Yugoslavia - How redistribution hurts productivity in a socialist economy

Socialism as practiced in Eastern Europe is characterized by massive income redistribution. This paper focuses on: (a) interfirm redistribution, consisting of taxing profitable firms in order to subsidize unprofitable ones; and (b) intrafirm redistribution, consisting of the compression of personal income differentials within a firm. The author constructs a theoretical model of redistribution of income as practiced in Yugoslav firms. Empirical results lead to the conclusions that efficiency in production could be improved at no cost if such redistribution were abolished. Furthermore, economies in which much of the GNP is redistributed through bargaining are also bound to be inefficient in distribution because some groups are less able to represent their common interests than others. Contrary to a common belief, socialist countries can not be praised on the count of equity either. This paper presents the estimating framework and the results of the empirical analysis obtained on the basis of a sample of Slovenian enterprises and a brief discussion of policy implications concludes the paper.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Inequality,Health Economics&Finance,Work&Working Conditions

The persistence of job security in reforming socialist economies

The quest for efficiency underlies the reform efforts of the socialist economies, but job security and overemployment (redundant jobs) still characterize these economies. The author argues that reforming socialist economies have maintained job security not through planning but mainly through a complicated bargaining among coalitions that results in a massive redistribution. This redistribution amounts to a bailing out of the ailing or less productive firms and workers at the expense of the more productive firms and workers and of the household sector as a whole. The author substantiates his argument with an empirical analysis of the redistribution associated with the soft budget constraint in Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s. He shows that redistribution is the outcome of a confrontation among coalitions and explains its compensatory nature.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

Introducing Unemployment Insurance to Developing Countries

The paper identifies key labor market and institutional differences between developed and developing countries, analyzes how these differences affect the working of the standard, OECD-style unemployment insurance (UI) program, and derives a desirable design of unemployment benefit program in developing countries. It argues that these countries – faced by large informal sector, weak administrative capacity, large political risk, and environment prone to corruption – should tailor the OECD-style UI program to suit their circumstances. To minimize employment disincentives, to ensure affordability, and to minimize administration cots, such adaptations include: (i) relying on self-insurance (via unemployment insurance savings accounts – UISAs) as a main source of financing and complementing it by solidarity funding; (ii) simplifying monitoring of job-search behavior and labor market status, and even eliminating personal monitoring of continuing eligibility requirements in the early phases; (iii) keeping modest benefits both in terms of the replacement rate and potential benefit duration; (iv) drawing on employers’ and workers’ contributions as sources of financing; and (v) piggybacking on existing networks to administer benefits. Particularly attractive is the UISAs-cum-borrowing version that uses pension wealth as collateral, making the system proof to moral hazard and strategic behavior, and allowing it to be rapidly deployed, such as in response to the currently emerging global economic crises.unemployment, unemployment insurance, unemployment insurance savings accounts

Unemployment insurance and duration of unemployment : evidence from Slovenia's transition

Between 1990 and 1992 in Slovenia, recipients of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits tended to remain (formally) unemployed until their benefits expired, before taking a job. Institutional set-up suggests, and labor surveys show, that many of the recipients were actually working while collecting UI benefits. In the spirit, if not in the letter of the law, the UI system was abused. The author shows that the escape rate of the recipients of unemployment compensation to employment increased dramatically just before the potential exhaustion of unemployment benefits - and decreased equally dramatically after benefits were exhausted. When grouped by the potential duration of benefits, unemployment length varies significantly. The unemployed with longer potential benefits stay unemployed longer. Because these groups differ in their characteristics (for example, in age), this does not prove the"waiting behavior"of the recipients. However, exits to employment dramatically increase just before exhaustion - and that does prove waiting behavior. The pattern of an increased escape rate just before benefits are exhausted and its dramatic fall thereafter is more rigorously demonstrated using hazard model estimation. Possibilities for informal employment are abundant in Slovenia, and the environment of transition economies generally seems conducive to misuse of the UI system. Legislative loopholes and failure to enforce the labor code allowed the unemployed to work and to collect benefits. The monitoring of job searches was also lax. The author's calculations suggest that reducing the duration of benefits would reduce the incidence of unemployment, its duration, the amount spent on UI benefits, and the inefficiencies generated by raising taxes to finance unemployment insurance. At the same time, reducing the duration of benefits would not impair job matches or crowd out jobs for nonrecipients. True, despite increased efficiency generally, the workers with the least job mobility might suffer hardships for the least mobile group and greater efficiency generally would have to be resolved in the political sphere. Redesigning the system for better targeting would be less controversial. One way to reduce UI spending without seriously curtailing incentives to work would be to reduce the benefits in proportion to earnings from irregular work. Another possibility is stricter monitoring of the job searches of the unemployed. To reduce spending and make"double dipping"less attractive, old-age insurance could be removed from the package of benefits the UI system offers. Also, counselors who help the unemployed find jobs (and who may thus develop a close relationship with them) should perhaps not be expected to be able to make impartial decisions about disqualifications for benefits; someone else should do that. In addition to better targeting, a"benefit transfer program"- a voluntary program that converts UI benefits Also, counselors who help the unemployed find jobs (through vouchers) into hiring subsidies - seems particularly attractive for Slovenia and other transition economies. In a way, such a program would legalize the"double-dipping"that has been taking place in Slovenia and possibly elsewhere. It would legalize practices that have undermined the system's credibility. But it might improve fiscal savings while sustaining the incentive to find jobs.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Public Health Promotion,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Youth and Governance,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Labor Markets,Social Protections&Assistance

