Generalized stochastic differential utility and preference for information

This paper develops, in a Brownian information setting, an approach for analyzing the preference for information, a question that motivates the stochastic differential utility (SDU) due to Duffie and Epstein [Econometrica 60 (1992) 353-394]. For a class of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) including the generalized SDU [Lazrak and Quenez Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 154-180], we formulate the information neutrality property as an invariance principle when the filtration is coarser (or finer) and characterize it. We also provide concrete examples of heterogeneity in information that illustrate explicitly the nonneutrality property for some GSDUs. Our results suggest that, within the GSDUs class of intertemporal utilities, risk aversion or ambiguity aversion are inflexibly linked to the preference for information.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/105051604000000756 in the Annals of Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Efficient Consumption Set Under Recursive Utility and Unknown Beliefs

In a context of complete financial markets where asset prices follow Ito's processes, we characterize the set of consumption processes which are optimal for a given stochastic differential utility (e.g. Duffie and Epstein (1992)) when beliefs are unknown. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of a consumption process, consists of the existence of a solution to a quadratic backward stochastic differential equation and a martingale condition. We study the efficiency condition in the case of a class of homothetic stochastic differential utilities and derive some results for those particular cases. In a Markovian context, this efficiency condition becomes a partial differential equation.recursive utility; quadradtic backward stochastic differential equations; beliefs; martingale condition

Dynamic choices of hyperbolic consumers: the continuous time case.

This paper characterizes the set of differentiable subgame perfect equilibria in a continuous time intertemporal decision optimization problem with non-constant discounting. The idea of an infinitesimal self is formalized and the equilibrium characterization takes the form of an integral equation (IE) which is reminiscent of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Beginning with a local existence proof of IE, we analyze some equilibria of the consumption saving problem. We then use the equation IE to suggest a critical indeterminacy in the Ramsey growth model with non-constant discountingHyperbolic discount, consumption saving decision, growth theory

Leverage Choice and Credit Spread Dynamics when Managers Risk Shift

We develop a structural model of the leverage choices of risk-averse managers who are compensated with cash and stock. We further characterize credit spread dynamics over the life of the debt. Managers optimally balance the tax benefits of debt with the utility cost that results from their ex-post asset substitution choices. Our model predicts the existence of a U-shaped relationship between the cash component of pay and leverage levels: when cash compensation is low, safe debt with a high face value is issued and when cash compensation is high, risky debt with a high face value is issued. At moderate levels of the cash-to-stock value ratio low leverage is chosen but credit spreads can be significant and again relate to compensation terms. The model illustrates the quantitative importance of including agency costs in the tradeoff theory of capital structureCredit Spreads, Capital Structure, Agency Costs of Debt

Democratic Policy Decisions with Decentralized Promises Contingent on Vote Outcome

We study pre-vote interactions in a committee that enacts a welfare-improving reform through voting. Committee members use decentralized promises contingent on the reform enactment to influence the vote outcome. Equilibrium promises prevent beneficial coalitional deviations and minimize total promises. We show that multiple equilibria exist, involving promises from high- to low-intensity members to enact the reform. Promises dissuade reform opponents from enticing the least enthusiastic reform supporters to vote against the reform. We explore whether some recipients of the promises can be supporters of the reform and discuss the impact of polarization on the total promises

Present-Biased Lobbyists in Linear Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games

We investigate a linear quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind turbine farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount performance with a non-constant rate. Our objective is to identify a consistent planning equilibrium in which the players are aware of their inconsistency and cannot commit to a lobbying policy. We analyze the equilibrium behavior in both single player and two-player cases, and compare the behavior of the game under constant and non-constant discount rates. The equilibrium behavior is provided in closed-loop form, either analytically or via numerical approximation. Our numerical analysis of the equilibrium reveals that strategic behavior leads to more intense lobbying without resulting in overshooting

Generalized stochastic differential utility and preference for information

This paper develops, in a Brownian information setting, an approach for analyzing the preference for information, a question that motivates the stochastic differential utility (SDU) due to Duffie and Epstein [Econometrica 60 (1992) 353-394]. For a class of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) including the generalized SDU [Lazrak and Quenez Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 154-180], we formulate the information neutrality property as an invariance principle when the filtration is coarser (or finer) and characterize it. We also provide concrete examples of heterogeneity in information that illustrate explicitly the nonneutrality property for some GSDUs. Our results suggest that, within the GSDUs class of intertemporal utilities, risk aversion or ambiguity aversion are inflexibly linked to the preference for information.