Are computers going to solve urban problems? On ICTs and social inclusion

In this paper, it is argued that large cities can benefit from higher levels of ICT (information and communication technology) adoption among the population. An analytical framework is developed, that enables the analysis, assessment and comparison of urban ICT adoption stimulation policies. In the empirical part, the frame is applied to four types of ICT adoption policies that are pursued in different European cities: The Hague, Eindhoven, Helsinki, and Manchester. It is concluded that adoption policies can be justified for a number of reasons, and may contribute to urban development in several respects. However, in many cases, policies lack effectiveness, because crucial factors that determine ICT adoption are not taken into account. Also, in too many cases, public policies interfere with market initiatives. On the basis of the case studies, the conclusion is drawn that the most effective policies are not only problem driven but also opportunity-based and integrative. That includes infrastructure provision, content development and resource building among low-adoptive groups.

Group Formation in a Public Good Experiment. On The Dynamics of Social Ties Structures

Economic behavior often takes place in groups of small numbers of people interacting with each other (like work teams, neighborhoods, social networks, etc.). Characteristic of such interaction is the development of (affective) interpersonal relationships, or social ties. According to sociologists, the embeddedness of economic behavior in networks of social ties has a profound impact on economic performance. Although, in economics, there is a growing awareness of the significance of social factors, the study of social dynamics is still in its infancy. In this paper we investigate experimentally the development of social ties structures, and thereby the formation of informal groups, through economic interaction in a public good environment. It turns out that complicated dynamics arise from individual differences in social value orientation and (affective) response patterns. Our findings point at the importance of leadership in controlling and channeling emotions and sentiments to build effective groups, like teams or communities. This leads to a different perspective on management than the one provided by standard agency theory.

Input Versus Output Taxation in an Experimental International Economy

This paper is concerned with a policy oriented macroeconomic experiment involving an ‘international’ economy with a relatively small ‘home’ country and a large ‘foreign’ country. It compares the economic performance of two alternative tax systems as a means to finance unemployment benefits: a sales-tax-cum-labor-subsidy system versus a wage tax system. The two systems are applied to the home country, while the wage tax system always obtains in the foreign country. In stark contrast with expectations of experts the sales tax system clearly outperforms the wage tax system, using standard economic indicators. It is argued that producers' reluctance to incur costs up-front while being uncertain about product prices can explain this outcome. Several pieces of evidence are provided to support this claim. The results strongly suggest that behavioral aspects have to be taken into account also in applied macroeconomic models.laboratory experiment, wage tax, sales tax, macroeconomic policy, behavioral economics

Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder. We compare the behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs officials that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission. The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs. Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.

The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.Game Theory;Lobbying

Local strategic networks and policies in European ICT clusters - the cases of Amsterdam, Bari, Dublin and Oulu

Regional interfirm networks are believed to be a vehicle for innovation and regional economic growth. From this perspective, local and regional governments are increasingly trying to promote these types of networks. This article discusses the relation between strategic networks and local development. It focuses on the role of local institutions that support strategic networking in ICT clusters in a number of European cities. It also discusses and analyses the way local and national governments try to influence local strategic networks in this sector. Our case studies are Amsterdam, Bari, Dublin, and Oulu.strategic networks policies ICT cluster casestudy Amsterdam Bari Dublin Oulu

Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of Emotions and Fairness Norms

This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after punishment for an unkind action. It also studies how fairness perceptions affect the reaction to punishment and whether this effect is consistent across repeated play and role experiences. A repeated version of the power-to-take game is used. In this game, the proposer can make a claim on the resources of a responder. Then, the responder can destroy any part of her own resources. The focus is on how proposers adjust their behavior depending on their fairness perceptions, their experienced emotions, and their interaction with responders. We find that fairness plays an important role in the behavior of proposers. Specifically, deviations from a perceived fairness norm trigger feelings of shame and guilt, which induce proposers to lower their claims. However, we also find that the perceived fairness norm varies considerably between individuals. Therefore, it is not the case that proposers who considered they were acting fairly were particularly nice to responders. Our results also show that the different types of individuals predicted by models of social preferences, can be traced among the subjects that played the same role in both periods, but fail to describe the behavior of subjects who switched from one role to the other.

Urban Broadband Internet Policies in Europe: A Critical Review

In this paper, urban broadband policies are critically reviewed. Cities and regions in Europe play an increasingly active role in the provision of broadband electronic infrastructure. Some cities are concerned that weaker groups will have little chances to get broadband access, and should be helped. Others take a more offensive stance, and promote broadband access to strengthen the local image, attract innovative companies and/or highly-skilled people. Peripheral cities take action to tackle spatial discrimination by telecom companies. There is now a scientific and political debate as to whether, and to what extent, governments should intervene in broadband markets. Several studies have pointed at the many pitfalls and negative side effects of broadband policies; others are more moderate, or even argue that governments should intervene to prevent a broadband divide. Much of this literature addresses national policies. In this article, we focus on the local level, as local policymakers seem to become more active. In this paper, we present a typology of local/regional broadband policies, based on a number of examples from European cities. We discuss the pro's and cons of various types of intervention, confront the case studies with the arguments listed in the literature, and critically evaluate the policies. Among other things, we conclude that policies are too easiliy justified with "loose" arguments of economic and social benefits, and that too often, policymakers fail to take a technology and supplier neutral approach, which may have perverse impacts in the long run.

Social Ties and Coordination on Negative Reciprocity: The Role of Affect

This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which subjects are anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders’ decisions, beliefs, and emotions. We find that friends punish the proposer more than strangers, and that they are more likely to coordinate their punishment (without communication). Both punishment and coordination are explained by the responders’ emotional reactions. Furthermore, the responders’ expectations are better predictors of emotions and destruction than their fairness perceptions.