Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation Strategies and Multinational Financial Policy

Several investment-repatriation strategies are added to the standard model of a multinational in which an affiliate is located in a low-tax country and is limited to two alternatives: repatriating taxable dividends to the parent or investing in its own real operations. In our model, affiliates can invest in passive assets, which the parent can borrow against, or in related affiliates which can be used as vehicles for tax-favored repatriations. We show analytically how the availability of alternative strategies can effect real investment throughout the worldwide corporation. We use firm level data for U.S. multinationals to test for the importance of alternative strategies. The evidence is generally consistent with the theory, particularly the strategies using related affiliates.

The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies

Most studies of tax competition and the race to the bottom focus on potential host countries competing for mobile capital, neglecting the role of corporate tax planning and of home governments that facilitate this planning. This neglect in part reflects the narrow view frequently taken of the policy instruments that countries have available in tax competition. But high-tax host governments can, for example, permit income to be shifted out to tax havens as a way of attracting mobile companies. Home countries will cooperate in this shift if their companies’ gain is greater than any reduction in the domestic tax base. We use various types of U.S. data, including firm level tax files, to identify the role of the three parties (host governments, home governments and MNCs) in the evolution of tax burdens on U.S. companies abroad from 1992 to 2002. This period is of particular interest because the United States introduced regulations in 1997 that greatly simplified the use of more aggressive tax planning techniques. The evidence indicates that from 1992 to 1998 the decline in effective tax rates on U.S. companies was driven largely by host governments defending their market share. But after 1998, tax avoidance behavior seems much more important. One indication is that effective tax rates on U.S. companies had a much weaker link with local statutory tax rates. After 1997, the new regulations motivated a very large growth in intercompany payments and a parallel growth of holding company income abroad. We attempt to estimate how many of these payments were deductible in the host country, and conclude that by 2002 the companies were saving about $7.0 billion per year by using the more aggressive planning strategies. This amounts to about 4 percent of companies’ foreign direct investment income and about 15 percent of their foreign tax burden.

Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral

In this paper, I attempt to bring the debate over deferral up to date. The paper is divided into three sections. The first starts with a review of traditional models of international tax systems to provide a basic understanding of the efficiency consequences of deferral. This section then proceeds to evaluate some of the theoretical arguments for deferral that have appeared in the most recent economic literature. The second section provides a brief overview of current U.S. tax policy toward foreign source income. This review provides the background necessary to evaluate results from the empirical economic literature on the impact of taxes on multinational firms. The third section explores how firms' economic behavior is affected by the availability of deferral on active profits. Understanding the behavioral responses of firms to home and host country taxation is necessary to evaluate the efficiency and revenue aspects of changes to the current deferral regime. As in the first section, the focus is on the most recent evidence available in the economic literature

The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations

U.S. corporations owe taxes to the U.S. Treasury on income earned both inside and outside American borders. This paper examines the incentives created by the U.S. tax system for the legal avoidance of taxes on foreign source income. Using data from 1986 corporate tax returns, we investigate the extent to which U.S. corporations structure and coordinate remittances of income from their foreign subsidiaries to reduce their U.S. and foreign tax liabilities. In contrast to previous work in this area, our estimates of the tax consequences of income remittances from foreign subsidiaries to parent corporations explicitly take into account the ability to use foreign tax credits generated from one source of foreign income to offset the U.S. tax liability generated by other sources of foreign income, withholding tax rates on income remittances, variations in source country corporate income tax systems, and dynamic aspects of the U.S. tax system. Our findings indicate that U.S. multinationals are able to take advantage of the U.S. tax system to avoid paying much U.S. tax on their foreign source income.

The Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the Location of Assets in Financial Services Firms

This paper examines the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the international location decisions of U.S. financial services firms. The Act included rule changes that made it substantially more difficult for U.S. firms to defer U.S. taxes on overseas financial services income held in low-tax jurisdictions. These same rule changes were not applied to other forms of income; in particular, income generated from active manufacturing operations was still eligible for deferral after the Act. We use information from the tax returns of U.S. corporations to examine how local taxes affect the allocation of assets held abroad. We find that, before the Act, the location of assets in financial subsidiaries was responsive to differences in host country tax rates across jurisdictions. However, after the Act, differences in host country tax rates no longer explain the distribution of assets held in financial services subsidiaries abroad. In contrast, we find that assets held in manufacturing subsidiaries have become more sensitive to variations in tax rates. Our results suggest that the tightening of the anti-deferral provisions applicable to financial services companies has been successful in neutralizing the effect of host country income taxes on investment location decisions.

