Conflict or Interaction between OPEC and GECF? A Mixed Approach of Game Theory and Variable Dynamic Models over Time

The restrictions on oil reserves and environmental hazards have led resource-rich countries to focus their attention on gas energy. In this regard, the importance of gas as an appropriate energy source will become even more significant in the coming years. The establishment of a cartel consisting of natural gas producers and exporters in order to achieve strategies for managing and controlling the gas market demonstrates this importance. This paper examines the confrontation or interaction between oil OPEC and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (gas GECF); using the time series data for OPEC and GECF gas and oil demand in the period from 1970-1 to 2016-4. Regarding the coefficients obtained from the estimation of OPEC and OPEC gas and solving their equations simultaneously in the MATLAB 2014 software, the following results have been obtained; based on the cumulative response function in the case of the formation of a gas cartel, these two cartels will choose collusion strategies. The reason for this can be searched in some common members of the two cartels. Also, based on the impulse response function, oil demand is evaluated more than gas demand. It can be due to the multiple uses of oil over gas which increase the intensive substitution between these two products.