Funds Transfer Operations: Boon or Bane to the Viability of Rural Financial Intermediaries?

As far as the policies are concerned, the government has been successful in reversing the flow of loanable funds in favor of rural areas through maintenance of agricultural loan quota and deposit retention policies. This paper examines the structure of funds transfer operations of rural-based branches of banks, the factors that determine the volume of transferred funds from one branch to another and the impact of funds transfer operations on the savings mobilization efforts of rural-based financial intermediaries.banking system, rural sector, deposit liabilities, financial intermediaries, funds transfer

Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts

A cake is a metaphor for a heterogeneous, divisible good. When two players divide such a good, there is always a perfect division—one that is efficient (Pareto-optimal), envy-free, and equitable—which can be effected with a finite number of cuts under certain mild conditions; this is not always the case when there are more than two players (Brams, Jones, and Klamler, 2011b). We not only establish the existence of such a division but also provide an algorithm for determining where and how many cuts must be made, relating it to an algorithm, “Adjusted Winner” (Brams and Taylor, 1996, 1999), that yields a perfect division of multiple homogenous goods.Cake-cutting; fair division; envy-freeness; adjusted winner; heterogeneous good

Funds Transfer: Boon or Bane to the Viability of Rural Financial Intermediaries

Institutional credit set up by the government may not necessarily be the major source of funds in the rural areas. In addition, there may be enough funds to support production and to sustain employment if financial resources are not rained. These insights are just few of authors’ findings in this paper. It suggests that addressing the problem of rural financial drain can open up the opportunities to pursue rural development without eroding the national budgetrural sector, financial intermediaries, funds transfer

Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts

Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist (2009) asked whether there exists a two-person moving-knife procedure that yields an envy-free, undominated, and equitable allocation of a pie. We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the second yields an allocation with the two “almosts” removed. The latter, however, requires broadening the definition of a “procedure," which raises philosophical, as opposed to mathematical, issues. An analogous approach for cakes fails because of problems in eliciting truthful preferences.mechanism design; fair division; divisible good; cake-cutting; pie-cutting

An Assessment of Policies Affecting the Financial Sector, 1986-1988

This paper assesses the performance of the Aquino government in the financial sector. it presents the major policies and strategies outlined by the government. It also describes and analyzes the actions taken by the government in relation to the policies and a strategy spelled out and assesses its results quantitatively. Some policy issues are discussed.financial market, financial economy, financial sector

Funds Transfer Operations: Boon or Bane to the Viability of Rural Financial Intermediaries?

As far as the policies are concerned, the government has been successful in reversing the flow of loanable funds in favor of rural areas through maintenance of agricultural loan quota and deposit retention policies. This paper examines the structure of funds transfer operations of rural-based branches of banks, the factors that determine the volume of transferred funds from one branch to another and the impact of funds transfer operations on the savings mobilization efforts of rural-based financial intermediaries.banking system, rural sector, deposit liabilities, financial intermediaries, funds transfer

Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake

Is there a division among n players of a cake using n-1 parallel vertical cuts, or of a pie using n radial cuts, that is envy-free (each player thinks he or she receives a largest piece and so does not envy another player) and undominated (there is no other allocation as good for all players and better for at least one)? David Gale first asked this question for pies. We provide complete answers for both cakes and pies. The answers depend on the number of players (two versus three or more players) and whether the players' preferences satisfy certain continuity assumptions. We also give some simple algorithms for cutting a pie when there are two or more players, but these algorithms do not guarantee all the properties one might desire in a division, which makes pie-cutting harder than cake-cutting. We suggest possible applications and conclude with two open questions.Fair division; cake-cutting; pie-cutting; divisible good; envy-freeness; allocative efficiency