Cultural replication and microbial evolution

The aim of this paper is to argue that cultural evolution is in many ways much more similar to microbial than to macrobial biological evolution. As a result, we are better off using microbial evolution as the model of cultural evolution. And this shift from macrobial to microbial entails adjusting the theoretical models we can use for explaining cultural evolution

The appointment: a communion sermon

1 Corinthians 11:2

Do we sense modalities with our sense modalities?1

It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fai

Success semantics: the sequel

The aim of this paper is to reinterpret success semantics, a theory of mental content, according to which the content of a belief is fixed by the success conditions of some actions based on this belief. After arguing that in its present form, success semantics is vulnerable to decisive objections, I examine the possibilities of salvaging the core of this proposal. More specifically, I propose that the content of some very simple, but very important, mental states, the immediate mental antecedents of action, can be explained in this manne

Do we see apples as edible?

Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out that Susanna Siegel's influential argument in favor of the claim that we represent sortal properties perceptually does not work. Second, I argue that we can fix this argument if we replace the sortal property in question with the property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in genera

The changing market for distribution: implications for Exel Logistics

This paper has been written to compliment a previous Working Paper (The Evolution of a Distribution Brand: The Case of Exel Logistics) and to some extent allows that company’s development (1989- 1993) to be placed in the context of marketplace and industry changes. I wish to examine three of the main trends affecting the distribution industry over the same period. Firstly, the move towards the centralisation of operations by both manufacturers and retailers, secondly at the debate surrounding contracting-out and in-house distribution activities and finally, the issues under consideration must be seen in a wider context - that of distribution and the Single European Market (SEM), which could be said to be the most important development facing the distribution industry for many years. These trends will be discussed in some detail and, where appropriate, from Exel Logistics’ perspective in order to consider how far the company has gone both in dealing with marketplace changes and in achieving its aims.School of Managemen

Function attribution depends on the explanatory context: A Reply to Neander and Rosenberg's Reply to Nanay

In ‘A modal theory of function’, I gave an argument against all existing theories of function and outlined a new theory. Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg argue against both my negative and my positive claim. My aim here is not merely to defend my account from their objections, but to (a) very briefly point out that the new account of etiological function they propose in response to my criticism cannot avoid the circularity worry either and, more importantly, to (b) highlight, and attempt to make precise, an important feature of my modal theory that may have been understated in the original paper – that function attributions depend on the explanatory project at hand