Worker Flows, Job Flows and Firm Wage Policies: An Analysis of Slovenia

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labor market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. We investigate the impact of the changing labor market for Slovenia using unique longitudinal matched employer-employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and links of the workers to the firms with whom they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and also are able to improve the match quality of its workers.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39871/3/wp486.pd

Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency?: The Case of Slovenian Manufacturing, 1994-2001

The Slovenian transition represents a slow but steady liberalization of constraints on competition. Using a unique longitudinal data set on all manufacturing firms in Slovenia over the period 1994-2001, this study analyzes how firm efficiency changed in response to changing competitive pressures, holding constant firm attributes. Results show that the period was one of atypically rapid growth of total factor productivity (TFP) relative to levels in OECD countries, and that the rise in firm efficiency occurs across almost all industries and firm types: large or small; state or private; domestic or foreign-owned. Changes in firm ownership type have no impact on firm efficiency. Rather, competitive pressures that sort out inefficient firms of all types and retain the most efficient, coupled with the entry of new private firms that are at least as efficient as surviving firms, prove to be the major source of TFP gains. Market competition from new entrants, foreign-owned firms, and international trade also raise TFP in the industry. Results strongly confirm that market competition fosters efficiency.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40007/3/wp621.pd

The Armenian labor market in transition : issues and options

Reform of the labor market in the former Soviet Union (FSU) is essential to increase productivity. The transition of the FSU economies to a market economy must involve a massive displacement of workers, and will entail labor shortages for certain skills. A key challenge will be to reallocate labor at the lowest social costs. The authors identify key labor market issues in Armenia, reflecting on the dilemmas and options policymakers face both in Armenia and elsewhere in the FSU. Armenians are ardent advocates of radical reform and have already made progress in several areas (including successful privatization of land in 1990). But the Armenian transition is taking place in particularly unfavorable circumstances - including a severe energy crisis because of an economic blockade imposed by neighboring Azerbaijan. In Armenia, current labor policies represent a step in the right direction because they leave primary responsibility for finding a job to the individual. The state's role is simply to provide a social safety net and to create an environment that generates jobs. Tangible progress has been made but the adjustment process has just begun and is hindered by inconsistent labor policies - in some areas too radical and in others smacking of the old interventionism. The authors offer several general policy guidelines. Undertake several initiatives, not just one - possibly worker training as well as job search assistance, self employment grants, and temporary public employment. Use some resources to monitor and evaluate interventions to find out what works. Coordinate active policy interventions and the interface between active and passive instruments. Be prepared to change as the macroeconomic environment changes, and take advantage of the current climate. Under high inflation, for example, consider widening the wedge between wages and various cash and in-kind transfers. When inflation abates, consider paying cash benefits on the basis of prior earnings. Above all, be flexible and sensitive to signals and changes in signals. Among policy options, one size does not fit all.Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Labor Standards,Health Monitoring&Evaluation

The tax wedge in Slovenia: international comparison and policy recommendations

When taxes on labor are introduced, a “tax wedge” appears between the labor costs paid by the employer (gross wage) and the net wage received by an employee. At a certain level of wage, a higher tax wedge increases unemployment and decreases employment, all other things being equal. The paper tackles three main questions: the characteristics of the tax wedge, unemployment and employment rates in OECD countries in the recent past, tax wedge policy in the EU15 and the new EU members and the tax system and its effects on the unemployment and employment rates in Slovenia. We found that the OECD countries can be classified into two groups of countries if the tax wedge, the unemployment rate and the employment rate are taken into consideration. The first group is the high tax wedge, high unemployment rate and low employment rate group of countries, whereas the other group has the opposite characteristics. European member states (old and new) have on average a higher tax burden on labor than the OECD average, consequently suffering from higher unemployment rates. Slovenia has an unreasonably high tax wedge; in the EU only Belgium and Germany have a higher tax burden. According to previous and our empirical findings we suggest that Slovenia could benefit from a reduction in the tax wedge.economic policy, tax wedge, Slovenia, EU, OECD.

Does work pay in Slovenia?

Income transfers may generate work disincentives: if certain income payments are stopped when individuals (re)enter employment, this creates disincentives for taking employment – so called “unemployment trap”. To make work pay, several countries have introduced policies – financial incentives – which enhance employment opportunities for marginal groups in the labor market. Such policies increase in-work incomes and so improve work incentives for those receiving only out-of-work incomes. This paper tries to shed light on two questions, first being how does “making work pay” work in Slovenia, compared OECD countries, and the second, should Slovenia introduce earnings supplements or other in-work arrangements in tackling possible unemployment trap. According to international comparison Slovenia does not “step-out”, when we look at net replacement rates. Slovenia, however, has not introduced a single active labor programs that would stimulate directly and financially unemployed to join (official) employment, even though a lower paid job. In the paper we suggest the implementation of some kind of in-work arrangement at least for those, who are potentially less stimulated to reemploy.economic policy, financial incentives to work, Slovenia, EU, OECD.

Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency?: The Case of Slovenian Manufacturing, 1994-2001

Using a unique longitudinal data set on all manufacturing firms in Slovenia from 1994-2001, this study analyzes how firm efficiency changed in response to changing competitive pressures associated with the transition to market. Results show that the period was one of atypically rapid growth of total factor productivity (TFP). The rise in firm efficiency occurs across almost all industries and firm types: large or small; state or private; domestic or foreign-owned. Changes in firm ownership type have no direct impact on firm efficiency. However, increased market competition related to rising market share of private firms, new market entrants, foreign-owned firms, and international trade raise TFP across all firms in an industry, whether private or state owned. In addition, competitive pressures that sort out inefficient firms of all types and retain the most efficient, coupled with the entry of new private firms that are at least as efficient as surviving firms, prove to be the major source of TFP gains. Results strongly confirm that market competition fosters efficiency.