The Republic’s Reluctant Rulers

I attempt to resolve three closely related problems concerning philosophers’ rule over Kallipolis in Plato\u27s Republic. First and foremost, it seems that the rulers should willingly take up ruling, since it is just to rule and the rulers are just people. So why does Plato emphasize that they must be compelled to rule? Second, since just acts are beneficial, how does ruling, qua just act, benefit philosophers? Third, since Plato has been accused of jumping unfairly between just actions and just souls, what exactly is the connection between the two? I submit that these questions are intricately related, so that the answer for each depends on that of the next

A Platonic Trope Bundle Theory

This paper provides a rational reconstruction of a Platonic trope bundle theory that is a live alternative to contemporary bundle theories. According to the theory, Platonic particulars are composed of what Plato calls images of Forms; contemporary metaphysicians call these tropes. Tropes are dependent on Forms and the Receptacle, while trope bundles are structured by natural kinds using the Phaedo's principles of inclusion and exclusion and the Timaeus’ geometrised elements, as well as by co-location in the Receptacle. Key elements of discussion include persistence and abundance of Plato's tropes. The resulting theory is compared with contemporary trope bundle theories

Days of the Gandy Dancers

BACK then, oh maybe fifteen-twenty years ago, we had a thing we called Gandy Dancer\u27s Day. It wasn\u27t any kind of a celebration we was inclined to look forward to, like the county fair or Sheldon\u27s Carnival, and it didn\u27t help none to know how good our chances was to get two or three days of it

The Ontology of the Secret Doctrine in Plato’s Theaetetus

The paper offers an interpretation of a disputed portion of Plato’s Theaetetus that is often called the Secret Doctrine. It is presented as a process ontology that takes two types of processes, swift and slow motions, as fundamental building blocks for ordinary material objects. Slow motions are powers which, when realized, generate swift motions, which, in turn, are subjectively bundled to compose sensible objects and perceivers. Although the reading of the Secret Doctrine offered here—a new version of the “Causal Theory interpretation”—is not without problems, these problems are acknowledged in Plato’s text, confirming that this interpretation is correct

Making Room for Particulars: Plato’s Receptacle as Space, Not Substratum

The ‘traditional’ interpretation of the Receptacle in Plato’s Timaeus maintains that its parts act as substrata to ordinary particulars such as dogs and tables: particulars are form-matter compounds to which Forms supply properties and the Receptacle supplies a substratum, as well as a space in which these compounds come to be. I argue, against this view, that parts of the Receptacle cannot act as substrata for those particulars. I also argue, making use of contemporary discussions of supersubstantivalism, against a substratum interpretation that separates substratum and space in the Timaeus

We Should Always Call the Receptacle the Same Thing: Timaeus 50b6-51b6

Plato’s Timaeus is a challenge to understand and to interpret, but its central ontological innovation, a third kind in addition to the standard Platonic categories of Being and Becoming, is, even according to Timaeus himself, a murky and difficult topic. I endeavor to shed a meager light on this shadowy entity, the Receptacle of all Becoming, by examining an argument Timaeus gives for the claim that “we should always call it the same thing” (50b6-7).[1] This claim comes immediately after the famous gold analogy, about which I will say only a few words, and so it also closely follows the “much misread” passage of 49c7-50b5, about which I will say even less.[2] At the other end of the argument (51b6-e6), Timaeus takes up the question of the existence of Forms; this is another topic I will leave aside. What I will do is to focus on the argument that is given in the nine lines from 50b6-c6 and explained in the following page (50c7-51b6), employing what is perhaps “bastard reasoning” to extract from this passage some clear dogmata about this unclear kind.[3] [1] All references are to Burnet’s edition of the Timaeus, unless otherwise noted. Translations are my own. [2] Interpretations of this passage include Cherniss 1954, Cornford 1937, pp. 178-81, Gulley 1960, Lee 1967, McCabe 1994, pp. 179-84, Miller 2003, Mohr 1980, pp. 138-44, reprinted in Mohr 1985, pp. 85-91, and Mohr 2005, pp. 83-90, Prior 1985, pp. 109-10, Silverman 1992, Silverman 2002, pp. 257-65, Taylor 1928, White 1981, pp. 307-19, Zeyl 1975, and Zeyl 2000, pp. lvi-lxiv. [3] In this paper I will not claim that Plato believes there is a Receptacle with such a nature as is laid out in the Timaeus, although I think this is likely. Instead, I’ll discuss what Timaeus, the character in the dialogue, tells us about the Receptacle

Compulsion to Rule in Plato’s Republic

Three problems threaten any account of philosophical rule in the Republic. First, Socrates is supposed to show that acting justly is always beneficial, but instead he extols the benefits of having a just soul. He leaves little reason to believe practical justice and psychic justice are connected and thus to believe that philosophers will act justly. In response to this problem, I show that just acts produce just souls. Since philosophers want to have just souls, they will act justly. Second, Socrates’ alleged aim is to demonstrate that justice is beneficial, but philosophers, who have to give up a life of philosophy to rule, actually appear to be harmed by ruling. I explain that, since the founders of the city justly command them to rule, philosophers cannot, in fact, obtain a better life, and so ruling does not harm them. Third, it seems incongruous that philosophers, who should, as just people, jump at the opportunity to rule Kallipolis, must be compelled to rule. I show that Plato carefully constructs an educational system that produces rulers who do not want to rule, since such rulers alone will rule best