COUNTRY RISK: Economic Policy, Contagion Effect or Political noise?

The opening of the capital account was one of the important structural reforms implemented by Argentina. This liberalization increased the linkage of the real economy with the changing conditions of the international financial markets. In particular, recent data show a clear relation between interest rates and the business cycle on the one hand, and sovereign spreads on the other. In order to understand better these linkages, it is necessary to analyze the determinants of these spreads also known as country risk. Using monthly data for the period 1994 to 1998, we find that this spread is explained by: 1) growth expectations, 2) fiscal deficits, 3) the debt service to export ratio and its growth rate, 4) contagion effects, 5) external shocks including movements of international interest rates, and 6) political noise. Based on these findings, we offer a discussion of some of the policies that should be implemented in order for the spreads to start declining and for the country to eventually reach an "investment grade" rating for its sovereign bonds.

The Accounting Mirror of the Banking Business: The Bank of Barcelona (1845-1856).

El Banco de Barcelona fue el primer banco emisor regional en España. Gracias a la reciente recuperación del archivo del Banco de Barcelona, analizamos los ratios contables de solvencia, liquidez y rentabilidad para el periodo 1844-1856. The Bank of Barcelona was the first regional issuing bank in Spain. Thanks to the recent recovery of the Bank of Barcelona archive, we have analysed accounting ratios of solvency, liquidity and profitability in the 1844-1856 period.Historia bancaria española siglo XIX, Banco de Barcelona, coeficiente de caja, ratios contables. 19th-century Spanish banking history, Bank of Barcelona, cash reserve, accounting ratios.

The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations

The Uruguay Round involved a grand North-South bargain: The North reduced import barriers, particularly in textiles and agriculture. The South adopted new domestic regulations in such areas as services and intellectual property—changes that would lead to increased purchases from the North. In mercantilist economics, apples for apples—imports for imports. In real economics, apples for oranges. Finger and Nogués argue that while the North’s reduction of import barriers benefits both the North and the South, the new domestic regulations adopted by countries of the South could prove costly to those countries. To begin with, the regulations will be expensive to implement. And while the cost side of their impact is secured by a legal obligation (in the case of intellectual property rights, for example, the cost is higher prices for patented goods), the benefits side is not so secured.Uruguay Round, Services negotiations, Doha Round reciprocity

The O.J. Circus

The O.J. Circu