A Customer Service Design Case Study: Insights on Customer Loyalty in the Brazilian Food Sector

Marketing managers of local and international food companies have realized that what they offer to customers go well beyond the characteristics and attributes of the products their companies manufacture and market. Service has become an integral part of the offer (Grönroos, 1993); a high service quality improves the company competitiveness, builds customer trust, supports the company brand and other product attributes (Berry & Parasuraman, 1991, p. 12). This paper seeks to investigate whether customer care service perceived quality in the food sector is truly relevant to customer satisfaction and loyalty.quality service evaluation, consumer service, loyalty, food industry, Agribusiness, International Relations/Trade,

Determinants of Privatization Prices

Generating government revenue is a common objective in privatization. This paper asks: what determines privatization prices? Pursuing this query helps resolve the current controversies about the bearing of speed and the role for government actions prior to privatization. The data, gathered from primary sources, encompass 361 privatized Mexican companies in 49 four-digit industry codes. The determinants of auction privatization prices are divided into three groups: (1) company performance and industry parameters; (2) the auction process and its requirements; and (3) the prior restructuring actions taken by the government. Controlling for company and industry effects reveals the significant impact of the costs and characteristics of the labor force. Minority control packages carry large discounts. Auction requirements that allow foreign investors result in higher sale premia, while restrictions constraining participation or payment forms reduce net prices. The speed of privatization substantially influences net prices: the longer it takes to put the company on the block, the more severe the deterioration in performance, and the lower the premium obtained. Pre-sale reductions in labor force, and particularly the firing of CEOs, lead to significantly higher premiums. Debt absorption, investment, and performance improvement programs do not increase the net price, while de-investment measures prove more beneficial. Overall, the results show increased premia for government actions that stimulate bidder participation and expedite the privatization process.

Review of Dysmorphoptilidae Handlirsch (Hemiptera: Cicadomorpha) from the Argentinean Triassic, with description of a new subfamily, and a new species

This contribution presents new fossil insect taxa of the order Hemiptera (Cicadomorpha, Dysmorphoptilidae, Gallegomorphoptilinae subfam. n.) from the Ischichuca Formation (late Middle Triassic to early Late Triassic) from La Rioja Province (Argentina). One subfamily, one new species, and three new combinations, are proposed: Gallegomorphoptila kotejai sp. n., G. acostai comb. n., G. gigantea comb. n., G. pulcherrima comb. n. Also, a wide review of the family Dysmorphoptilidae HANDLIRSCH (diverse and well represented in the Argentinean Triassic levels), is madeFil: Martins-Neto, R.G.. Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais; BrasilFil: Gallego, Oscar Florencio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Nordeste. Centro de Ecología Aplicada del Litoral. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Centro de Ecología Aplicada del Litoral; Argentin

La privatización y la reestructuración de la fuerza laboral en todo el mundo

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Los críticos de la privatización sostienen que una reestructuración insuficiente de la fuerza laboral es una inquietud clave y que los gobiernos deberían crear mejores programas de reducción. Ponemos a prueba, empleando datos nuevos de una muestra aleatoria de 400 compañías de todo el mundo, las teorías en pugna acerca del acierto de los programas de reducción y sus repercusiones sobre los precios que pagan los compradores y las políticas de reenganche de los propietarios privados a continuación de una privatización. Nuestros resultados demuestran que los programas de reducción que llevan a cabo los gobiernos antes de una privatización están plagados de problemas de selección adversa. Al controlar la naturaleza endógena, varias políticas de reducción laboral tienen efectos negativos sobre los precios netos de la privatización. A modo de confirmación del argumento a favor de la selección adversa, varios tipos de redimensionamiento voluntario conducen a una mayor frecuencia de reenganche de los mismos trabajadores por parte de los nuevos dueños de la empresa privatizada. Los programas obligatorios basados en la capacitación son el único tipo de programas que guardan algún tipo de relación con precios más elevados y niveles más bajos de reenganche tras la privatización, pero los costos políticos y económicos de esta política pueden hacerla poco práctica. Lo más adecuado con respecto a la reducción laboral antes de una privatización parece ser una decisión moderada de no intervenir.

Privatization and labor force restructuring around the world

Some critics of privatization argue that poor labor force restructuring is a key concern and that governments should establish better retrenchment programs. Using new data from a sample of 400 companies in the world, Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes test competing theories about the wisdom of retrenchment programs and theireffect on prices paid by buyers, and rehiring policies by private owners after privatization. The results show that adverse selection plagues retrenchment programs carried out by governments before privatization. Controlling for endogeneity, several labor retrenchment policies yield a negative impact on net privatization prices. In confirmation of the adverse selection argument, various types of voluntary downsizing lead to a higher frequency of rehiring of the same workers by the new private owners. Compulsory skill-based programs are the only type of program that is marginally associated with higher prices and lower rehiring rates after privatization, but the political and economic costs of this policy may make it somewhat impractical. While a qualified non-intervention policy appears to be the safest bet in labor retrenchment before privatization, another one might be to set up a social safety net or labor reallocation program before privatization, and then let the new private owners decide who is redundant and who is not. Setting up the program before privatization may help with the political viability of the process and letting the new owners manage the retrenchment may help avoid adverse selection.Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Labor Policies,Municipal Financial Management,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Health Economics&Finance

The Truth About Privatization in Latin America

Privatization is under attack. Criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses. We evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from Latin America. There are four main results. First, the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases. Second, in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization, we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses, exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits. Third, the manner in which privatization is carried out matters. Transparency and homogeneity in procedures, speed, and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion. Finally, privatization’s success is enhanced by two complementary policies: re-regulation or deregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces; and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms’ access to capital at lower costs. Overall, the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity, firm restructuring, fiscal benefits, output growth and even quality improvements. Most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design, opaque processes with heavy state involvement, lack of re-regulation and a poor corporate governance framework.