E-government in the making: socio-economic development in the Akshaya project

This paper discusses the Akshaya E-Government project. The paper uses general concepts borrowed from actor network theory to discuss the ongoing negotiation that shapes E-Government projects. We aim at shedding light on the importance of the dynamic interactions that shape the impact of ICT on government polices. In particular, we show that the nature of the service delivered and the socioeconomical development supported by the project are constantly shaped by the negotiation that occurs among the different actors involved and the consequent changes the project itself experiences. We therefore suggest to study e-Government in its making and not as results of planned action and sequential evolutionary phases

Pay for performance risks discouraging motivated employees

They dislike the effort needed for measuring performance; some change jobs, even at a pay cut, write Antonio Cordella and Tito Cordell

The internet and public bureaucracies: towards balancing competing values

Innovation in public administration is one of the central aspects of public sector reforms. Given the procedural nature of government tasks, the adoption of the Internet and related information and communication technologies (ICT) has become critical for government organisations. The aim of this paper is to discuss the implications of the diffusion Internet led innovations in the public sector on balancing public values. Rather than diminishing their benefits, we aim at highlighting challenges and dilemmas that can emerge from ICT implementation in the public sector. The paper starts by reviewing the main trends of e-government research and show a dominant view towards managerial and private sector values embedded in the literature. To propose an alternative approach, we then draw on an empirical example from Mexico, that of the Federal Transparency and Access to Government Information Law. Using Mexico’s available statistics and secondary data, the case explores how a quicker ICT-mediated interaction between citizens and government can result in social and political dilemmas. We propose to bring into play the public value paradigm to highlight these issues. Conclusions follow

Public sector reforms and the notion of 'public value': implications for egovernment deployment

Governments are increasingly investing in information and communication technologies (ICT) as tool to foster the rationalization of public administration. This paper discusses e-government within the context of governmental reforms heavily influenced by the New Public Management (NPM), which suggests that the use of ICT within the public sector will enhance efficiency, effectiveness and accountability. Based on the concept of ‘public value’ developed by Moore (1995), we propose to question the overall impact e-government initiatives may have on governments’ ability to deliver social and economic outcomes that correspond to citizens’ expectations. Our central argument is presented as follows: while ICT can help to achieve the main NPM values, e-government initiatives do not guarantee to have a positive effect on broader public values. Even when this argument is not new, in this paper we aim to strengthen the need for a deeper discussion of the implications of e-government programs in the context of public values. To do so, we propose a framework that distinguishes between clusters of public values: those that are related to managerial practices and those related to democratic values. We draw on descriptive examples to illustrate our main arguments

To give or to forgive ? aid versus debt relief

Is generalized debt relief an effective development strategy, or should assistance be tailored to countries'characteristics? To answer this question, the authors build a simple model in which recipient governments reveal their creditworthiness if donors offer them to choose between aid and debt relief. Since offering such a menu is costly, it is preferred by donors only when the cost of assistance is low, and the probability that an indebted country is creditworthy is high enough. For lower probabilities and higher costs of assistance, donors prefer a policy of only debt relief. Very limited aid is the preferred policy only for high costs of assistance, and low probabilities that the government is creditworthy.Debt Markets,External Debt,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Finance

Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs

When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. If donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, however, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may, however, lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of “aid rationing.” Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund

Country Insurance

In this paper, we examine how country insurance schemes affect policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted. Copyright 2005, International Monetary Fund

CATalytic insurance : the case of natural disasters

Why should countries buy expensive catastrophe insurance? Abstracting from risk aversion or hedging motives, this paper shows that catastrophe insurance may have a catalytic role on external finance. Such effect is particularly strong in those middle-income countries that face financial constraints when hit by a shock or in its anticipation. Insurance makes defaults less appealing, relaxes countries'borrowing constraint, increases their creditworthiness, and enhances their access to capital markets. Catastrophe lending facilities providing"cheap"reconstruction funds in the aftermath of a natural disaster weaken but do not eliminate the demand for insurance.Debt Markets,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Labor Policies,Emerging Markets,Financial Intermediation

Country Insurance

The recent wave of financial crises has fueled the debate on the effect of IFIs intervention on governments' incentives to undertake reforms. In this paper we treat this intervention more generally as a country insurance contract, and examine its implications in a stylized set-up. More precisely, we identify the conditions under which the positive insurance effect dominates moral hazard considerations, and the channels through which this is achieved. In particular, we find that the case for country insurance is stronger for crisis-prone volatile economies, especially so if assistance is made contingent on the occurrence of adverse external macroeconomic shocks. Overall, our findings argue in favor of fairly-priced country insurance or insurance-type standing credit facilities that can be factored in ex ante by the borrowing government, as opposed to the customized discretionary bailoutsFinancial Crises, Bailouts, Moral Hazard, Insurance Effect,

Country Insurance

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers’ incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: “buffering” reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, “enhancing” reforms that pay off more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted.