최고경영자 연간 성과급 계약에 관한 연구

학위논문 (박사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 경영대학 경영학과, 2017. 8. 신재용.My dissertation examines the determinants on the target setting of executive annual bonus contracts. Prior research in managerial accounting has documented that external information, such as peer performance, is typically used in target setting. However, there is only limited evidence of what specific information is actually used in this process. My first essay examines how analysts annual earnings forecasts influence target setting for executives bonus contracts. I provide novel evidence that analyst forecasts are positively associated with firms bonus target revisions. Furthermore, the use of analyst forecasts in target setting is less pronounced when the forecasts are noisier, and it is more prominent when analysts have an informational advantage over managers. I find that target ratcheting is attenuated for favorable performance and becomes severe for unfavorable performance when past performance is greater than analyst forecasts. Finally, the results from additional analyses are not consistent with alternative explanations that both bonus target revisions and analyst forecasts are influenced by internal planning information or that analyst forecasts are influenced by bonus target revisions (i.e., reverse causality). Recent studies have suggested that annual bonus has an incentive effect comparable to stock compensation (Frydman and Jenter 2010Jensen and Murphy 2011Guay, Kepler, and Tsui 2016). However, only a limited number of papers have addressed annual bonuses. The aim of my second essay is 1) to overview the comprehensive landscape of executive bonus plans 2) and to investigate the determinants of pay-for-performance sensitivity (hereafter, PPS) and the convexity of annual incentives. I find that the 80/120% rule for target setting holds on average, with differences across industries. I also show that firms growth options are one of the key elements in determining bonus PPS and the convexity of bonus payouts after controlling for peer information and other economic factors.Essay I. The Use of Analyst Forecasts in the Target Setting of Executive Annual Bonus Contracts 1 I. Introduction 2 II. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 14 III. Sample and Research Design 27 3.1.Sample 27 3.2.Research Design 28 IV. Descriptive Statistics 31 V. Empirical Results 33 5.1. Do Boards Incorporate Analyst Forecasts in the Target Setting of Their Executive Annual Bonus Contracts (H1)? 33 5.2. The Effects of Noise in Analyst Forecasts and Analysts Information Advantage Over Management on the Use of Analyst Forecasts in Target Setting (H2 and H3) 36 5.3. The Use of External Benchmark information on the Magnitude of Target Ratcheting (H4) 39 VI. Additional Analyses 40 6.1. Comparing the Relative Importance of Analyst Forecasts versus Management Forecasts in Target Setting 40 6.2. Potential Reverse Causality: Analyst Forecast Revisions Around the Approval Date of the Annual Bonus Plan 46 6.3. Time-series Analysis 47 6.4. Alternative Growth Proxies 478 VII. Conclusion 49 Appendix A.2014 Proxy Statement of Biogen Inc 51 Appendix B.2014 Proxy Statement of El Paso Electronic Company 52 Appendix C.Variable Definitions 53 Reference 56 Essay II. The Structure of CEO Bonus Contracts 75 I. Introduction 76 II. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 80 2.1. Annual Bonus Contracts 80 2.2. Pay for Performance Sensitivity 82 2.3. Pay Convexity 88 III. Research Design and Sample 91 3.1. Research Design 91 3.2. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 96 IV. Empirical Results 97 V. Conclusion 104 Appendix A. 2014 Proxy Statement of El Paso Electronic Company 105 Appendix B. The example of Estimating Bonus Pay-for-performance Sensitivity using data from Monsanto Company 106 Appendix C. Variable Definitions 107 Reference 109Docto

