Assessing Photovoltaic Solar Technologies as a Solution for the Problem of Power Shortage in Iraq

In a developing country like Iraq, where the infrastructure of the electricity public sector (production, transportation, and distribution) has suffered for a long time from the direct effects of successive wars; lack of technocracy; bureaucracy; neglect; massive corruption; and much more, have all contributed to the failure of this sector. Indeed, the electricity sector in Iraq has not been developed for more than forty years; or even properly rehabilitated and/or maintained its facilities, which has led to a huge gap between the demand and supply (demand is double than the supply). It is obvious that the alternative solutions that have been proposed and implemented since 2003 have not become a solution that could fill even a small portion of the gap. In this paper, a proposed solution that seemingly has never been given a chance to be put on the table by both private and public sectors will be discussed. An assessment for photovoltaic solar panels technologies as an effective, viable, and quick solution for the infrastructure and demand problem was conducted using the Hierarchical Decision Model (HDM) as a methodology to assess the most efficient, and affordable candidate technologies relevant to all the valid perspectives and criteria

Achieving High Reliability Organizations Using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps - the Case of Offshore Oil and Gas

The safety culture of so-called high-reliability organizations (HROs) encompasses values, routines, and work processes that allow an organization to prevent mistakes and quickly bounce back if unexpected events occur. It is said to provide a model for improving organizational resilience in the offshore oil and gas industry, where small errors can grow into accidents with devastating environmental, social, and economic impacts. To date, such a transfer of successful practices is impeded by a lack of system perspective that would allow researchers and practitioners to fully understand the safety dynamics in HROs, adjust them to the unique setting of offshore oil and gas, plan safety interventions, and anticipate the direct and indirect effects of these interventions. In this dissertation, I developed and rigorously tested a model of how safety interventions impact interdependent aspects of HROs\u27 characteristics, based on peer-reviewed research, an industry workshop, and a survey of offshore oil and gas industry practitioners. This approach combines the qualitative research method of Thematic Analysis (TA), Thematic Network (TN), Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) modeling and simulation, and Exploratory Modelling and Analysis (EMA). Furthermore, I developed thematic proximity as a measure for determining edges\u27 weights in FCMs that are based on research texts, thus reducing the need for including subject matter experts in modeling studies. This work makes several contributions: on a theoretical level, it shows the inherent dynamics of HROs and points to several limitations in existing High Reliability Organizations Theory (HROT) as well as uncertainties regarding the efficacy of some safety interventions. On a practical level, it provides a planning tool for safety decision-makers that can also serve as the foundation of future safety culture training. Finally, it makes several contributions to FCM methodology, namely a model architecture that combines knowledge from the literature with that of human experts, the introduction of thematic proximity coefficient, and the adaptation of model testing strategies from the literature on Systems Dynamics

Listening to the Well, Listening to Each Other, and Listening to the Silence-New Safety Lessons from Deepwater Horizon Comment

It is common for accident reports and the analysis of large-scale disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout, to point to communication failures. This narrow explanation implicitly assumes that accidents could be prevented if employees spoke up about safety. In contrast, the first author of this paper, whose professional experience is introduced in this Commentary to provide context, has frequently observed that there are, in fact, many cases when employees speak up but are not listened to. These patterns of communication (or lack thereof) occur at the intersection of personal, leadership, and organizational factors, which jointly affect how safety issues are recognized, communicated, and addressed. As such, communication problems are at “the tip of the iceberg” of safety problems, not at their root. In this paper, we review research on high-reliability organizations (HROs) with excellent safety records to identify their communication patterns and practices and how they contribute to the ability to enact five principles of HROs: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, deference to expertise, commitment to resilience, and sensitivity to operations. We then apply this lens to investigate the Deepwater Horizon disaster, based on court documents, expert reports, and personal interviews. Specifically, we investigate how the communication patterns between the onshore experts and the offshore crews compared to the recommendations of HRO theory and how existing discrepancies might help explain the accident. We found that many employees were aware of safety issues and communicated concerns openly, but there was little organizational response to the issues they raised. This failure to listen was largely owed to factors that were not directly related to communication, such as time pressure and lack of resources, and a culture that valued a “can do attitude” and getting things done so much that it got in the way of sensitivity to operations, expert-based guidance, and communication about problems. Moreover, the challenges of the project and its aggressive timeline created an extreme, almost toxic, commitment to resilience. Based on these findings, we discuss recommendations for improving safety in offshore oil and gas production