What is the strategic value of investments in alternative local energy supply?

This paper studies strategic incentives to invest in electricity generation capacity using a local fuel like renewables or coal. It shows that investing in this capacity, even if not used, improves the bargaining position of a power producing firm that also imports another fuel such as gas. When several importers are considered, the paper finds that investment has a positive strategic effect on all other importers’ bargaining position. A government energy policy that forces utilities to invest in capacity based on particular fuels can be justified not only for environmental but also for strategic reasons.

Partnerships and new rural governance for reacting to demographic change in rural regions in Germany

Peripheral rural areas are particularly affected by demographic changes. The research question is: how the involved rural actors interact with each other to react to the resulting challenges, and why does this mode of interaction come about? The contribution presents empirical data from a survey and three case studies conducted in 2008 and 2009. The results indicate the coincidence of cooperation and unilateral action. Regional partnership is limited and every actor first tries to solve his problems by himself, and where necessary with a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Rural actors engage in cooperation most notably to acquire funding, to exchange experiences, to prepare concepts and to conduct analyses. They develop and implement their projects, however, predominantly unilaterally.rural governance, rural development, regional cooperation, actor-centred institutionalism, Community/Rural/Urban Development, R58,

Arbitrage in Energy Markets: Competing in the Incumbent's Shadow

This paper studies the welfare implications of using market mechanisms to allocate transmission capacity in recently liberalized electricity markets. It questions whether access to this essential facility should be traded on a market, or whether the incumbent should retain exclusive usage rights. We show that granting exclusive use to the incumbent might be optimal, if the capacity of the essential facility is small and the incumbent can reduce production costs by taking advantage of interregional production-cost differences. This result counters the intuition that arbitrage will improve the social surplus when there is no output contraction. The reason is that when competition is imperfect, arbitrage might reduce production efficiency. We advise policymakers to introduce market mechanisms for the allocation of transmission capacity only if sufficient investment in the network is ensured or if the market power of the incumbent is broken in at least one of the markets in which it is active.Arbitrage;electricity sector;price discrimination

On the Group Level Swiss Solvency Test

In this paper we elaborate on Swiss Solvency Test (SST) consistent group diversification effects via optimizing the web of capital and risk transfer (CRT) instruments between the legal entities. A group level SST principle states that subsidiaries can be sold by the parent company at their economic value minus some minimum capital requirement. In a numerical example we examine the dependence of the optimal CRT on this minimum capital requirement. Our findings raise the question of how to actually implement this group level SST principle and how to define the respective level of minimum capital requirements, in particular.convex optimization; group diversification; minimum capital requirement; Swiss solvency test

Arbitrage in Energy Markets: Competing in the Incumbent’s Shadow

This paper studies the welfare implications of using market mechanisms to allocate transmission capacity in recently liberalized electricity markets. It questions whether access to this essential facility should be traded on a market, or whether the incumbent should retain exclusive usage rights. We show that granting exclusive use to the incumbent might be optimal, if the capacity of the essential facility is small and the incumbent can reduce production costs by taking advantage of interregional production-cost di?erences. This result counters the intuition that arbitrage will improve the social surplus when there is no output contraction. The reason is that when competition is imperfect, arbitrage might reduce production e?ciency. We advise policymakers to introduce market mechanisms for the allocation of transmission capacity only if su?cient investment in the network is ensured or if the market power of the incumbent is broken in at least one of the markets in which it is active.Arbitrage, electricity sector, price discrimination

Arbitrage in Energy Markets: Competing in the Incumbent's Shadow

This paper studies the welfare implications of using market mechanisms to allocate transmission capacity in recently liberalized electricity markets. It questions whether access to this essential facility should be traded on a market, or whether the incumbent should retain exclusive usage rights. We show that granting exclusive use to the incumbent might be optimal, if the capacity of the essential facility is small and the incumbent can reduce production costs by taking advantage of interregional production-cost differences. This result counters the intuition that arbitrage will improve the social surplus when there is no output contraction. The reason is that when competition is imperfect, arbitrage might reduce production efficiency. We advise policymakers to introduce market mechanisms for the allocation of transmission capacity only if sufficient investment in the network is ensured or if the market power of the incumbent is broken in at least one of the markets in which it is active.Arbitrage;electricity sector;price discrimination