Children’s Schooling and Parents’ Investment in Children: Evidence from the Head Start Impact Study

Parents may have important effects on their children, but little work in economics explores whether children's schooling opportunities crowd out or encourage parents' investment in children. We analyze data from the Head Start Impact Study, which granted randomly-chosen preschool-aged children the opportunity to attend Head Start. We find that Head Start causes a substantial increase in parents' involvement with their children—such as time spent reading to children, math activities, or days spent with children by fathers who do not live with their children—both during and after the period when their children are potentially enrolled in Head Start. We discuss a variety of mechanisms that are consistent with our findings, including a simple model we present in which Head Start impacts parent involvement in part because parents perceive their involvement to be complementary with child schooling in the production of child qualities.

Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence

This paper examines behavior in a tournament in which we vary the tournament prize structure and the information available about participants' skill at the task of solving mazes. The number of solved mazes is lowest when payments are independent of performance; higher when a single, large prize is given; and highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given. This result is strongest when we inform participants about the number of mazes they and others solved in a pre-tournament round. Some participants reported that they solved more mazes than they actually solved, and this misreporting also peaked with multiple differentiated prizes.Tournaments; Wage Structure

Taxation and the Earnings of Husbands and Wives: Evidence From Sweden

I examine the response of husbands\u27 and wives\u27 earnings to a tax reform in which husbands\u27 and wives\u27 tax rates changed independently, allowing me to examine the effect of both spouses\u27 incentives on each spouse\u27s behavior. I analyze the large Swedish tax reform of 1990–1991 and find that in response to a compensated fall in one spouse\u27s tax rate, each spouse\u27s earnings rise. I compare these results to those of simplified econometric models used in the typical setting in which independent variation in each spouse\u27s tax rate is unavailable. I find that standard econometric specifications may produce substantially biased estimates

Changes in the Incidence and Duration of Periods Without Insurance

BACKGROUND: Policymakers have recently proposed ways of providing health care coverage for an increased number of uninsured persons. However, there are few data that show how the incidence and duration of periods in which persons do not have insurance have changed over time. METHODS: We used two data sets from the Survey of Income and Program Participation of the U.S. Census Bureau: one that covered the period from 1983 through 1986 (25,946 persons), and another that covered the period from 2001 through 2004 (40,282 persons). For each set of years, we estimated the probability that a person would be uninsured for some period of time and the probability that a person would subsequently obtain private or public insurance. We also estimated the probabilities that persons in various demographic groups would become uninsured over the course of a year and would remain uninsured for various amounts of time. RESULTS: The percentage of the population that lost insurance in a 12-month period increased from 19.8% in 1983-1986 to 21.8% in 2001-2004 (P=0.04). The percentage that was uninsured for a period of time increased markedly among persons with the lowest educational level and predominantly represented loss of private coverage. The percentage of new uninsured periods that ended within 24 months increased from 73.8% to 79.7% between the two study periods (P<0.001); increases were seen in all age groups and among persons of all educational levels. Transition from no insurance to private insurance decreased from 65.2% to 59.2% (P<0.001). Transition from no insurance to public insurance increased from 8.7% to 20.4% (P<0.001). CONCLUSIONS: As compared with the years from 1983 through 1986, from 2001 through 2004, more people, particularly those with the lowest educational level, had periods in which they were not insured. The periods without insurance were shorter in 2001-2004 than they were in 1983-1986, since an increase in transitions to public coverage offset a reduction in transitions to private coverage. Our results portend difficulties if private coverage continues to decline and is not offset by further expansions of public insurance.Economic

Children’s Schooling and Parents’ Behavior: Evidence From the Head Start Impact Study

Parents may have important effects on their children, but little work in economics explores whether children\u27s schooling opportunities crowd out or encourage parents\u27 investment in children. We analyze data from the Head Start Impact Study, which granted randomly chosen preschool-aged children the opportunity to attend Head Start. We find that Head Start causes a substantial increase in parents\u27 involvement with their children—such as time spent reading to children, math activities, or days spent with children by fathers who do not live with their children—both during and after the period when their children are potentially enrolled in Head Start

