12 research outputs found
γμμΈλνκ΅ ζ³εΈγ 50λ μ νκ³ : μλ²ν λΆμΌ
λ€λ₯Έ λΆμΌλ λ§μ°¬κ°μ§μ΄κ² μΌλ, μ§λ 50λ
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μμμμ ultra vires μ΄λ‘ {μλκ° κ΅μ(μ΄ν μ μλ€μ μ§ν¨μ μλ΅ν¨), 1959}μ΄
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θεΈζθ³θ μ ζ³η ζζΏμ κ·Έ ιη : ηΎε η§ηθεΈθ¨΄θ¨ζΉι©ζ³ (PSLTRA of 1995)μ δΈεΏμΌλ‘
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Όλ¬Έ(μμ¬)--μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ :λ²νκ³Ό μμ¬λ²μ 곡,1998.Maste
(A)Study of the comprehensive exchange and the comprehensive share transfer under the Korean commercial code
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Όλ¬Έ(λ°μ¬)--μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ :λ²νκ³Ό μλ²μ 곡,2002.Docto
EU`s 13th Directive on Takeover Bids and Its Implications
In April 21, 2004, after 20-year-long negotiations and debates, the Council of
the European Union passed the 13th Directive on Takeover Bid (the Directive).
Aiming to encourage corporate restructuring and takeover activities, the Directive
adopted several controversial devices associated with takeover bid: mandatory bid;
board neutrality; breakthrough rule (BTR); optionality right of Member State;
reciprocity.
This paper analyses the effects of three major provisions of the Directive. First
of all, the mandatory bid rule requires acquirer to offer minority shareholders of
the target company the same price as has been offered to controlling shareholders,
thereby protecting minorities. This rule has two-fold chilling effect: it
would effectively prevent value-decreasing acquisition, discouraging incompetent
purchaser from buying the target; it might also prevent value-increasing acquisition,
imposing additional burden even on competent purchaser.
Secondly, the BTR allows the offeror to break through any restrictions on
voting and/or transfer over target shares, provided that she successfully obtains
75% cash-flow rights in the tender offer. BTR is expected to reduce the agency
cost from separation of cash-flow rights and voting rights. In terms of hostile
takeover activities, BTR has opposite effect to mandatory bid rule: BTR is
supposed to boost hostile takeover, while mandatory bid rule has chilling effect.
This paper shows how these two contradicting aspects would work in the future.
According to the economic analysis, the BTR might erode the protection for
minorities by mandatory bid rule.μ΄ λ
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