Optimal Contract Length for Voluntary Land Conservation Programs

In many parts of the world, deteriorating environmental conditions have led policy makers to develop policies and programs aimed at promoting conservation practices on lands devoted to agriculture. Such programs have been studied by environmental economists, but little research has been done on the usefulness of strategically varying the conservation contract's length. This paper uses theory and simulation to investigate the optimal contract length of land conservation programs when a policy maker tries to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of environmental benefits from the program. We find that contract length should vary with characteristics of the ecological processes that yield benefits from land retirement. Optimal contracts are longer when the environmental benefits in question things like woodland biodiversity take time to develop. However, it is not typically optimal to have the indefinitelylived contracts favored by some conservation groups, or even to offer contracts as long as the maturation period for the environmental services in question. In general, the optimal contract length depends on the trade off between an ecological effect (increasing the environmental benefits from one farmer) and an enrollment effect (increasing the number of farmers enrolled). Our findings also suggest that non-ecological regional characteristics (such as turnover rate and average farm income) could play an important role in the design of conservation programs.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Internal Finance and Growth: Microeconometric Evidence on Chinese Firms

Using a panel of 79,841 Chinese firms over the period 2000-2007, we examine the extent to which liquidity constraints affect firms. assets growth. We find that state owned enterprises are not affected, while the availability of internal finance represents a binding constraint for the growth of private firms, especially those operating in coastal regions, with negligible foreign ownership. Thanks to their high productivity, cash flow is, however, so abundant for these firms that they are able to grow at a very fast rate, despite being discriminated against by financial institutions. Hence, well developed external capital markets may not always be needed for fast economic growth.Assets growth, Cash flow, Financial constraints.

Internal Finance and Growth: Microeconometric Evidence on Chinese Firms

Does the availability of internal finance constrain firm growth? Or does it foster it? To answer these questions, we use a panel of 407,096 Chinese firms over the period 2000-2005. We estimate dynamic assets growth equations augmented with cash flow, and find that the growth of state owned enterprises is not affected by cash flow, while that of privately owned firms is most affected. Considering that they represent 62% of the observations in our sample and that, in spite of being typically discriminated against by financial institutions, private firms have experienced sensational growth rates, our results suggest that internal finance has fostered rather than constrained their growth.Assets growth, Cash flow, Financial constraints.

Internal Finance and Growth: Microeconometric Evidence on Chinese Firms

Does the availability of internal finance constrain firm growth? Or does it foster it? To answer these questions, we use a panel of 407,096 Chinese firms over the period 2000−2005. We estimate dynamic assets growth equations augmented with cash flow, and find that the growth of state owned enterprises is not affected by cash flow, while that of privately owned firms is most affected. Considering that they represent 62% of the observations in our sample and that, in spite of being typically discriminated against by financial institutions, private firms have experienced sensational growth rates, our results suggest that internal finance has fostered rather than constrained their growth.assets growth, cash flow, financial constraints