible for him to accommodate both independentist and dependentist views of the relation between right and virtue
Dignity, Law and Value: Enriching Sensen's Strong Priority Account
According to Oliver Sensenās book, Kant on Human Dignity, the notion of dignity which can be found in the Kantian corpus is fundamentally different from the notion that gains currency in politics-related contexts today, namely, dignity as a value inherent in human beings, a value that commands respect. According to Sensen, Kantās ethics makes it impossible for a value to be the foundation of a moral requirement; instead, Kant regards value as a prescription of reason, a prescription given by the moral law. Values are normatively secondary and determined by moral laws ā call this the Strong Priority Thesis (SPT) of the moral law over values. In this paper, I formulate several objections to Sensenās SPT and I offer the Weaker Priority Thesis (WPT) as a philosophically and exegetically more compelling account of Kantās view. The WPT interprets Kant as advancing a more complex account of the relation between moral law, values and dignity than Sensenās SPT; moreover, I argue that, on the basis of the WPT, Kantās account becomes sufficiently complex to incorporate also the SP
How Far Do We Self-legislate?
Abstract In his early writings, Kant regarded the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality, as well as the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them. Nevertheless, this impressively sounding principle gradually disappeared from the later Kantās texts, and there is not much in the literature to explain why. Pauline Kleingeldās purpose, in the two articles I consider here, is to address this lacuna and to show that there are good philosophical reasons for this principleās gradual disappearance from the Kantian framework. One of my aims, in this paper, is to formulate and argue for several reservations about Kleingeldās argument; however, even if these reservations turn out to be apposite, my claim is not that Kant did not actually abandon the Principle of Autonomy; instead, I argue that, even if Kleingeld were right and Kant had abandoned the Principle of Autonomy, he would still not have needed to.</jats:p
Kantās Critique Of Religion: Epistemic Sources Of Secularism
The secular interpretation of Kant is widespread and Kant is viewed as the most prestigious founding father of liberal secularism. At the same time, however, commentators note that Kantās position on secularism is in fact much more complex, and some go as far as to talk about an ambiguous secularism in his work. This paper defends a refined version of the secular interpretation. According to this refined version, Kant can offer a limited, political secularism on the basis of a simple argument which focuses on the distinct epistemic statuses of political and religious claims; however, the paper argues, a more general secularism is unwarranted on the basis of the same argument. If my argument is correct, then it will account at least in part for the plurality of interpretations. Moreover, any further attempt to show that Kantās relation to secularism is ambiguous or dismissive should take into consideration the argument from epistemic grounds presented her
Aspects of Practical Bindingness in Kant: Introduction
AbstractOne of the few points of consensus in the Kantian literature is that Kantās Moral Law is binding universally and unconditionally. Hence, the Moral Law is binding for all human agents (universally) irrespective of the agentsā particular interests (unconditionally). Whether or not we intend to act on the Moral Law, this is the law we ought to follow. Beyond this point of consensus, however, even the most important details are matters of controversy. What exactly does the Moral Law require of us? What, if anything, grounds its bindingness? In particular, does Kant argue that the Moral Law is binding because it is āself-legislatedā? What is the relation between the Moral Law (supreme principle of morality) and substantive moral laws such as the law that we ought to promote the happiness of others? What does Kant mean by his claim that the will has autonomy? In the four articles discussed in this special issue, Kleingeld proposes novel answers to these questions. This introduction presents the articles and brings to the fore the larger theme tying them all together.</jats:p