Changes in the Incidence and Duration of Periods Without Insurance

BACKGROUND Policymakers have recently proposed ways of providing health care coverage for an increased number of uninsured persons. However, there are few data that show how the incidence and duration of periods in which persons do not have insurance have changed over time. METHODS We used two data sets from the Survey of Income and Program Participation of the U.S. Census Bureau: one that covered the period from 1983 through 1986 (25,946 persons), and another that covered the period from 2001 through 2004 (40,282 persons). For each set of years, we estimated the probability that a person would be uninsured for some period of time and the probability that a person would subsequently obtain private or public insurance. We also estimated the probabilities that persons in various demographic groups would become uninsured over the course of a year and would remain uninsured for various amounts of time. RESULTS The percentage of the population that lost insurance in a 12-month period increased from 19.8% in 1983–1986 to 21.8% in 2001–2004 (P=0.04). The percentage that was uninsured for a period of time increased markedly among persons with the lowest educational level and predominantly represented loss of private coverage. The percentage of new uninsured periods that ended within 24 months increased from 73.8% to 79.7% between the two study periods (P\u3c0.001); increases were seen in all age groups and among persons of all educational levels. Transition from no insurance to private insurance decreased from 65.2% to 59.2% (P\u3c0.001). Transition from no insurance to public insurance increased from 8.7% to 20.4% (P\u3c0.001). CONCLUSIONS As compared with the years from 1983 through 1986, from 2001 through 2004, more people, particularly those with the lowest educational level, had periods in which they were not insured. The periods without insurance were shorter in 2001–2004 than they were in 1983–1986, since an increase in transitions to public coverage offset a reduction in transitions to private coverage. Our results portend difficulties if private coverage continues to decline and is not offset by further expansions of public insurance

How do 401(k)s Affect Saving? Evidence from Changes in 401(k) Eligibility

This paper investigates the effect of 401(k) eligibility on saving. To address the possibility that eligibility correlates across individuals with their unobserved tastes for saving, I examine a change in eligibility: some individuals are initially ineligible for their 401(k) but become eligible when they have worked at their firm long enough. I find that eligibility raises 401(k) balances, but I find no evidence that other financial assets decrease. I also find no evidence that intertemporal substitution drives increases in saving following eligibility. In response to eligibility, IRA assets increase, consistent with a “crowd-in” hypothesis, and accumulation of cars decreases

Taxes and Time Allocation: Evidence from Single Women

Hundreds of papers have investigated how incentives and policies affect hours worked in the market. This paper examines how income taxes affect time allocation in the other two-thirds of the day. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1975 to 2004, we analyze the response of single women's housework, labor supply, and other time to variation in tax and transfer schedules across income levels, number of children, states, and time. We find that when the economic reward to participating in the labor force increases, market work increases and housework decreases, with the decrease in housework accounting for approximately two-thirds of the increase in market work. Analysis of repeated cross-sections of time diary data from 1975 to 2004 shows that changes in "home production" account for at least half of the increase in market hours of work in response to policy changes. Data on expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey from 1980 to 2003 show some evidence that expenditures on market goods likely to substitute for housework increase in response to a greater incentive to join the labor force. The baseline estimates imply that the elasticity of substitution between consumption of home and market goods is 2.43. The results are consistent with the classic time allocation model of Becker (1965).

Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence

This paper examines behavior in a tournament in which we vary the tournament prize structure and the available information about participants’ skill at the task of solving mazes. The number of solved mazes is lowest when payments are independent of performance; higher when a single, large prize is given; and highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given. This result is strongest when we inform participants about the number of mazes they and others solved in a pre-tournament round. Some participants reported that they solved more mazes than they actually solved, and this misreporting also peaked with multiple differentiated prizes.Economic