On"good"politicians and"bad"policies - social cohesion, institutions, and growth

Social cohesion - that is, the inclusiveness of a country's communities - is essential for generating the trust needed to implement reforms. Citizens have to trust that the short-term losses that inevitably arise from reform, will be more than offset by long-term gains. However, in countries divided along class and ethnic lines, and with weak institutions, even the boldest, most civic-minded and well-informed politician (or interest group) will face severe constraints in bringing about policy reform. The authors hypothesize that key development outcomes (particularly economic growth) are most likely to be associated with countries that are both socially cohesive and governed by effective public institutions. They test this hypothesis for the sample of countries with available data. The authors develop a conceptual framework based on the idea of social cohesion, then review the evidence on which it is based. While several earlier studies have shown that differences in growth rates among developing countries are a result of weak rule of law, lack of democracy, and other institutional deficiencies, the authors focus on the social conditions that give rise to these deficiencies. They also seek to establish empirically a causal sequence from social divisions to weak institutions to slow growth. The essence of their argument, supported by new econometric evidence, is that pro-development policies are comparatively rare in the developing world less because of the moral fiber of politicians (though that surely matters) than because good politicians typically lack the room for maneuver needed to make desired reforms. This lack of maneuverability is a product of insufficient social cohesion and weak institutions. The authors also explore the determinants of social cohesion, focusing on historical accidents, initial conditions, and natural resource endowments. Social cohesion should not be seen as a concern primarily of developing and transition economies. Indeed, it is important in the United Kingdom as in Ukraine, in Canada as in Colombia, in the Netherlands as in Australia.Social Capital,Decentralization,Labor Policies,Public Health Promotion,Community Development and Empowerment,Inequality,Poverty Assessment,Economic Development,Governance Indicators,Social Capital

The global challenge for Maastricht University: Globalizing universities in a globalizing world:Speech by Dr. Jo Ritzen on the occasion of the Opening Ceremony of the Academic Year 2005-2006

Rede dr. ir. J.M.M. Ritzen, voorzitter College van Bestuur, bij opening academisch jaa

Rural Coopetition: A Consumer Perspective of Marketing Activities Involving SMEs

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are central to global and domestic economies and are a significant factor in rural economic development. Rural SMEs face unique challenges of geographical location and limited resources requiring strategies that can create an enduring competitive advantage. This study explores market-oriented coopetition as a competitive strategy that forms collaborative relationships between competitors to create value for consumers. Through the analysis of a small cluster of rural SMEs, the focus of this study addresses the underexplored consumer perspective of coopetition events based on quantitative analyses of customer satisfaction and market share

The virtuous loop of quality of government (QoG) and institutional trust in OECD countries, 2006-2021 and culture

We explore empirically the relationship between trust in government and the quality of government (QoG) with a dynamic panel model for the period 2006-2021 in the 38 OECD countries, with reverse and lag specifications while incorporating a range of social, political, and economic factors as explanatory variables. The results show a clear positive mutually reinforcing dynamic between QoG and trust in government when the social, political and economic factors are included. Trust in government with a three-year lag is positively related to QoG. Foreign-born population with a three-year lag is negatively associated with QoG. The other way around: trust in government is affected by the QoG in the same year. Economic decline reduces trust in government. QoG and trust appear to be embedded in culture (measured with the Hofstede indices). Power distance is negatively related to both QoG and institutional trust. The association between individualism and QoG is positive, while long-term orientation and indulgence positively impact trust.<br/

The virtuous loop of quality of government (QoG) and institutional trust in OECD countries, 2006-2021 and culture

We explore empirically the relationship between trust in government and the quality of government (QoG) with a dynamic panel model for the period 2006-2021 in the 38 OECD countries, with reverse and lag specifications while incorporating a range of social, political, and economic factors as explanatory variables. The results show a clear positive mutually reinforcing dynamic between QoG and trust in government when the social, political and economic factors are included. Trust in government with a three-year lag is positively related to QoG. Foreign-born population with a three-year lag is negatively associated with QoG. The other way around: trust in government is affected by the QoG in the same year. Economic decline reduces trust in government. QoG and trust appear to be embedded in culture (measured with the Hofstede indices). Power distance is negatively related to both QoG and institutional trust. The association between individualism and QoG is positive, while long-term orientation and indulgence positively impact trust.<br/