The quest for reasonable retail energy prices in Europe: positive and normative dimensions

Public opinion in various EU Member States increasingly perceives energy prices as unreasonable. Primarily owing to distributional concerns, state interference with the liberalised retail energy market is ever-present across many EU Member States, despite its implications for the development of competitive (national and EU) energy markets. Rather than solely engaging with the conditions of state intervention as such, this article takes a step back and argues that an appreciation of what constitutes a reasonable price for energy supply is a necessary prerequisite in determining the relevance, scope and conditions of state intervention in retail energy prices. In the absence of a definition of the concept in secondary legislation, it offers a novel conceptual framework centred on the contextual interpretation of “a reasonable price for energy supply”. The article offers two understandings of reasonableness: one underpinned by the principle of market competition and the other understood as affordability. It elaborates on the different set of conditions and criteria against which they are judged and it explains how these have informed various instruments enshrined in the energy liberalisation directives for achieving reasonable prices for end-consumers. Its broader aim is to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of what is meant by a “reasonable retail energy price” within the context of national and EU competitive retail energy markets and explore how the resulting tension between the two understandings of reasonableness is accommodated in the broader EU constitutional and institutional context

Are economists Kings? Economic evidence and discretionary assessments at the UK utility regulatory agencies

UK sectoral regulatory authorities are hybrid communities of, among others, lawyers and economists. Since the liberalization of essential services, expert economists enjoy broad discretionary powers in advancing the agencies’ broad statutory objectives. Yet, despite the significant societal impact of economic regulation, existing scholarship in the fields of competition law and regulation and public law has, with very few exceptions, disregarded these actors and the very essence of their work. This article aims to address this gap in the literature by blending theoretical with empirical insights deriving from 14 semi-structured elite interviews with regulatory economists in the regulatory agencies for energy (Office for Gas and Electricity Markets), telecoms (Office for Communications), and water (Office of Water Services). It explores the increased reliance on economics in the regulatory decision-making process and the impact this has had on the authorities’ decision-making and discretion, when making complex trade-offs between the various goals of the regulatory enterprise. In doing so, it puts forward a theoretical framework inspired by Craig Parsons’ typology of political action so as to identify and examine the nature and scope of the constraints that inform and shape the influence of economics in the exercise of regulatory discretion. This endeavour is significant in the sense that it is the first of its kind and, in that it provides a normative framework of analysis that can be applied in other areas of regulation heavily infused with and influenced by economic evidence and analysis, such as ‘pure’ competition law enforcement by both sectoral and competition authorities

Economic evidence in regulatory disputes: revisiting the court-regulatory agency relationship in the US and the UK

This article examines the issue of the appropriate scope of review of economic evidence enshrined in the discretionary assessments of utility regulators in the US and the UK. It advances a balance of institutional competencies approach to the question of the degree of deference owed to the regulatory agency’s economic assessments. In doing so, it revisits the doctrinal positions advanced in the US and UK for the substantive review of administrative discretion, so as to become attuned to the challenges posed by economic evidence. Drawing on insights from political science and economics, the suggested approach illuminates the institutional disadvantages of the courts that may warrant a high degree of deference. At the same time, however, it remains sensitive to the polycentric elements of regulatory disputes as well as to a number of institutional realties that may attenuate the weight of such comparative institutional disadvantages

Interim Measures in EU Competition Cases: Origins, Evolution, and Implications for Digital Markets

Key Points: 1. Interim measures are among the most powerful and intrusive enforcement tools that are available to competition authorities in the EU because, pending the outcome of investigations, they can be used to ensure that effective competition is maintained and irreparable damage averted. 2. The revival of interim measures in Broadcom may ultimately displace the Commission’s increased reliance on Article 9, Regulation 1/2003 commitment decisions for a supposedly swift resolution of complex cases. 3. Interim measures may be more suitable than commitment decisions in digital markets with network effects, where there is a serious risk that a competition law infringement will have an irreversible impact on competition and the market structure, but their use may be hampered by the significant constraints imposed by EU Courts on the ability of the Commission to adopt interim relief

Google Shopping and the As-Efficient-Competitor Test: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

‘In the third place, as regards the arguments summarised in paragraph 514 above, according to which the Commission failed to demonstrate that competing comparison shopping services that had experienced difficulties were as efficient as Google, when in fact they are not, the Commission is correct in maintaining that it was not required to prove this. The use of the as-efficient-competitor test is warranted in the case of pricing practices (predatory pricing or a margin squeeze, for example), in order, in essence, to assess whether a competitor that is as efficient as the dominant undertaking allegedly responsible for those pricing practices, and which, in order not to be driven immediately from the market, would charge its customers the same prices as those charged by that undertaking, would have to do so at a loss and accentuating that loss, causing it to leave the market in the longer term (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paragraphs 53 to 55 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the practices at issue are not pricing practices

