THE OMC IN THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT POLICY: BRINGING SOCIALISATION IN

This paper argues in favour of a more thorough analysis of a specific set of dynamics taking place in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the latter being conceived as an informal organizational framework aimed at mutual learning (de Burca and Zeitlin, 2003) and policy change (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Radaelli, 2000). The aim of this paper is to uncover the missing link between these two elements, which has hitherto been black-boxed by the literature. Theoretical tools from International Relations (IR) theories (i.e. constructivist institutionalism) are borrowed in order to circumvent such a fallacy. The premises are the same as the ones hitherto employed by scholars studying the OMC (e.g. Jacobsson, 2004): can norms and values assume a binding character even outside the ‘territorially bounded democratic government’ (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008) and thus leading to policy change? If so, how does this phenomenon take place? Nevertheless, the approach is different, in that it builds on two closely interrelated factors: the concept of socialisation with its micro-processes (Johnston, 2001; Johnston, 2008) and the institutional characteristics of social environments (Rogowski, 1999). Accordingly, this paper will address the question: is the OMC in European employment policy a social environment conducive of socialisation?Open Method of Coordination, mode of governance, policy learning, socialisation Romania

Better than asking: an experiment on the effectiveness of FOI requests

In July 2015 the government appointed a new independent commission to look into how the law on freedom of information (FOI) is working. Having received 30,000 pieces of evidence, the commission has also managed to unite the Guardian and the Daily Mail against it while Labour has responded with its own alternative review. Here, Ben Worthy, Peter John, and Matia Vannoni explain how their field experiment provides evidence that FOI requests work, and that they are twice as likely to get a response than informal requests

A costly commitment: populism, economic performance, and the quality of bureaucracy

We study the consequences of populism for economic performance and the quality of bureaucracy. When voters lose trust in representative democracy, populists strategically supply unconditional policy commitments that are easier to monitor for voters. When in power, populists try to implement their policy commitments regardless of financial constraints and expert assessment of the feasibility of their policies, worsening government economic performance and dismantling resistance from expert bureaucrats. With novel data on more than 8,000 Italian municipalities covering more than 20 years, we estimate the effect of electing a populist mayor with a close-election regression discontinuity design. We find that the election of a populist mayor leads to smaller repayments of debts, a larger share of procurement contracts with cost overruns, higher turnover among top bureaucrats – driven by forced rather than voluntary departures – and a sharp decrease in the percentage of graduate bureaucrats

Quality of legislation and compliance: a natural language processing approach

Several disciplines, such as economics, law, and political science, emphasize the importance of legislative quality, namely well-written legislation. Low-quality legislation cannot be easily implemented because the texts create interpretation problems. To measure the quality of legal texts, we use information from the syntactic and lexical features of their language and apply these measures to a dataset of European Union legislation that contains detailed information on its transposition and decision-making process. We find that syntactic complexity and vagueness are negatively related to member states’ compliance with legislation. The finding on vagueness is robust to controlling for member states’ preferences, administrative resources, length of texts, and discretion. However, the results for syntactic complexity are less robust

Where Are the Revolving Doors in Brussels? Sector Switching and Career Progression in EU Business–Government Affairs

By applying event history analysis to a unique large sample of more than 300 government affairs managers working for companies active in the European Union (EU), this article investigates whether managers with work experience in the public or nonprofit sector are more likely to progress in their career in their current company and whether career progression depends on when that experience takes place. The findings suggest that managers with experience in the public and nonprofit sector are less likely to progress in their careers. This effect becomes stronger when the stage of the career at which the manager had experience in the public sector is taken into consideration. These findings are contrary to the expectations from the public and private management literature and suggest that we should see less revolving door activity in Brussels. We propose that these findings are driven by the distinct EU public policy process and the variance in individual and organizational incentives in the EU public sector

Transparency at the parish pump: a field experiment to measure the effectiveness of freedom of information requests in England

How effective are systems of transparency, such as Freedom of Information (FOI) requests? The ambitious aims of FOI laws hinge on whether requests produce the desired information for the citizens or groups that use them. The question is whether such legally mandated requests work better than more informal mechanisms. Despite the high hopes of advocates, organizational routines, lack of awareness or resistance may limit legal access and public bodies may seek to comply minimally rather than behave in concordance with the spirit of the law. This article reports a field experiment that compared FOI requests and informal nonlegal asks to assess which is more effective in accessing information from English parish councils. The basic premise of statutory access is borne out. FOI requests are more effective than simple asks and the size or preexisting level of openness of a body appears to make little difference to their responsiveness. FOI requests are more effective in encouraging bodies to do more than the law asks (concordance) than encouraging more minimal levels of legal cooperation, when a body simply fulfills its obligations to varying degrees (compliance).This finding indicates high levels of support for FOI once it is within the system

A Comparative Test of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory:Policy Punctuations in Tobacco Control

Tobacco control plays a central role in the development of the punctuated equilibrium theory. The proponents of the theory posit that this policy, like many others, develops through punctuations, namely the combination of periods of policy inertia, due to negative feedback effects, and drastic policy change, due to positive feedback effects. Yet little has been done to empirically test this claim. By relying on a unique dataset of policy changes in tobacco taxation and regulation across multiple countries over the last decades, the article tests the punctuation hypothesis in tobacco control. Findings show that tobacco control evolves through long periods of policy inertia, followed by short periods of drastic change, namely punctuations, thus providing further support for the punctuated equilibrium theory. This article presents the first large-N test of the punctuated equilibrium theory on tobacco control

studying preference attainment using spatial models

Interest group influence represents the Higgs boson of contemporary social research. Scholars have tried to define and measure influence for decades: tens of different definitions are used in the literature and as many methods to measure it can be found. The literature has recently converged towards an agreement on how to study interest group influence: preference attainment. The latter has monopolised the research in the literature in the last years. Yet, a discussion on what preference attainment is, what it does and what it does not is still missing in the literature. This works aims to fill this gap by providing a theoretical and methodological informed discussion on interest group influence and preference attainment. In so doing, I propose a novel method to apply preference attainment in an effective and efficient manner