Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment

I offer analyses of free will in terms of a complex set of psychological capacities agents possess to varying degrees and have varying degrees of opportunities to exercise effectively, focusing on the under-appreciated but essential capacities for imagination. For an agent to have free will is for her to possess the psychological capacities to make decisions—to imagine alternatives for action, to select among them, and to control her actions accordingly—such that she is the author of her actions and can deserve credit or blame for them. For an agent to act of her own free will is for her to have had (reasonable) opportunity to exercise these capacities in making her decision and acting. There is a long philosophical tradition of treating free will as the set of capacities that, when properly functioning, allow us to make decisions that contribute to our leading a good or flourishing life. On this view, free will is a psychological accomplishment. Free will allows us to be the causal source of our actions in a way that is compatible with determinism and naturalism

Your Brain as the Source of Free Will Worth Wanting: Understanding Free Will in the Age of Neuroscience

Philosophical debates about free will have focused on determinism—a potential ‘threat from behind’ because determinism entails that there are conditions in the distant past that, in accord with the laws of nature, are sufficient for all of our decisions. Neuroscience is consistent with indeterminism, so it is better understood as posing a ‘threat from below’: If our decision-making processes are carried out by neural processes, then it might seem that our decisions are not based on our prior conscious deliberations or reasoning. The response to this threat will require a neurophilosophical theory of mind that makes sense of the causal role of our conscious reasons and reasoning. Without such a theory, our conscious self seems bypassed by the neural processes in our brains, and this view seems to explain why many scientists assume that neuroscience challenges free will. However, I argue that most people are amenable to the possibility of a future theory of mind that is physicalist (if not reductionist), yet preserves much of our ordinary experience and understanding of conscious decision-making and self-control. I outline such a theory using the resources of causal interventionism. I argue that this view is best understood as a minimal revision to our understanding of free will, rather than an elimination of it. And I argue that this view has more reasonable and effective implications for our moral and legal practices than an eliminativist or skeptical theory of free will

Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy

First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the emerging field of “experimental philosophy,” in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons’ intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophy—independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to actively engage with the material and paves the way for more fruitful and impassioned classroom discussion. We offer some suggestions for how to use surveys in the classroom and provide an appendix that contains some examples of scenarios teachers could use in their courses

The Possible Role of Transplacentally-Acquired Antibodies to Infectious Agents, With Molecular Mimicry to Nervous System Sialic Acid Epitopes, as Causes of Neuromental Disorders: Prevention and Vaccine Implications

Proof of causality of most neuromental disorders (NMD's) is largely unavailable. Lessons from four-decade investigations of the epidemiology, immunology, pathogenesis, prevention and therapy of perinatal infectious agents, which invade directly the nervous system, have led us to propose a new indirect effect hypothesis: maternal transplacentally-acquired antibodies, to agents with epitope molecular mimicry with the developing nervous system, can cross the fetus/infant's blood–nervous system barriers to cause NMD's, clinically manifest years later

Pragmatic Conservative Nationalism: The Coalition Avenir Quebec

The Coalition Avenir Quebec (CAQ) is a provincial political party that was founded in 2011 and formed the province’s government for the first time in 2018. The purpose of this major research project is to explain the origins and policy preferences of the CAQ. It will argue that the CAQ reflects a “pragmatic conservative nationalist” ideology, and that this is as much a result of a conscious political orientation as it is a necessity in Quebec’s politically moderate electoral landscape. The party is the ideological heir and the continuation of the centre-right faction of the Parti Québécois (PQ), most notably represented by Lucien Bouchard, premier from 1998 to 2001. The CAQ is currently led by François Legault, a former PQ cabinet minister who had been recruited to politics by Bouchard himself. To demonstrate the argument that the CAQ represents “pragmatic conservative nationalism,” the paper will be organized as follows. The essay will begin by reviewing the existing academic literature and discourse surrounding the CAQ. There is a debate on whether the party even has a coherent ideology. Some believe it to be a platform of electoral opportunism on the part of Legault, who took advantage of both the failure of the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) to obtain power, as well as the fall in support for Québécois sovereignty

THE COST OF COERCION: IS THERE A PLACE FOR “HARD” INTERVENTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW?

The contractual relationship between author and intermediary—be it a producer, publisher, or anyone facilitating the commercial exploitation of the author’s copyrighted works—is often viewed as an unequal one. Other than a minority of superstars, the vast majority of authors are forced to accept contractual terms dictated by their powerful counterparties. This outcome is perceived by many scholars and policymakers as undesirable. Thus, in an effort to protect the authors’ wellbeing in their contractual dealings, legislatures from around the world are increasingly keen to adopt regulatory measures that limit the menu of options the parties can adopt contractually. Specifically, these instruments endeavor to offset author’s weak bargaining position either by ensuring a minimum level of remuneration to authors’ ex-ante or providing them with an inalienable right to ask for a modification of the com-sensation stipulated in the contract ex-post or by granting them an inalienable right to regain control of their previously transferred rights. Overall, these legislative interventions are seemingly based on the assumption that regulating author-intermediary transactions ex ante and ex post will invariably improve the financial situation of authors as a whole. This assumption is mistaken. Drawing on insights from neoclassical and behavioral economics, the benefits and drawbacks of these interventions are narrated throughout this paper. It is further demonstrated that while these legislative interventions were adopted with the best possible intentions, they ultimately prove ineffective in meeting their own objective of securing authors a more favorable distribution of wealth. In fact, they occasionally harm the very group of beneficiaries they were designed to help. Particularly, the different forms of interventions into the author-intermediary contractual relationships create an inter-author redistribution of wealth and redistribution over time, which largely harm the most vulnerable groups of authors. These findings illustrate the limitations of the current legislative interventions that were designed to strengthen the position of authors vis-àvis their counterparties and emphasize that the structural disparities in bargaining powers cannot be easily remedied by legal intervention alone