Margin squeeze: an above cost predatory pricing approach

We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze conducts. Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze conducts should solely be evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards. The adjustment corresponds to an increase in the cost benchmark used in the predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales. This can reduce both the risks of false-positives and false-negatives in margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic arguments against above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical structures where margin squeezes take place and by presenting case law evidence supporting this adjustment. Our approach can help to reconcile the divergent US and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze

Common foreign and security policy and energy policy

The article is the first to explore the EU’s CFSP and Energy policy nexus. In doing so, it examines the externalisation and securitisation of the EU’s internal energy market. The main argument advanced is that EU energy security policy development has become an important variable in ensuring EU wider foreign policy objectives. However, rather than addressing the CFSP liaisons with EU energy policy solely from the perspective of foreign policy objectives, the chapter also explores the securitisation of energy policy from the perspective of the internal market. It therefore argues that there is a very strong link between securitisation and competitiveness. As such, it explores the EU’s capacity to externalise its internal market policies both inside and outside the contours of CFSP by providing an overview of the existing CFSP framework and insight on the extraterritorial application and force of EU competition law to achieve CFSP objectives

The Nexus between EU Common Foreign & Security Policy and Energy Policy

The chapter seeks to unravel the nexus between the EU’s CFSP and energy policy. In doing so, it examines the externalization and securitization of the EU’s internal energy market and argues that the development of the EU’s energy security policy has become an important variable in ensuring EU wider foreign policy objectives. Rather than addressing the CFSP liaisons with EU energy policy solely from the perspective of foreign policy objectives, the chapter also explores the securitization of energy policy from the perspective of the internal market. It argues that there is a strong link between securitization and competitiveness. It also explores the EU’s capacity to externalize its internal market policies both inside and outside the contours of CFSP by providing an overview of the existing CFSP framework and insight on the extraterritorial application and force of EU competition law to achieve CFSP objectives

Stakeholder interactions and corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices: Evidence from the Zambian copper mining sector

Purpose – This paper critically explores the interactions of key stakeholders and their impact upon CSR practices in the Zambian copper mining sector. Design/methodology/approach – This case study of the Zambian copper mining sector utilises an overall political economy framework, focusing on power asymmetries between the state and MNCs. Within this context, we draw on both stakeholder salience theory and legitimacy theory in order to explore the interactions of key stakeholders and their impact upon CSR practices. Findings – We find power asymmetries between the state and MNCs existing according to a number of different dimensions which are exacerbated by a number of factors including divisions within the government itself as a key stakeholder. However, despite the existence of stark power asymmetries, we find that in the Zambian context, there are some possibilities for agency on the part of civil society, and so that legitimacy theory has some (albeit limited) explanatory potential. Originality/value - The paper contributes to the literature on CSR in developing countries by exploring these issues in a critical case, that of the Zambian copper mining sector on which the economy is so heavily dependent

Financial incentives for increasing uptake of HPV vaccinations: a randomized controlled trial.

OBJECTIVE: Uptake of human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations by 17- to 18-year-old girls in England is below (<35%) target (80%). This trial assesses (a) the impact of financial incentives on uptake and completion of an HPV vaccination program, and (b) whether impacts are moderated by participants' deprivation level. It also assesses the impact of incentives on decision quality to get vaccinated, as measured by attitudes toward the vaccination and knowledge of its consequences. METHOD: One thousand 16- to 18-year-old girls were invited to participate in an HPV vaccination program: 500 previously uninvited, and 500 unresponsive to previous invitations. Girls randomly received either a standard invitation letter or a letter including the offer of vouchers worth £ 45 (€ 56; $73) for undergoing 3 vaccinations. Girls attending their first vaccination appointment completed a questionnaire assessing decision quality to be vaccinated. Outcomes were uptake of the first and third vaccinations and decision quality. RESULTS: The intervention increased uptake of the first (first-time invitees: 28.4% vs. 19.6%, odds ratio [OR] = 1.63, 95% confidence interval [CI; 1.08, 2.47]; previous nonattenders: 23.6% vs. 10.4%, OR = 2.65, 95% CI [1.61, 4.38]) and third (first-time invitees: 22.4% vs. 12%, OR = 2.15, 95% CI [1.32, 3.50]; previous nonattenders: 12.4% vs. 3%, OR = 4.28, 95% CI [1.92, 9.55]) vaccinations. Impacts were not moderated by deprivation level. Decision quality was unaffected by the intervention. CONCLUSIONS: Although the intervention increased completion of HPV vaccinations, uptake remained lower than the national target, which, in addition to cost effectiveness and acceptability issues, necessitates consideration of other ways of achieving it