Exclusive vs Overlapping Viewers in Media Markets

This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price for advertising opportunities to multi-homing viewers. Strategic incentives of firms in this setting are different than those in former models of media markets. If viewers can only watch one channel, then firms compete for marginal consumers by reducing the amount of advertising on their channels. In our model, channels have an incentive to increase levels of advertising, in order to reduce the overlap in viewership. We take an account of the differences between the predictions of the two types of models and find that our model is more consistent with recent developments in broadcasting markets. We also show that if channels can charge subscription fees on viewers, then symmetric firms can end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one collects all or most of its revenues from advertisers, while the other channel collects most of its revenues via viewer fees

Exclusive vs Overlapping Viewers in Media Markets

This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price for advertising opportunities to multi-homing viewers. Strategic incentives of firms in this setting are different than those in former models of media markets. If viewers can only watch one channel, then firms compete for marginal consumers by reducing the amount of advertising on their channels. In our model, channels have an incentive to increase levels of advertising, in order to reduce the overlap in viewership. We take an account of the differences between the predictions of the two types of models and find that our model is more consistent with recent developments in broadcasting markets. We also show that if channels can charge subscription fees on viewers, then symmetric firms can end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one collects all or most of its revenues from advertisers, while the other channel collects most of its revenues via viewer fees.

Exclusive vs Overlapping Viewers in Media Markets

This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price for advertising opportunities to multi-homing viewers. Strategic incentives of firms in this setting are different than those in former models of media markets. If viewers can only watch one channel, then firms compete for marginal consumers by reducing the amount of advertising on their channels. In our model, channels have an incentive to increase levels of advertising, in order to reduce the overlap in viewership. We take an account of the differences between the predictions of the two types of models and find that our model is more consistent with recent developments in broadcasting markets. We also show that if channels can charge subscription fees on viewers, then symmetric firms can end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one collects all or most of its revenues from advertisers, while the other channel collects most of its revenues via viewer fees.Media; Multihoming; Platform Competition; Two-Sided Markets

Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships

This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the resulting value of a viewer for the other platform. We label this form of competition "either or both." A central result is that platform ownership does not affect advertising levels, despite nontrivial strategic interaction between platforms. This result holds for general viewer demand functions and is robust to allowing for viewer fees. We show that the equilibrium advertising level is inefficiently high. We also demonstrate that entry of a platform leads to an increase in the advertising level if viewers' preferences for the platforms are negatively correlated, which contrasts with predictions of standard models with either/or competition. We validate this result in an empirical analysis using panel data for the U.S. cable television industry

PRIDE Inspector: a tool to visualize and validate MS proteomics data

PRIDE Inspector thus provides a user-friendly, comprehensive tool for the browsing, inspection, and evaluation of data in the PRIDE database, or in a compatible standard file format. As such, we believe that PRIDE Inspector will substantially increase the ability of researchers, editors and peer-reviewers to explore, review, evaluate, and reuse proteomics data.This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust (grant number WT085949MA) and EMBL core funding. R.G.C. is supported by EU FP7 grant SLING (grant number 226073). J.A.V. is supported by the EU FP7 grants LipidomicNet (grant number 202272) and ProteomeXchange (grant number 260558). A.F. was partially supported by the Spanish network COMBIOMED (RD07/0067/0006, ISCIII-FIS). L.M. would like to acknowledge support from the EU FP7 PRIME-XS grant (grant number 262067)

The PRoteomics IDEntification (PRIDE) Converter 2 Framework: An Improved Suite of Tools to Facilitate Data Submission to the PRIDE Database and the ProteomeXchange Consortium

The original PRIDE Converter tool greatly simplified the process of submitting mass spectrometry (MS)-based proteomics data to the PRIDE database. However, after much user feedback, it was noted that the tool had some limitations and could not handle several user requirements that were now becoming commonplace. This prompted us to design and implement a whole new suite of tools that would build on the successes of the original PRIDE Converter and allow users to generate submission-ready, well-annotated PRIDE XML files. The PRIDE Converter 2 tool suite allows users to convert search result files into PRIDE XML (the format needed for performing submissions to the PRIDE database), generate mzTab skeleton files that can be used as a basis to submit quantitative and gel-based MS data, and post-process PRIDE XML files by filtering out contaminants and empty spectra, or by merging several PRIDE XML files together. All the tools have both a graphical user interface that provides a dialog-based, user-friendly way to convert and prepare files for submission, as well as a command-line interface that can be used to integrate the tools into existing or novel pipelines, for batch processing and power users. The PRIDE Converter 2 tool suite will thus become a cornerstone in the submission process to PRIDE and, by extension, to the ProteomeXchange consortium of MS-proteomics data repositories.publishedVersio

Either or Both Competition: A 'Two-Sided' Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the influence of preinfarction angina on the long-term survival rate of non-thrombolized patients. MATERIAL AND METHODS: A prospective, observational study, in which 122 patients admitted at the coronary care unit at Hospital Nacional Edgardo Rebagliati Martins with a diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction (AMI) who did not undergo thrombolysis and survived to the acute intrahospitalary period, who were followed through a period of 5 years, was made. The main outcome measures were overall mortality and cardiac events. Patients were divided into 4 groups according to the presence or not, and characteristics of preinfarction angina. RESULTS: Kaplan-Meier analysis showed that those with preinfarction angina had a shorter survival and more cardiac events, as compared with those without preinfarction angina (p < 0,05). History of angina more than 30 days before AMI also correlates with shorter survival and more cardiac events, as compared with those without preinfarction angina or with recent onset angina (p <0,05). CONCLUSIONS: Non-thrombolized patients with history of previous angina had a worst long-term prognosis, with the exception of those with early onset angina.OBJETIVO: Evaluar la influencia de la angina preinfarto en el pronóstico a largo plazo en el paciente no trombolizado. METODOLOGÍA: Se realizó un estudio prospectivo, observacional no concurrente, en 122 pacientes con infarto agudo de miocardio (IMA) no trombolizado, atendidos en la UCIC-HERM y que sobrevivieron al período agudo intrahospitalario. Los indicadores del seguimiento a cinco años fueron: mortalidad general y otros eventos cardíacos. Seleccionamos cuatro grupos de pacientes de acuerdo a la ausencia o al tipo de angina. RESULTADOS: Las curvas de Kaplan-Meier muestran que los pacientes con angina previa tienen menor sobrevida y mayor ocurrencia de eventos cardíacos comparado con los pacientes sin antecedente de angina (p <0,05). Los pacientes con antecedente de angina estable o inestable de más de un mes antes del IMA también tuvieron menor sobrevida y mayor tasa de eventos cardíacos en comparación con los que presentaron angina de reciente inicio o no tenían angina (p <0,05). CONCLUSIONES: A excepción de la angina de reciente inicio, el antecedente de angina tiene un efecto desfavorable a largo plazo en el paciente con IMA no trombolizado

Either or both competition: A "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships

In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effects on advertising levels and the impact of entry and mergers. We identify novel forces which reflect outlets' incentives to control the composition of their customer base. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain several empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models