Ideal Independence, Free Sequences, and the Ultrafilter Number

We make use of a forcing technique for extending Boolean algebras. The same type of forcing was employed in [BK81], [Kos99], and elsewhere. Using and modifying a lemma of Koszmider, and using CH, we obtain an atomless BA, A such that f(A) = smm(A) < u(A), answering questions raised by [Mon08] and [Mon11]

Certification and Voting Software: Position Statement

Computers are important in every aspect of modern life. Automative tabulating machines are designed to be the most consistent and reliable counting approach invented. Still, questions of reliability, security and auditability persist. Ken Thompson and others have shown that, like other carelessly composed processes, computer programs can harbor potentially criminal activity. To be useful for voting, software must simplify and improve the ability to record and report intentions. Best practices must be used in creating important software to guard against bugs and malware. In spite of the fact that malware can be hidden in any program, there are ways to assure that it is not impacting the operation of the software. First, test vectors must allow testing of the software in every conceivable situation. Second, demonstrations can be arranged to show that it is running correctly when it is actually used. Third, computers can produce multiple records to assure that it has performed correctly

The Voter Verifiable Audio Audit Transcript Trail (VVAATT)

The debate about verifiable voter audit trails has prematurely narrowed into two camps: those who categorically deny the need for any back-up records and those who advocate the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). As jurisdictions and watch-dog groups prepare to define their election processes we should consider all alternatives. This paper describes a new approach for a verification audit trail, the Voter Verifiable Audio Audit Transcript Trail (VVAATT), which improves the recount process because it produces a transcript of ballots that can be counted either by hand or by computer (or by both methods). Because it allows voters to confirm selections as they proceed, rather than after the fact, it simultaneously reduces adjacency errors (i.e. inadvertent selections of candidates whose names appear next to the desired choices). The audio transcript format makes it beneficially difficult for individual votes to be accidentally or maliciously separated out from the larger group. The system is also inexpensive and easy to implement using current technologies

Testimony on Voter Verification

In the past five years, following the 2000 Florida election fiasco, the voting technologies used in the United States have undergone a significant change. The use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines has increased and provided great opportunities for advances in accessibility and voting user interface design. Auditing steps of elections is important. Demonstrating that a computer program in a optical scan or DRE system is collecting them correctly must be done by testing and might be improved by redundant media created by separate means (electronic, or physical). One audit trail proposal is for the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). The VVPAT system adds a printer to a machine and adds an extra step to the end of the voting process when the voter prints out and approves a paper receipt of their vote. We have introduced the idea of a voter verified audio audit transcript trail (VVAATT). A VVAATT system adds audio feedback to the voting process. The audio feedback is recorded and the recording serves as an audit for the election

Study Shows Ballot Design and Voter Preparation Could Have Eliminated Sarasota Florida Voting Errors

Election results showed extremely inconsistent voting rates for two high profile races in the Florida counties of Sarasota, Charlotte, and Sumter on November 7, 2006. The expected missing selections for these races were around 1.5 percent. The second race on the ballot in Sarasota -- Congressional Race 13 for the House of Representatives CR13 -- was missing 13.7 percent of voter selections. The fourth race in Charlotte and Sumter -- Attorney General -- was missing 21 percent of selections. These races were both between only two candidates and appeared on the ballot page next to a large race that had seven candidates

Processes Can Improve Electronic Voting: A Case Study of An Election

Across the United States, I have personally watched hundreds of precincts vote since 2001. Most recently, I traveled to Reno/Sparks, Nevada to observe the rollout of the Sequoia Direct record electronic voting systems with verifiable paper trail printers on September 7, 2004. This experience was also enriched by the members of the Secretary of State of California’s poll-watching effort, who invited me to join them to watch the election progress at eleven different polling places, which together represent almost forty different precincts. At each polling place I conducted interviews with poll workers and election officials as well as exit polls of voters. The California team, comprised of election officials from all over the state, who’s broad experience provided helpful context and insights. What I witnessed at the election both encouraged and horrified me. The paper “receipts” were less confusing than I feared they would be. Poll workers and voters alike showed an eagerness to “get it right,” even when the new technology required them to endure some amount of initial frustration. However, things went gravely wrong when workers did not have adequate time to set up or test equipment; when, in the pressure of the moment, procedures were ignored or forgotten and, instead, solutions were improvised; or when no standard policy existed to guide election officials in proper protocol. In my experience, such problems are not unique to that election, to the Sequoia electronic voting machines, or to the paper trail audit system. Indeed, the shortcomings I encountered in Nevada resemble those I have seen in precincts throughout the country and with every kind of voting system. Luckily, most of these problems can easily be solved if we focus on improving both training and process. We can learn from our mistakes. Toward that end, a detailed account of my day in Reno follows

Enhancing Publicity and Promotion: Applying Gerard Hauser\u27s Theory of Reticulate Public Spheres to Encourage Discourse for Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC)

Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC), or the unification of advertising, public relations (PR) and marketing functions, is a widely utilized method for publicizing and promoting products and services in today\u27s market. Although IMC has moved to the forefront by replacing traditional marketing methods, it remains unclear as to how it can be utilized to reengage public spheres and revive the reputations of marketing functions as a whole. This project applies Gerard Hauser\u27s theory of reticulate public spheres to IMC in order to encourage discourse between marketing professionals and consumers. Hauser\u27s model depends on members of insider and outsider communities to enhance their publicness by creating and maintaining constructive, inclusionary, and invitational discourses. Discourse-based IMC models can generate improved relationships between marketing professionals and consumers by restoring trust and credibility for marketing functions through the use of authentic discourses that emerge from interaction