Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition

This paper examines the elements of institutional development critical to the enhancement of company performance in transition economies. This includes initial conditions, forms of privatization, institutional frameworks and the competitiveness of markets. Comparing empirical evidence, this paper concludes that there is a clear distinction in effectiveness of policies followed and their impact between Central Europe and CIS countries. This divergence is attributed to fundamentally different political attitudes toward reform, the need of CIS governments to gain political support for reform and as a consequence of the desire of Central European countries to join European Union.privatization, corporate governance, competition, soft budget, transition economies

Why Transition Paths Differ: Russian and Chinese Enterprise Performance Compared

We use enterprise data to analyse and compare the determinants of enterprise performance in China and Russia. We find that in China, enterprise growth and efficiency is associated with rapid increases in factor inputs including management, as well as TFP, but not greatly associated with ownership or institutional factors. In contrast, sales growth in Russia is not associated with improvements in factor quantity (except for labor) or quality; TFP is not influenced by competition and privatization to outsiders does not enhance company performance relative to insider ownership. The main determinants of TFP are instead demand and institutional factors at a regional level.informal enterprise performance, privatization in Russia and China, total factor productivity

Do Institutions Have a Greater Effect on Female Entrepreneurs?

This paper compares the impact of institutions on individual decisions to become entrepreneurs in the form of new business start ups by males and females across 44 developed and developing economies between 1998 and 2004. We test four hypotheses; that women are less likely to undertake entrepreneurial activity in countries where the rule of law is weaker; where the state sector is larger; where the informal financial sector is weaker and where the formal financial sector is weaker. We use data from the Global Enterprise Monitor survey (GEM) which covers at least 2,000 individuals annually in each of up to 44 countries, merged with country-level data, from the WB WDI and Heritage Foundation. We start with a spectrum of institutional variables and by utilizing factor analysis prior to regression estimation models, we are able to obtain results that are more robust and address multicollinearity between the institutional measures. We find that women are less likely to undertake entrepreneurial activity in countries where the state sector is larger, and demonstrate that this result applies to both high aspiration and low aspiration entrepreneurship. We also find that women benefit more from the larger informal financial sector.female entrepreneurship, state sector, informal finance

Institutions, Networks and Entrepreneurship Development in Russia: An Exploration

In this paper we explore the ways in which institutions and networks influence entrepreneurial development in Russia. By utilizing new Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data collected in 2001, we investigate the effects of the weak institutional environment in Russia in terms of three dimensions: on the rate of productive entrepreneurial activity measured in terms of start-ups and existing business owners; on the characteristics of business owners; and on business financing. In addition, the analysis explores the effectiveness of Russia’s informal networks for circumventing the weak institutional environment for business development. Our results indicate that Russia’s business owners share many of the same characteristics as business owners in advanced western countries, though education is not associated with entrepreneurial activity. However, the main differences are in the sources of financing and the fact that relatively few individuals engage in productive entrepreneurial activity. Our results support the notion of the limited effectiveness of Russia’s networks for supporting entrepreneurial activity in its weak institutional environment.Entrepreneurship, Institutions, Networks, Russia

The Role of Informal Institutions in Corporate Governance: Brazil, Russia, India and China Compared

This paper argues that the role of informal institutions is central to understanding the functioning of corporate governance. We focus on the four largest emerging markets; Brazil, Russia India and China – commonly referred to as the BRIC countries. Our analysis is based on the Helmke and Levitsky framework of informal institutions and focuses on two related aspects of corporate governance: firm ownership structures and property rights; and the relationship between firms and external investors. We argue that for China and some states of India, ‘substitutive’ informal institutions, whereby informal institutions substitute for and replace ineffective formal institutions, are critical in creating corporate governance leading to positive domestic and foreign investment. In contrast, Russia is characterized by ‘competing’ informal institutions whereby various informal mechanisms of corporate governance associated with corruption and clientelism undermine the functioning of reasonably well set-out formal institutions relating to shareholder rights and relations with investors. Finally Brazil is characterized by ‘accommodating’ informal institutions which get round the effectively enforced but restrictive formal institutions and reconcile varying objectives that are held between actors in formal and informal institutions.institutions (informal and formal), corporate governance, shareholder rights, suppliers of finance, emerging markets

Shadow Economy and Entrepreneurial Entry

We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of the shadow economy on entrepreneurial entry, utilising 1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data merged with macro level variables. A simple correlation coefficient suggests a positive linear link between the size of the shadow economy and entrepreneurial entry. However, this masks more complex relationships. With appropriate controls and instrumenting for potential endogeneity where required, the impact of the shadow economy on entry is found to be negative, based on a linear specification. Moreover, there is also evidence of nonlinearity: entrepreneurial entry is least likely when the shadow economy is of medium size. We attribute the negative effects of shadow economy on entry to perceived strong competition faced by new entrants when the shadow economy is widespread. At the individual level, an extensive shadow economy has a more negative impact on respondents who are risk averse. In addition, in the economies where property rights are strong, the negative impact of the shadow economy is weaker.shadow economy, entrepreneurship

Informality as a Stepping Stone: Entrepreneurial Entry in a Developing Economy

We model decisions with respect to formality or informality for entrepreneurs in a new industry for a developing economy. We show that informality allows a leader to explore, without significant sunk costs, the potential profitability of the industry; that is, informality may be a stepping stone, enabling an entrepreneur to experiment cheaply in an uncertain environment. There are circumstances under which, without this option, the industry would not become established. We analyse the roles of parameters such as a minimum wage rate and we show that the existence of finance constraints can actually encourage entry in this context.

Regulatory Barriers and Entry in Developing Economies

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough.

Regulatory Barriers & Entry in Developing Economies

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough.Entry, Entry Barriers, Developing Economy.

The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies

Using a panel dataset containing information on FDI flows from market to transition economies, we establish the determinants of FDI inflows to Central and Eastern Europe: country risk, unit labour costs, host market size and gravity factors. In turn, we find country risk to be influenced by private sector development, industrial development, the government balance, reserves and corruption. By introducing structural shift dummy variables for key announcements of progress in EU accession we show that announcements have impacted directly upon FDI receipts but have not influenced country credit ratings. The Agenda 2000 announcement by the European Commission induced a bifurcation between the 'first wave' transition countries and the remainder of our sample. The underlying dynamics of the process illustrate that increases in FDI improve country credit ratings with a lag, hence increasing future FDI receipts. Consequently we suggest that the accession progress has the potential to induce virtuous cycles for the frontrunners but may have serious consequences for the accession laggards.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39726/3/wp342.pd