Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue

We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We require the aggregation to be supportive, i.e. for every issue $j$ the corresponding component $f_j$ of every aggregator on every issue should satisfy $f_j(x_1, ,\ldots, x_n) \in \{x_1, ,\ldots, x_n\}$. We prove that, in such a set-up, non-dictatorial aggregation of votes in a society of some size is possible if and only if either non-dictatorial aggregation is possible in a society of only two members or a ternary aggregator exists that either on every issue $j$ is a majority operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies $f_j(x,x,y) = f_j(x,y,x) = f_j(y,x,x) =x, \forall x,y$, or on every issue is a minority operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies $f_j(x,x,y) = f_j(x,y,x) = f_j(y,x,x) =y, \forall x,y.$ We then introduce a notion of uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator, which is defined to be an aggregator that on every issue, and when restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue, differs from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets of feasible voting patterns that admit a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator. Then making use of Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint satisfaction problems, we connect social choice theory with combinatorial complexity by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns $X$ has a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted conservative constraint satisfaction problem on $X$, in the sense introduced by Bulatov and Jeavons, with each issue representing a sort, is tractable; otherwise it is NP-complete

Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries in Social Choice

A large amount of literature in social choice theory deals with quantifying the probability of certain election outcomes. One way of computing the probability of a specific voting situation under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption is via counting integral points in polyhedra. Here, Ehrhart theory can help, but unfortunately the dimension and complexity of the involved polyhedra grows rapidly with the number of candidates. However, if we exploit available polyhedral symmetries, some computations become possible that previously were infeasible. We show this in three well known examples: Condorcet's paradox, Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting and in Plurality voting vs Plurality Runoff.Comment: 14 pages; with minor improvements; to be published in Social Choice and Welfar

Risk, precaution and science: towards a more constructive policy debate. Talking point on the precautionary principle

Few issues in contemporary risk policy are as momentous or contentious as the precautionary principle. Since it first emerged in German environmental policy, it has been championed by environmentalists and consumer protection groups, and resisted by the industries they oppose (Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999). Various versions of the principle now proliferate across different national and international jurisdictions and policy areas (Fisher, 2002). From a guiding theme in European Commission (EC) environmental policy, it has become a general principle of EC law (CEC, 2000; Vos & Wendler, 2006). Its influence has extended from the regulation of environmental, technological and health risks to the wider governance of science, innovation and trade (O'Riordan & Cameron, 1994)

Comments on: Multicriteria Decision Systems for Financial Problems

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Vertical integration in production and services: development in transaction cost economics

In this paper, we first establish the core, fundamental concepts of Williamson's TCE, examining the different governance structures or the institutional alternatives that TCE theory proposes. We go on to describe some critical considerations and theoretical proposals that correspond fundamentally to Williamson's heuristic model, the integration of incentives in organizational forms, idiosyncratic demand, and how the concept of transaction is conceived in general.Peris-Ortiz, M.; Bonet, F.; Rueda Armengot, C. (2011). Vertical integration in production and services: development in transaction cost economics. Service Business. 5(1):87-97. doi:10.1007/s11628-011-0103-0S879751Alchian A (1965) The basic of some recent advances in the theory of management of the firm. J Ind Econ 14:30–41Alchian A (1969) Corporate management and property rights. In: Manne GH (ed) Economic Policy and Regulation of Corporate Securities. 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Behavioral implications of shortlisting procedures

We consider two-stage “shortlisting procedures” in which the menu of alternatives is first pruned by some process or criterion and then a binary relation is maximized. Given a particular first-stage process, our main result supplies a necessary and sufficient condition for choice data to be consistent with a procedure in the designated class. This result applies to any class of procedures with a certain lattice structure, including the cases of “consideration filters,” “satisficing with salience effects,” and “rational shortlist methods.” The theory avoids background assumptions made for mathematical convenience; in this and other respects following Richter’s classical analysis of preference-maximizing choice in the absence of shortlisting

The theory of international business: the role of economic models

This paper reviews the scope for economic modelling in international business studies. It argues for multi-level theory based on classic internalisation theory. It present a systems approach that encompasses both firm-level and industry-level analysis