Longitudinal Analyses of the Effects of Trade Unions

This paper examines how measurement error biases longitudinal estimates of union effects. It develops numerical examples, statistical models, and econometric estimates which indicate that measurement error is a major problem in longitudinal data sets, so that longitudinal analyses do not provide the research panacea for determining the effects of unionism (or other economic forces) some have suggested. There are three major findings:1) The difference between the cross-section and longitudinal estimates is attributable in large part to random error in the measurement of who changes union status. Given modest errors of measurement, of the magnitudes observed,and a moderate proportion of workers changing union status, also of the magnitudes observed, measurement error biases downward estimated effects of unions by substantial amounts. 2) Longitudinal analysis of the effects of unionism on nonwage and wage outcomes tends to confirm the significant impact of unionism found in cross-section studies, with the longitudinal estimates of both nonwage and wage outcomes lover in the longitudinal analysis than in the cross-section analysis of the same data set. 3) The likely upward bias of cross-section estimates of the effect of unions and the likely downward bias of longitudinal estimates suggests that,under reasonable conditions, the two sets of estimates bound the "true" union impact posited in standard models of what unions do.

Public Policy and Employment Discrimination in the U.S.

This paper examines evidence on employment practices in the U.S. with respect to race and the impact of governmental anti-bias activity on these practices. It shows a striking difference in the responses of American employers to job applications differing in race from the responses of British employers and asks whether these differences can be attributed to the greater U.S. effort to aid minority workers. It reviews the recent research by Jonathan Leonard on the effect of court suits and affirmative action compliance activity and concludes that much of the improved status of minorities in the U.S. is indeed due to governmental activity and public policy.

The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits

This paper examines the effect of trade unionism on the exit behavior of workers in the context of Hirschman's exit-voice dichotomy. Unionism is expected to reduce quits and permanent separations and raise job tenure by providing a "voice" alternative to exit when workers are dissatisfied with conditions. Empirical evidence supports this contention, showing significantly lower exit for unionists in several large data tapes. It is argued that the grievance system plays a major role in the reduction in exit and that the reduction lowers cost and raises productivity.

Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance

The debate over the influence of labour market flexibility on performance is unlikely to be settled by additional studies using aggregate data and making cross-country comparisons. While this approach holds little promise, micro-analysis of workers and firms and increased use of experimental methods represent a path forward. Steps along this path could help end the current 'lawyer's case' empiricism in which priors dominate evidence.

Should We Organize? Effects of Faculty Unionism on Academic Compensation

This paper uses the American Association of University Professors surveys for the period 1965 to 1976 to examine the effect of faculty unionism on faculty pay. It compares estimated effects of unionism on compensation from cross-section regressions of faculty pay on union organization and from a longitudinal model designed to correct cross-section estimates for "unobserved characteristics" of schools that are correlated with unionism. The major findings are that: 1. unionism raises faculty pay but that the extent of the effect varies greatly by estimating model and time period covered; 2.the years a school has been organized has a stronger effect on pay than the standard 0-1 union dummy variable; 3. unionism raises the fringe benefit share of compensation; 4. the estimated coefficient on faculty unionism in cross-section regressions overstates the union impact because unionized schools tend to have been higher paying even before organization.