Peer Reviews on the Fight against Terrorism a Hidden Success of EU Security Governance?

This paper provides a first study on use of professional peer reviews by the EU to strengthen the European fight against terrorism. The first part outlines two theoretical approaches to assessing the outcome effectiveness of such peer reviews, namely compliance and learning. Peer reviews can serve both ends and have been increasingly touted as an effective tool to address transnational threats. The second part analyzes the evolution and impact of the EU's peer reviews on the fight against terrorism. Although the first peer review took several years to complete, it was regarded as a striking success that improved mutual trust and the coherence of the international fight against terrorism. It was therefore followed by a second peer review on consequence management in response to terrorist attacks. From a critical perspective, it is shown that the impact of these peer reviews could be doubted from both a compliance and learning perspective, as monitoring and flanking measures have remained too weak. The conclusions point to additional political or normative deficits of peer reviews in EU security policy-making.

Public Good Theory and the 'Added Value' of the EU's Counterterrorism Policy

This paper develops a deductive theoretical framework for assessing the EU's added value in the fight against terrorism. The first part argues that public good theory helps to conceptualize objectives of international counterterrorism cooperation and the respective role of international organizations. It critically evaluates existing discussions of security cooperation from this theoretical perspective and sets out a typology of policies according to three aggregation technologies (weaker links, summation, better shot), each of which is linked to a specific set of governance challenges. The second part surveys the EU's counterterrorism efforts on this basis. Weaker link issues - such as the protection of the movement of people, goods and capital - and the related problem of mutual assurance have been quite successfully addressed, even if there is increasing uncertainty over the boundaries of cooperation. In contrast, the EU fell short with regard to joint efforts in the fight against terrorism due to the non-excludable nature of benefits, as in the case of foreign policy, or (partial) rivalry of consumption, as in the case of intelligence sharing or disaster response capacities. Finally, the EU increasingly supports better shot initiatives to develop new instruments and technologies to combat terrorism, but is often overtaken by mini-lateral forms of cooperation.counterterrorism, public good theory, international organisations, European Union

EU Civilian Crisis Management and Organisational Learning

Commentators and policy-makers stress the need to learn the lessons of EU civilian crisis management. Yet despite numerous case studies mission performance, we know little about the EU's overall capacity for such learning. The first part of this article outlines a theoretical framework for analysing organisational learning in the context of peace operations. It recommends focusing on administrative reform and conceptual development in Brussels, and lists various factors that are expected to facilitate or inhibit organisational learning cycles. On this basis, second part presents a historical survey of the EU's learning efforts in civilian crisis management. Despite a dynamic expansion of mission tasks as well as corresponding review processes, organisational learning has remained haphazard and limited to capacity expansion or mission support requirements. Only over the last two years did the EU invest in more formalised lessons-learning processes, which led to improved information gathering across missions and created more space for conceptual discussions on mission objectives. Yet at the time of writing, this increased institutional momentum for learning could not overcome fundamental political constraints on more ambitious reforms of EU peace operations

Assessing the EU's Added Value in the Area of Terrorism Prevention and Violent Radicalisation

This paper questions the effectiveness and the prospects of EU efforts to prevent terrorism and violent radicalisation. After the terrorist of attacks of Madrid and London,, member states agreed on a comprehensive strategy to prevent radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, but simultaneously underlined the limits of EU competences. The European Commission therefore focused on indirect measures, such as research support. Over time, however, both flexible cooperation among a subset of member states and new EU initiatives generated few or biased policy outputs. The second part of the paper questions the resulting proposal to create a network of local or sub-national actors for best practice exchange. It is argued that preventive counterterrorism relies on contentious scientific evidence and that authoritative evaluations remain tied to national policy-making. Finally, the EU Commission cannot mobilise sufficient resources to ensure that 'frontline' organisations, such as police services, implement new practices. The conclusions raise further research questions on the use of knowledge and complex governance patterns in EU internal security

