34 research outputs found
The effect of parental leave on female employment: evidence from state policies
This paper analyzes the effect of federal and state maternity leave policies on female employment. We analyze if the enactment of the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) differentially affected states that previously implemented maternity leave laws than those states which did not. Additionally, we study whether FMLA caused an increase in the female employment and labor force participation in those states that expanded its benefits and relaxed the eligibility criteria. Finally, we analyze the Paid Family Leave program in California, comparing how the change in female employment and labor force participation differs from those states which have FMLA alone and those which have complemented the benefits of FMLA. Using March CPS data available from the Integrated Public Use Micro data Series (IPUMS), our results suggest, first, a positive and significant effect of FMLA on female employment and, second, a positive and significant effect on the change in female employment for some of the states that expanded the benefits and eligibility criteria of FMLA.Family Medical Leave Act, Temporary Disability Insurance, Female Employment
Environmental Policy in a Linear City Model of Product Differentiation
This paper analyzes how a tax/subsidy policy affects consumers? behavior when choosing between green (pollution free goods) and conventional products and its effects on welfare when some consumers have strong preferences for green goods. We develop a three stage complete information game, using the Hotelling?s linear city model. We show that when products are identical in all respects except in their environmental properties, a tax/subsidy policy performs better than the case without policy. Our efficiency comparisons suggest that under a setting of horizontal product differentiation a tax/subsidy (either on consumers or polluting ?firms) produces higher social welfare than the absence of policy. Moreover, the proportion of consumers who prefer green products affects the welfare gains from a subsidy or tax policy.Green products, environmental policy, horizontal product differentiation
Keeping Negotiations in the Dark: Environmental Agreements under Incomplete Information
This paper investigates the role of uncertainty as a tool to support cooperation in international environmental agreements. We consider two layers of uncertainty. Under unilateral uncertainty treaties become successful with positive probability in the signaling game, even under parameter conditions for which no agreement is reached under complete information. Under bilateral uncertainty, a separating equilibrium emerges where the leader participates in the treaty only when its environmental concerns are high. We show that the agreement is signed for larger sets of parameter values under unilateral uncertainty. We then show that further layers of uncertainty might enhance social welfare.Signaling games; Unilaterial uncertainty; Bilateral uncertainty; Non-binding negotiations
Can Incomplete Information Lead to Under-exploitation in the Commons
This paper analyzes the protection of a common pool resource (CPR) through the manage- ment of information. Speci?cally, we examine an entry deterrence model between an incumbent perfectly informed about the initial stock of a CPR and an uninformed potential entrant. In our model, the appropriation of the CPR by the incumbent reduces both players?future pro?ts from exploiting the resource. In the case of complete information, we show that the incumbent operating in a high-stock common pool overexploits the CPR during the ?rst period since it does not internalize the negative external e¤ect that its ?rst-period exploitation imposes on the en- trant?s future pro?ts. This ine¢ ciency, however, is absent when the common totally regenerates across periods. Under incomplete information, we identify an additional form of ine¢ ciency. In particular, the incumbent operating in a low-stock CPR underexploits the resource in order to signal the low available stock to potential entrants, deterring entry. When the common fully regenerates, we show that such underexploitation becomes more signi?cant since the low-stock incumbent aims to protect its larger monopoly pro?ts.Common Pool Resources; Signaling games; Externalities
The Informative Role of Subsidies
This paper investigates the effect of monopoly subsidies on entry deterrence. We consider a potential entrant who observes two signals: the subsidy set by the regulator and the output level produced by the incumbent firm. We show that not only an informative equilibrium can be supported, where information about the incumbent's costs is conveyed to the entrant, but also an uninformative equilibrium, where the actions of regulator and incumbent conceal the monopolist's type, thus deterring entry. While the regulator?s role can support entry-deterrence practices, we demonstrate that his presence is nonetheless welfare improving. Furthermore, we compare equilibrium welfare relative to two benchmarks: complete information environments, and standard entry-deterrence games where the regulator is absent.Entry deterrence; Signaling; Monopoly subsidies
Environmental Protection Agencies: Measuring the Welfare Benefits from Regulation under Different Information Contexts
This paper evaluates the welfare benefits of introducing environmental regulation in a market that is subject to the threat of entry. We consider complete and incomplete information settings, where potential entrants use the regulator’s tax policy and the incumbent’s output decisions in order to infer the incumbent’s cost structure. When the regulator is absent, we show that firms? entry-deterring practices increase pollution relative to complete information. Hence, under certain conditions, environmental regulation becomes more beneficial in incomplete than in complete information contexts. Our results, therefore, identify under which cases an under-or over-estimation of the welfare benefits of environmental regulation arises from ignoring the information setting in which firms interact. We also examine how this estimation error increases as firms become more symmetric in their production costs.Entry deterrence; Signaling; Emission fees; Welfare Benefits
When does Disinformation Promote Successful Treaties
This paper analyzes the negotiation of a non-binding treaty where agents are uninformed about each others?ability to comply with the terms of the agreement. We show that the presence of incomplete information allows the treaty to become successful under larger set of parameter conditions than under complete information. The paper also examines the welfare properties of our equilibrium results, showing a welfare improvement relative to complete information under certain conditions. Finally, we extend our analysis to settings where countries?types are correlated, ?nding that the equilibrium outcome where information is conveyed can be supported under larger conditions, whereas equilibria where information is concealed are sustained under a more restrictive set of parameter values.Signaling games; Information transmission; non-binding negotiations; Correlated types
The importance of foregone options
Recent experimental evidence supports the influence of a player's unchosen alternatives in other agent's actions. This paper examines a tractable theoretical model of reference-dependent preferences in which individuals compare other players'chosen action with respect to their un- chosen alternatives. We analyze the equilibrium prediction in complete information sequential- move games, and compare it with that of standard games where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., with strictly individualistic agents), our model predicts higher cooperation among the players than standard game-theoretic models. We apply our results in three economic contexts: the labor market gift exchange game, the ultimatum bargaining game, and the sequential public good game. Revised Feb. 2009Unchosen alternatives, Sequential-move games, Relative comparisons, Kindness, Reciprocity.
Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties
This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own noncompliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries’ probability to join the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries’ compliance, and decreasing in their own noncompliance costs. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all types of countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.Signaling games, environmental agreements, nonbinding negotiations, noncompliance cost
Commitment in Environmental Policy as an Entry-Deterrence Tool
This paper investigates under which conditions governments strategically commit to stringent environmental policies in order to protect domestic markets from entry. We compare social welfare under two policy regimes: a ?exible and in?exible environmental policy. We show that commitment becomes socially optimal when its associated welfare loss, due to a stringent fee across time, is smaller than its welfare gain, which arises from an improved environmental quality. Otherwise, the regulator optimally chooses a ?exible environmental policy which cannot credibly deter entry. In addition, we demonstrate that the incentives of the social planner and the incumbent fi?rm are not necessarily aligned regarding entry deterrence. In particular, under certain conditions the regulator ?nds socially optimal to practice entry deterrence whereas the incumbent would actually prefer entry.Entry deterrence, Emission fees, Perfect commitment