401 research outputs found

    Strategic R and D investments with uncertainty

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    I introduce uncertainty into the model of strategic cost-reducing R and D investments and reexamine welfare implications. I discuss two models. In one model an increase in expenditure decreases production costs when R\&D succeeds, and in the other model it increases probability of success. I show that two models yield completely different implications for tax-subsidy policies on R and D investments. In the former model equilibrium investment level is always too low from the viewpoint of social welfare, while in the latter model it can be either too low or too high and relatively risky (safe) investments should be subsidized (taxed).production substitution

    Equilibrium Location and Economic Welfare in Delivered Pricing Oligopoly

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    We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (or spatial price discrimination model) with a linear city. First, we extend a delivered pricing duopoly with Bertrand competition of Hamilton et al. (1989) to an n-firm model and explicitly solve the equilibrium location pattern. Next, we investigate welfare implication of the equilibrium location pattern. Given the Bertrand competition in the second stage we consider the welfare effect of relocations from the equilibrium locations. The equilibrium distance between firms is smaller than in the first best case, while it is too large from the second best viewpoint.

    What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?

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    We investigate a desirable role of public enterprise in mixed oligopoly in free-entry markets. We compare the following three cases: (i) a public firm produces before private firms (public leadership), (ii) all firms produce simultaneously (Cournot), (iii) a public firm produces after private firms (private leadership). We find that private leadership is best and public leadership is worst, in contrast to the cases without entries and exits of private firms. We also investigate the welfare implication of privatization. We find that some important results shown by existing works do not hold under private leadership.free-entry market, Stackelberg, Cournot, mixed oligopoly, commitment

    Patent licensing, bargaining, and product positioning

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    Innovators who have developed advanced technologies, along with launching new products by themselves, often license these technologies to their rivals. When a firm launches a new product, product positioning is also an important matter. We consider a standard linear city model with two firms in which the licenser and the licensee negotiate on licensing and engage in Nash bargaining after they determine their product positions. We investigate how the bargaining power of the licenser affects the product positions of the firms. We find that the licenser more likely chooses the central position when its bargaining power is weak whereas the product position of the licenser accelerates price competition between the firms. We also discuss the welfare implication. We find that the inverse U shape relationship between the bargaining power of the licenser and total social surplus, i.e., neither too strong nor too weak bargaining power of the licensor is optimal.

    Access charges, vertical separation, and lobbying

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    We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities forthe access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a free-entry market, we find that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such a market. The vertically integratedfirm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.

    Equilibria for circular spatial Cournot markets

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    This paper investigates a location-quantity model in a circular city. Pal (1998) investigates a duopoly model and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium. Matsushima (2001a) investigates an n-firm oligopoly model and shows that, if the number of firms is even, another equilibrium exists where half of the firms agglomerate at one point and the other firms agglomerate at the opposite point. We find that there exist many other equilibrium patterns that include the above two patterns as special cases.circular city

    Airport privatization and international competition

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    We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism wherebyprivatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) andtwo types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using thesimple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airportsare privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.

    Regional restriction, strategic delegation, and welfare

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    We investigate the effects of restricting locations of firms into Hotelling duopoly models. In the standard location-price models, the equilibrium distance between firms is too large from the viewpoint of consumer welfare. Thus, restricting locations of firms and reducing the distance between firms improve consumer welfare, through lower prices and smaller transportation costs for consumers. We introduce strategic reward contracts into the location-price models. We find that in contrast to the above existing result, restriction of the locations of firms reduces consumer welfare. Restricting locations of the firms reduces transportation costs but increases the prices through the change of strategic commitments by the firms, and it yields a counterintuitive result.

    How Many Firms Should Be Leaders? Beneficial Concentration Revisited

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    We investigate the relationship between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and welfare. First, we discuss the model wherein m leaders and N - m followers compete. Daughety (1990) finds that under linear demand and constant marginal cost, the Stackelberg model yields larger welfare and HHI than the Cournot model. Thus, he demonstrates that beneficial concentration occurs. We find that this always occurs under general cost and demand functions when m is sufficiently large, but does not always occur when m is small. Next, we consider the free entry of followers, and find that beneficial concentration always occurs regardless of m. In particular, the more persistent the leadership, the more likely it is to be beneficial.HHI, beneficial concentration, leadership, free entry market

    Evolution of competitive equilibrium with endogenous product differentiation

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    Previous theoretical researches show that learning from good performers yields intense competition and results in the low profitability of firms. These researchers do not take into account differentiation strategies being referred as a useful strategic tool to mitigate competition. We introduce an evolutionary (learning) game into a duopoly model with product differentiation on the Hotelling line. We find that central agglomeration appears in the unique stochastically stable state in which the equilibrium price is equal to the marginal cost of firms. This implies that perfectly competitive equilibrium appears even when firms have an opportunity to differentiate themselves through product differentiation and to mitigate competition.
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