The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation

This study uses tax return data for U.S. nonfinancial corporations for the period 1971-82 to estimate the importance of restrictions on the ability of firms to use tax credits and to obtain refunds for tax losses. Our results suggest that the incidence of such unused tax benefits increased substantially during the early 1980s, though we do not find these increases attributable to increased investment incentives during that period. Using estimates of a three-state (taxable, not taxable, partially taxable) transition probability model, we calculate the effective tax rates on various types of investments undertaken by firms differing with respect to tax status. We confirm previous findings about the marginal tax rate on interest payments, and that it is important to distinguish current tax payments from marginal tax rates in estimating the incentive to invest.

The spillover effect of outward foreign direct investment on home countries: Evidence from the United States

Most studies of foreign direct investment (FDI) spillovers focus on externalities of inward FDI to host country firms. However, spillovers may also be generated from outward FDI and flow to home country firms. We test for the presence of spillovers from U.S. multinational corporations to domestic U.S. firms in the same industry, downstream industries and upstream industries using firm level information from Standard and Poor's Compustat data and industry level data on U.S. outward FDI from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. We find evidence of positive and significant spillovers flowing from multinational customers to their domestic suppliers. This is consistent with most previous studies of spillovers from inward FDI and may suggest a role for domestic policies that subsidize outward FDI. We also find that the presence of beneficial spillovers depends on several firm characteristics including exporting status, size and absorptive capacity

Tax Policy and the Dynamic Demand for Domestic and Foreign Capital by Multinational Corporations

The extent to which domestic and foreign operations of multinational corporations (MNCs) are related has important implications for the analysis of investment demand and its responsiveness to tax policy. We estimate the structural parameters of a model in which domestic and foreign investment interact in two important ways. First, the MNC's production technology allows the marginal products of domestic and foreign capital to be interdependent. Second, the marginal adjustment costs of investment in one locaton may be affected by investment in other locations. We estimate the model using firm-level panel data from Canadian MNCs that invest solely in the United States. Our estimtes support the view that production and adjustment cost technologies are related. We find that domestic and foreign capital are greater than unit elastic substitutes and that investment in one location lowers the marginal adjustment cost of investment in the other location. We use our parameter estimates to simulate the effect of various tax policies on the growth of parent and affiliate capital stocks. The simulations demonstrate that allowing for interdependent capital demand across locations has important implications for the analysis of tax policy towards MNCs

The three parties in the race to the bottom: host governments, home governments and multinational companies

Most studies of tax competition and the race to the bottom focus on potential host countries competing for mobile capital, neglecting the role of corporate tax planning and of home governments that facilitate this planning. This neglect in part reflects the narrow view frequently taken of the policy instruments that countries have available in tax competition. For example, high-tax host governments can permit income to be shifted out to tax havens as a way of attracting mobile companies. Home countries will cooperate in this shift if they think the benefit to their companies is greater than any reduction in the domestic tax base. We use various types of U.S. data, including firm level tax files, to identify the role of the three parties (host governments, home governments and MNCs) in the evolution of tax burdens on U.S. companies abroad from1992 to 2002. This period is of particular interest because the United States introduced regulations in 1997 that greatly simplified the use of more aggressive tax planning techniques. The evidence indicates that from 1992 to 1998 the decline in effective tax rates on U.S. companies was driven largely by host governments defending their market share. But after 1998, tax avoidance behavior seems much more important. Effective tax rates on U.S. companies had a much weaker link with local statutory tax rates. Furthermore, the disparity in the reported profitability of subsidiaries in high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions grew substantially. After 1997, there was a very large growth in intercompany payments and a parallel growth of holding company income. We attempt to estimate how much of these payments were deductible in the host country, and conclude that by 2002 the companies were saving about $7.0 billion per year by using the more aggressive planning strategies. This amounts to about 4 percent of foreign direct investment income and about 15 percent of their foreign tax burden