Keynesianism, Pennsylvania Avenue Style: Some Economic Consequences of the Employment Act of 1946

The Employment Act of 1946 created the Council of Economic Advisers as an institution and serves as a convenient marker of a broader change in opinions: the assumption by the federal government of the role of stability the macro- economy. The magnitude of this shift should not be understated: before the Great Depression strong currents of macroeconomic theory held that stabiliza- tion policy was positively unwise. It solved problems in the present only by storing up deeper and more dangerous problems for the future. Yet as a result of the shift in opinions and sentiments marked by the 1946 Employment Act, no government since WWII has dared do anything other than let fiscal automatic stabilizers swing into action during recession. This may have been a significant force tending to moderate the post-WWII business cycle, but the bulk of the CEA's time and energy now and in the past has been devoted not to macroeconomic but to microeconomic issues. The CEA has been one of the few advocates of the public interest in allocative efficiency present in the government. The CEA has been more successful in its microeconomic role than many would have predicted ex ante. Its relative success can be traced to the staffing pattern set up by two strong early chairs Arthur Burns and Walter Heller who made sure that the CEA staff was largely composed of short-term appointees whose principal loyalties were to the discipline of economics and who were less vulnerable to the processes that block pressure for allocative efficiency in other parts of the government.

"Liquidation" Cycles: Old-Fashioned Real Business Cycle Theory and the Great Depression

During the 1929-33 slide into the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve took almost no steps to keep the money supply or the price level stable. Instead, the Federal Reserve acted - disastrously - as if the gathering Great Depression could not be avoided, and was best endured. Such a liquidationist' theory of depressions was in fact common before the Keynesian Revolution, and was held and advanced by economists like Kayek and Schumpeter. This paper tries to reconstruct the logic of the liquidationist' view. It argues that the perspective was carefully thought out (although not adequate to the Depression), may hold some truth in other times and places, and could be the core of a more productive research program that currently popular real' business cycle theories.

Study of cascade ring-closing metathesis reactions en route to an advanced intermediate of Taxol

A highly functionalized intermediate in the synthesis of Taxol has been synthesized, which features the tricyclic core and the required oxygen substituents at C1, C2, C7, C10 and C13. The key step, a ring-closing dienyne metathesis (RCDEYM) reaction, has been thoroughly optimized to favor the tricyclic product over the undesired bicyclic product resulting from diene metathesis

The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program

The post-World War II reconstruction of Western Europe was one of the greatest economic policy and foreign policy successes of this century. "Folk wisdom" assigns a major role in successful reconstruction to the Marshall Plan: the program that transferred some $13 billion to Europe in the years 1948-51. We examine the economic effects of the Marshall Plan, and find that it was not large enough to have significantly accelerated recovery by financing investment, aiding the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, or easing commodity bottlenecks. We argue, however, that the Marshall Plan did play a major role in setting the stage for post-World War II Western Europe's rapid growth. The conditions attached to Marshall Plan aid pushed European political economy in a direction that left its post World War II "mixed economies" with more "market" and less "controls" in the mix.

The Bubble of 1929: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Closed-end mutual funds provide one of the few cases in which economists can observe "fundamental" values directly, and compare them to market values: the fundamental value of a closed-end fund is simply the net asset value of its portfolio. We use the difference between prices and asset values of closed-end funds at the end of the 1920s as a measure of investment sentiment. In the late l920s closed-end funds sold at large premia: at the peak, they appear willing to pay 60 percent more for closed-end funds than the post-WWII norm. Such substantial overpricing of closed-end funds -- where fundamentals are known and observed -- suggests that other assets were selling at prices above fundamentals as well. The association between movements in the medium closed-end fund discount and movements in broad stock price indices leads us to conclude that the stocks making up the S & P composite were priced at least 30 percent above fundamentals in the summer of 1929.

On the Existence and Interpretation of the "Unit Root" in U.S. GNP

In this paper, we assess the degree to which four of the most commonly used models of risky decision making can explain the choices individuals make when faced with risky prospects. To make this assessment, we use experimental evidence for two random samples of young adults. Using a robust, nonlinear least squares procedure, we estimate a model that is general enough to approximate Kahnenman and Tversky's prospect theory and that for certain parametric values will yield the expected utility model, a subjective expected utility model and a probability-transform model. We find that the four models considered explain the decision-making behavior of the majority of our subjects. Surprisingly, we find that the choice behavior of the largest number of subjects is consistent with a probability-transform model. Such models have only been developed recently and have not been used in applied settings. We find least support for the expected utility model -- the most widely used model of risky decision making.

Are Business Cycles Symmetric?

This note shows that contrary to widespread belief there is little evidence that the business cycle is asymmetric. Using American data for the pre- and post-war periods and data on five other major OECD nations for the post-war period, we are unable to support the hypothesis that contractions are shorter and sharper than expansions. We conclude that there is not much basis for preferring some version of traditional cyclical techniques to more modern statistical methods.

The Changing Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States

This paper examines the changing cyclical variability of economic activity in the United States. It first shows that the decline in variability since World War II cannot be explained by changes in the composition of economic activity or by the avoidance of financial panics. We then show that increased automatic stabilization by the government, and the increased availability of private credit after World War II combined to stabilize consumption and reduce the variability of aggregate demand. The main argument of the paper holds that greater price rigidity in recent times may have contributed to economic stability by preventing destabilizing deflations and inflations. Empirical evidence is presented to support this proposition.

Forecasting Pre-World War I Inflation: The Fisher Effect Revisited

We consider the puzzling behavior of interest rates and inflation in the United States and the United Kingdom between 1879 and 1913. A deflationary regime prior to 1896 was followed by an inflationary one from 1896 until the beginning of World War I; the average inflation rate was 3.8 percentage points higher in the second period than in the first. Yet nominal interest rates were no higher after 1896 than they had been before. This nonadjustment of nominal interest rates would be consistent with rational expectations if inflation were not forecastable, and indeed univariate tests show little sign of serial correlation in inflation. However, inflation was forecastable on the basis of lagged gold production. Investors' expectations of inflation should have risen by at least three percentage points in the United States between 1890 and 1910. We consider in an information processing context alternative ways of accounting for this failure of interest rates to adjust, for example the possible beliefs that increases in gold production might be transitory. We conclude that the failure of investors to exhibit foresight with regard to the shift in the trend inflation rate after 1896 is not persuasive evidence that investors were negligent or naive in processing information.