경영자의 보상구조가 CSR 공시에 미치는 영향

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경영학과 회계학 전공, 2013. 2. 곽수근.The determinants of CSR disclosure are not yet studied much. In this research, using traditional voluntary disclosure studies framework, I connect CEO compensation structure with CSR disclosure. I find that if CEOs stock compensation and debt compensation become higher, the firm discloses CSR report more frequently. These results are robust if I replace the level of CEO stock and debt compensation with relative ratio of CEOs stock and debt compensation in total compensation or log value of CEOs stock and debt compensation. Furthermore, although the founder CEO does not issue CSR disclosure frequently(Chen et al. 2008), if the founder CEO receives much stock compensation, the probability to issue CSR report increases.1. Introduction 4 2. Hypothesis Development 6 2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 6 2.2 The Effect of CEO compensation structure on CSR disclosure 8 2.3 The CSR disclosure decision of founder CEO 12 2.4 The effect of founder CEO compensation structure on CSR disclosure 13 3. Sample and Research Design 14 3.1 Data and Sample selection 14 3.2 Research Design 14 4. Results 18 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 18 4.2 The effect of CEO compensation structure on CSR disclosure 20 4.3 The effect of CEO compensation structure on Founder CEOs disclosure decision 21 4.4 Additional Analysis 22 5. Conclusion 23 Reference 25 TABLE 1The indicators of GRI report 29 TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 30 TABLE 3 Pearson Correlation Matrix 33 TABLE 4 The effect of CEO compensation on CSR disclosure(Level) 34 TABLE 5 The Effect of founder CEOs compensation on disclosure decision 35 TABLE 6 The effect of CEO compensation on CSR disclosure(Ratio) 37 TABLE 7 The effect of CEO compensation on CSR disclosure(Log) 38Maste

A comparison between Korea and Japan regarding how to determine the number of new CPAs: Focused on the pre-determination system

한국은 공인회계사 선발인원을 관리하기 위해 최소선발예정인원을 정부가 사전에 결정하여 공표한다. 최근 정부는 최소선발예정인원을 증원하였는데, 이를 계기로 회계사업계와 학계에서 찬반논란이 계속되고 있다. 본 연구는 한국과 일본의 공인회계사 선발인원 관리방식을 알아보고 다음과 같은 시사점을 도출하였다. 첫째, 최소선발예정인원 사전결정제도는 정부가 선발인원을 사전에 임의로 결정한다는 점에서, 공인회계사 공급이 시장원리에 어긋나거나 때로는 시장교란을 초래할 위험이 있을 수 있다. 둘째, 정부는 높은 수준의 목표치를 맞추기 위해 선발인원을 결정해왔으므로, 지난 20년간 공인회계사 공급확대정책이 추진되었다고 할 수 있다. 정부의 당초 정책목표였던 선진국 수준으로 공인회계사 수 증대, 공인회계사의 일반기업 진출, 회계산업의 경쟁 유도 등을 분석한 결과, 현재 상당부분 달성된 것으로 나타났다. 반면 공인회계사시험 응시인원이 크게 감소하고 회계법인 인력구성에서 숙련된 회계사가 부족한 현상이 나타나, 공인회계사로 인재유입이 줄고 인재유출이 늘어났다고 할 수 있다. 따라서 공인회계사 공급확대정책을 계속할 것인지 타당성을 검토할 필요가 있어 보인다. 셋째, 일본은 공인회계사 선발인원을 사전에 결정하는 절차가 없고 대신 응시인원을 관리하고 있다. 응시인원 관리는 회계감사환경을 향상시킴으로써 인재유입을 유도하는 것이어서, 시장원리에 부합하여 회계산업 발전에 보다 크게 기여할 수 있을 것이다. 넷째, 일본은 회계전문인력을 회계감사인력과 기업회계전문가로 이원화하여 사고하고, 현행 공인회계사 자격제도를 일부 보완하여 두 종류의 인력을 모두 양성할 수 있는 절충안을 마련한 바 있다. 일본의 응시인원 관리와 회계전문인력 이원화는 한국도 참고해볼 만하다. 한국의 공인회계사 선발인원 관리방식이 우수인재 유치와 회계산업 발전에 기여할 수 있도록 끊임없는 개선이 모색되기를 기대한다.N