US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences

This paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which decision makers are allowed to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values. The specification of the central bank objective is general enough to nest the symmetric quadratic form as a special case, thereby making the derived policy rule potentially nonlinear. This forms the basis of our identification strategy which is used to evelop a formal hypothesis testing for the presence of asymmetric preferences. Reduced-form estimates of postwar US policy rules indicate that the preferences of the Fed have been highly asymmetric with respect to both inflation and output gaps, with the latter being the dominant source of nonlinearity after 1983.nonlinear optimal monetary policy rules, asymmetric loss function, linearized central bank Euler equation

Measuring the time-inconsistency of US monetary policy

JEL Classification: E52, E58monetary policy, time-inconsistency, US, US monetary policy

Monetary Policy Shifts, Indeterminacy and Inflation Dynamics

The New-Keynesian Phillips curve plays a central role in modern macroeconomic theory. A vast empirical literature has estimated this structural relationship over various postwar full-samples. While it is well know that in a New-Keynesian model a weak central bank response to inflation generates sunspot fluctuations, the consequences of pooling observations from different monetary policy regimes for the estimates of the Phillips curve had not been investigated. Using Montecarlo simulations from a purely forward-looking model, this paper shows that indeterminacy can introduce a sizable persistence in the estimated process of inflation. This persistence however is not an intrinsic feature of the economy; rather it is the result of self full-filling expectations. By neglecting indeterminacy the estimates of the forward- looking term of the Phillips curve are shown to be biased downward. The implications are in line with the empirical evidence for the UK and US.indeterminacy, New-Keynesian Phillips curve, Montecarlo, bias, persistence

Measuring the Time-Inconsistency of US Monetary Policy

This paper offers an alternative explanation for the behavior of postwar US inflation by measuring a novel source of monetary policy time- inconsistency due to Cukierman (2002). In the presence of asymmetric preferences, the monetary authorities end up generating a systematic inflation bias through the private sector expectations of a larger policy response in recessions than in booms. Reduced-form estimates of US monetary policy rules indicate that while the inflation target declines from the pre- to the post-Volcker regime, the average inflation bias, which is about one percent before 1979, tends to disappear over the last two decades. This result can be rationalized in terms of the preference on output stabilization, which is found to be large and asymmetric in the former but not in the latter period.asymmetric preferences, time-inconsistency, average inflation bias, US inflation

Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: The Case of Asymmetric Preferences (new title: The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences)

This paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which the decision-makers are allowed to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values. Reduced-form and structural estimates of the central bank first order condition indicate that the preferences of the Fed have been highly asymmetric only before 1979, with the response to output contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude. This asymmetry is shown to induce an average inflation bias of 1.11% that appears to have substantially contributed to the great inflation of the 1960s and 1970s.asymmetric objective, nonlinear monetary policy rules, average inflation bias

How does the ECB target inflation?

The announced primary objective of the European Central Bank is price stability. While no restrictive reference is given to how the goal should be reached, such a mandate can be thought as a concern to stabilize some relevant macroeconomic aggregates. Accordingly, we frame ECB monetary policy in a general set up that allows policy makers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output gaps. The empirical analysis on aggregated Euro area data indicates that ECB monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule. While the objective of price stability is symmetric, the one on real activity is not in that output contractions require larger policy responses. Moreover, the actual Euro interest rate highly commoves with the counterfactual rate that the Bundesbank would have followed if charged to set policy rates for the Euro area. JEL Classification: E52, E58(asymmetric) central bank policy preferences, Bundesbank counterfactual interest rate target, ECB monetary policy rule

Monetary Policy Shifts, Indeterminacy and Inflation Dynamics

The New-Keynesian Phillips curve plays a central role in modern macroeconomic theory. A vast empirical literature has estimated this structural relationship over various postwar full-samples. While it is well know that in a New-Keynesian model a `weak' central bank response to inflation generates sunspot fluctuations, the consequences of pooling observations from different monetary policy regimes for the estimates of the structural Phillips curve had not been investigated. Using Montecarlo simulations from a purely forward-looking model, this paper shows that indeterminacy can introduce a sizable persistence in the estimated process of inflation. This persistence however is not an intrinsic feature of the economy; rather it is endogenous to the policy regime and results from the self full-filling nature of inflation expectations. By neglecting indeterminacy the estimates of the forward-looking term of the structural Phillips curve are shown to be biased downward. The implications are in line with the empirical evidence for the U.K and U.Sindeterminacy, New-Keynesian Phillips curve, Montecarlo, bias, persistence

How does the ECB target inflation?

The announced primary objective of the European Central Bank is price stability. While no restrictive reference is given to how the goal should be reached, such a mandate can be thought as a concern to stabilize some relevant macroeconomic aggregates. Accordingly, we frame ECB monetary policy in a general set up that allows policy makers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output gaps. The empirical analysis on aggregated Euro area data indicates that ECB monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule. While the objective of price stability is symmetric, the one on real activity is not in that output contractions require larger policy responses. Moreover, the actual Euro interest rate highly commoves with the counterfactual rate that the Bundesbank would have followed if charged to set policy rates for the Euro area.ECB monetary policy rule, (asymmetric) central bank policy preferences, Bundesbank counterfactual interest rate target

The Great Moderation and the ‘Bernanke Conjecture’

Was the Great Moderation in the United States due to good policy or good luck? Taking, as data generation process, a New Keynesian sticky-price model in which the only source of change is the move from a passive to an active monetary rule, we show how standard econometric methods, both reducedform and structural, often misinterpret good policy for good luck. Specifically, we show how such a move is perfectly compatible with: (a) little change in the estimated impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock, as in Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006). (b) Significant changes in the estimated volatilities of both reduced-form and structural shocks–as in (e.g.) Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) and Stock and Watson (2002)–even in the absence, by construction, of any change in the volatilities of structural innovations. (c) Little change in the integrated normalised spectra of inflation and GDP growth at the business-cycle frequencies, as in Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004). In line with Bernanke’s (2004) conjecture, the explanation is that conventional econometric methods are intrinsically incapable of capturing the role played by the systematic component of monetary policy in (de)stabilising in- flation expectations, and are therefore inevitably bound to confuse shifts in expected inflation with true structural innovations, thus giving the illusion of good luck even when good policy is, by construction, the authentic explanationGreat Inflation, indeterminacy, structural break tests, frequency domain, VARs.

The Price Puzzle: Fact or Artefact?

This paper re-examines the empirical evidence on the price puzzle and proposes a new theoretical interpretation. Using structural VARs and two different identification strategies based on zero restrictions and sign restrictions, we find that the positive response of prices to a monetary policy shock is historically limited to the subsamples associated with a weak central bank response to inflation. These subsamples correspond to the pre-Volcker period for the United States and the period prior to the introduction of the inflation targeting framework for the United Kingdom. Using a micro-founded New-Keynesian monetary policy model for the US economy, we then show that the structural VARs are capable of reproducing the price puzzle from artificial data only when monetary policy is passive and hence multiple equilibria arise. In contrast, this model never generates on impact a positive inflation response to a policy shock. The omission in the VARs of a variable capturing the high persistence of expected inflation under indeterminacy is found to account for the price puzzle observed in actual data.Price puzzle, New-Keynesian Model, Taylor principle, Indeterminacy, SVAR.