Donald Trump’s flawed plan to strong-arm other countries into “one-on-one” trade deals.

In late January, President Trump stated that he would be pushing for new “one-on-one” trade deals with specific countries to replace multilateral agreements; exploiting US economic clout to negotiate deals which benefit the US the most. Markus Gastinger has created an index of trade and economic power in order to determine which countries Trump might try to target. He finds that countries and blocs with which the US has a large trade deficit, such as China and the European Union are too powerful to make good targets. On the other hand, less powerful countries, such as Vietnam and Japan could simply refuse to negotiate. Either way, Trump’s trade policy may well end up being a continuation of the status quo

Will another country follow the UK out of the EU? This is why it's unlikely

The UK's decision to leave the European Union raised the prospect that other member states could follow suit. But are any other states likely to give up their membership? Markus Gastinger (University of Salzburg) presents an 'exit index' that captures how likely EU members are to leave, and finds it unlikely

The 'exit index': how likely are other countries to follow in the UK's footsteps?

Ever since the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union in June 2016, one question has been on the minds of many Europeans: which other member states could leave the EU in the years ahead? In fact, one argument among Brexiteers in the run-up to the referendum was that the UK needs to break free from the EU as a ’failing political project’, a mantra repeated by Leave supporters to this day. But how likely is it that the EU will fail

Understanding the role of joint bodies in EU external relations

Many international agreements made by the European Union establish new institutional mechanisms such as committees and working groups. Drawing on new research, Andreas Dür and Markus Gastinger explain how these ‘joint bodies’ help facilitate cooperation between the EU and third countries, and what they mean for the balance of power between the EU’s institutions

The tables have turned on the European Commission : the changing nature of the pre-negotiation phase in EU bilateral trade agreements

Published online: 16 Sep 2015We argue that one prime source of Commission autonomy in bilateral trade negotiations was the informational advantage that it acquired during the pre-negotiations, which is the phase preceding the adoption of negotiating directives by the Council. Initially, the Commission was entirely unmonitored owing to the lack of Treaty provisions applying to this stage in the negotiations. The Commission used this information asymmetry strategically vis-a-vis the Council to move outcomes closer to its ideal point. Later, member states have stepped up police-patrol monitoring manifesting itself empirically through two different channels. First, they have shifted the institutional arena for more political aspects to annual ministerial meetings. Second, preparatory works on a technical level are today followed by national experts. We examine this argument by adopting a principal-agent perspective and against the backdrop of EU-India relations.Is based on chapter of EUI PhD thesis, 201

EU trade agreements and European integration : Commission autonomy or Council control?

Published online: 23 November 2023Part available in Open Access: Introduction chapterEU Trade Agreements and European Integration studies 50 bilateral trade agreements negotiated by the European Commission from 1970–2008 and how they shaped European integration. The book argues that the Commission used these trade agreements, signed primarily with countries in Asia and Latin America, to advance European integration by ensuring that they became wider in scope and institutionally deeper by establishing ‘joint bodies’ – even in the face of resistance from member states in the Council of the European Union. Drawing upon principal–agent theory to explain Commission autonomy and Council control as well as extensive archival material and other sources across six in-depth case studies, it shows that the Commission primarily relied on asymmetric information to shape trade agreements in earlier negotiations. In later negotiations, the Commission harnessed its agendasetting power to submit agreements that the Council could only accept or reject. Overall, the book argues that these 50 trade agreements significantly impacted European integration by increasing the Commission’s external action capability, transforming it into a truly global political actor – one trade agreement at a time. This book will be of interest to scholars and students of European Union Studies and EU policy-making, practitioners involved in trade and external relations, and engaged citizens in Europe and abroad, particularly in India, which is prominently featured in the book.-- Introduction -- 1. Theorising Commission autonomy and Council control: Motive, means, and opportunity -- 2. The process and patterns of trade agreements -- 3. The Commercial Cooperation Agreement with India (1970–1973) -- 4. The trade agreement with China (1975–1978) -- 5. The Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement with India (1978–1981) -- 6. The Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development with India (1992–1993) -- 7. The Association Agreement with Chile (1998–2002) -- 8. The Economic Partnership Agreement with CARIFORUM (2002–2007) -- 9. ConclusionPublished version of EUI PhD thesis, 201

Negotiating bilateral trade agreements in the European Union : Commission autonomy and Member State control

Defence date: 18 November 2014Examining Board: Prof. Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (supervisor) Prof. Andreas Dür, University of Salzburg (co-supervisor) Prof. László Bruszt, European University Institute Prof. Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt, Dresden University of TechnologyWhich issues does the Commission focus on in the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements? How (to what extent) autonomous is the Commission, which sources and causal mechanisms bring this autonomy to bear, and have these sources changed over time? Which is the most effective mechanism of control available to member states in the Council to rein in the Commission? These are the three interrelated questions addressed by this study. Concerning the first question, I find that the Commission focuses on inte-gration issues. These are primarily found in the joint bodies established by the underly-ing agreements as well as the number of substantive issues mentioned therein. On ques-tion number two, I find that the Commission distinctly shapes BTAs slightly over 50 per-cent of the time. The primary source of Commission autonomy in the 1970s and 1980s was asymmetric information, i.e. the Commission having greater knowledge about all contingencies in the negotiations than the member states. More recently, Commission autonomy is better captured by its agenda-setting power, here defined as its ability to put before the Council an agreement that member states can vote only either up-or-down. With regard to question three I find that, initially, member states’ credible threat of non-ratification provided the most effective backstop to the Commission running lose. Over time, member states have stepped up monitoring mechanisms to take control of negotiations earlier, making direct oversight the most important tool for Council control. I examine and expound this argument by adopting a Principal-Agent (PA) perspective and process-tracing methodology against the backdrop of six in-depth case studies se-lected in accordance with objective and replicable criteria, of which five are retained for the final analysis. In conclusion, I join the camp of scholars making the case for a significant independent causal influence of the Commission on European public policy out-comes

Play it again, Sam! : teaching transferable skills through multiple repetitions of 'simple' simulations (with research benefits)

First published online: 12 June 2017The use of simulations in higher education teaching is burgeoning in political science curricula, particularly in international relations and European Union studies. This article contends that most simulations suffer from complexity bias and put too much emphasis on substantive knowledge. Drawing on the author’s experience, two ideal types of simulations are developed. ‘Complex’ simulations focusing on negotiating content and ‘simple’ simulations focusing on negotiating dynamics. It is argued that the transmission of transferable skills is facilitated by multiple repetitions of similar negotiating contexts within the same module. This suggests that instructors face a trade-off between teaching transferable skills and substantive knowledge and should locate their simulations at either end of this continuum. Where students are not native speakers, not yet familiar with specialised terminology or simply unversed in negotiating dynamics, there is a particularly strong argument to make for carrying out simple simulations first, followed by complex simulations later in the curriculum. Finally, opportunities for collaborative research are highlighted. Gathering and pooling data from simple simulations bridges pedagogy and research at minimal additional cost