Public Good Theory and the 'Added Value' of the EU's Counterterrorism Policy

This paper develops a deductive theoretical framework for assessing the EU's added value in the fight against terrorism. The first part argues that public good theory helps to conceptualize objectives of international counterterrorism cooperation and the respective role of international organizations. It critically evaluates existing discussions of security cooperation from this theoretical perspective and sets out a typology of policies according to three aggregation technologies (weaker links, summation, better shot), each of which is linked to a specific set of governance challenges. The second part surveys the EU's counterterrorism efforts on this basis. Weaker link issues - such as the protection of the movement of people, goods and capital - and the related problem of mutual assurance have been quite successfully addressed, even if there is increasing uncertainty over the boundaries of cooperation. In contrast, the EU fell short with regard to joint efforts in the fight against terrorism due to the non-excludable nature of benefits, as in the case of foreign policy, or (partial) rivalry of consumption, as in the case of intelligence sharing or disaster response capacities. Finally, the EU increasingly supports better shot initiatives to develop new instruments and technologies to combat terrorism, but is often overtaken by mini-lateral forms of cooperation

Peer Reviews on the Fight against Terrorism a Hidden Success of EU Security Governance?

This paper provides a first study on use of professional peer reviews by the EU to strengthen the European fight against terrorism. The first part outlines two theoretical approaches to assessing the outcome effectiveness of such peer reviews, namely compliance and learning. Peer reviews can serve both ends and have been increasingly touted as an effective tool to address transnational threats. The second part analyzes the evolution and impact of the EU's peer reviews on the fight against terrorism. Although the first peer review took several years to complete, it was regarded as a striking success that improved mutual trust and the coherence of the international fight against terrorism. It was therefore followed by a second peer review on consequence management in response to terrorist attacks. From a critical perspective, it is shown that the impact of these peer reviews could be doubted from both a compliance and learning perspective, as monitoring and flanking measures have remained too weak. The conclusions point to additional political or normative deficits of peer reviews in EU security policy-making

The next steps for EU counterterrorism policy: evolving threats of Jihadism, right-wing extremism, and transatlantic cooperation

In the wake of the Corona pandemic and the storming of the Capitol, threat perceptions with regard to right-wing extremists and conspiracy theories have increased markedly. The attacks in France and Austria last November showed that the threat from jihadist terrorism also remains acute. Against this background, the counter­terrorism agenda of the European Union (EU) was updated at the end of 2020 and covers a broad range of topics. However, it also testifies to the heterogeneity of the Union's competences and the different interests of EU member states. On the one hand, the EU's role remains limited when it comes to the rehabilitation of imprisoned terrorists and to the broad societal prevention of extremism. On the other hand, the EU is pushing forward with a set of regulations to remove illegal online content. This common legislative agenda is also part of a renewed transatlantic partnership. How­ever, pro­active measures against right-wing terrorism will, for the time being, be advanced in flexible coalitions. (author's abstract

EU border security in a time of pandemic: restoring the Schengen regime in the face of old conflicts and new requirements for public health

The massive mobility restrictions in the Schengen zone that were imposed to control the Corona pandemic are to be lifted from mid-June onwards. If a second wave of infec­tions does not follow suit, the German EU Council Presidency may oversee the end of all remaining internal border controls. The reform of the Schengen regulation, which has been overdue since the migration crisis, can be relaunched. The link between secure external borders and internal freedom of movement should have already been reappraised. Looking forward, targeted checks on persons for reasons of public health must be better coordinated. The forthcoming EU pact on migration and asylum will be even more difficult to agree on, however. Access to asylum procedures must be guaranteed without fail, despite national responsibility for public health. (author's abstract

The expansion of Frontex: symbolic measures and long-term changes in EU border management

Strengthening external border management remains the lowest common denomina­tor among Member States of the European Union (EU). Plans to expand the European Border and Coastguard Agency (Frontex) were formally adopted at the beginning of November. However, they will do little to meet the most pressing challenges of the EU’s migration policy. The goal of placing 10,000 border guards under the command of Frontex can only be achieved in the medium term. While some EU Member States currently use illegal practices to secure their national borders, Frontex is increasingly subject to legal controls; operational missions are only possible by invitation from the country of deployment. Without violating legal principles, Frontex alone will not be able to accelerate the return of those who are the subject of removal orders from the EU. Nevertheless, the forthcoming Frontex reform will provide some additional tech­nical value for securing the EU’s external borders. Under changed political circumstances, the agency may be a pioneer for more European and operational security cooperation. (author's abstract