5 research outputs found
The Korean Constitutional Court and Countermajoritarian Difficulty under the Roh Moo Hyun Administration: Analysis on Judicial Nullification Cases in Major Policy Issues
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λ²λΆ κ°νμ νλ²μ¬νμ λ μ μ€μ΄λΌλ μ λμ νλ‘ μμλμλ€. μ μλ λ―Όμ£Όμ£Όμμ κ°νλΌλ©΄ νμλ νμ μ£Όμμ κ°νμλ€. νκ΅λ―Όμ£Όμ£Όμλ μ΄ν μ¬λ²λΆμ λ
λ¦½μ± μ¦λμ μ μΉμ μ¬λ²νλ₯Ό κ²½ννκ² λμκ³ νΉν νλ²μ¬νμ μν μ μμ Β·μ§μ ν½μ°½μ μ§λ©΄νκ² λμλ€. λ°λΌμ μꡬ민주주μμμ μ ν΅μ μΌλ‘ λλλμ΄μ¨ μ¬λ²λΆμ λ°λ€μμ λ¬Έμ (countermajoritarian difficulty)κ° νκ΅μ μΉμμ
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μ΄μμ λν νμ¬μ μνκ²°μ μ μ΄ν΄λ³Έλ€. κ·Έ κ²°κ³Ό μ€μ°¨λν μ΄μμ μ¬λ²νκ° μ΄λ£¨μ΄μ‘μ§λ§ νμ¬ κ²°μ μ μ€μ§μ λ°λ€μμ μ΄ μλμλ€. λμμ ν©μ λ° λμνμ± λΆμ¬μ λ―Όμ£Όμ£Όμκ° μ μμ μμΉλ‘ νμ¬λ₯Ό μμ£Ό μ΄μ²νμλ λ°, μ΄λ° μν©μ μ§μμ λ§μΉ¨λ΄ λ°λ€μμ κ²°μ κ³Ό μ μμ μ¬λ²λΆλ₯Ό μΌκΈ°ν μλ μμ κ²μ΄λ€. κ²°κ΅ μ§κΈκΉμ§μ λ
Όμλ μ’μ λ―Όμ£Όμ£Όμκ° μ’μ νμ μ£Όμλ₯Ό κ°λ₯νκ² νλ€λ κ²μ κ°λ¦¬ν€κ³ μλ κ²μΌλ‘ 보μΈλ€.
After the democratization in South Korea in 1987, the new Constitution was adopted which introduced the direct presidential election system with a more powerful legislature and new constitutional review system. As the Korean Constitutional Court gained more independence and started to deal with essential political issues, it grew to be an important political actor. Accordingly, the matter of countermajoritarian ifficulty, which has always been important in the U.S. politics, has also become very critical in Korea. Therefore this paper aims to empirically analyze this matter in Korean context. First, I reviewed various related arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court. Then, I analyzed the matter of countermajoritarian difficulty in the Korean Constitutional Court under the Roh Moo Hyun administration based on the concept of law-making majority of Dahl. In conclusion, the Korean Constitutional Courts decisions on major issues were not against a determined and persistent law making majority but against a unstable and transient majority. Also, the frequent invitation of Judiciary to the imperial status will possibly cause countermajoritarian difficulty and an imperial judiciary in the future. This implies that a better constitutionalism ultimately needs a better democracy
μΉνλ κΈ°λ°μ μ λ ₯ μ μ½ νλ‘ν μ½
Thesis(master`s)--μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ :μ κΈ°Β·μ»΄ν¨ν° 곡νλΆ,2005.Maste