Schroeder and Whiting on Knowledge and Defeat

Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question

Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies

A guide to studying the socio-ecological transition in european agriculture

This paper shows the potential of the Social Metabolism approach to study the industrialization of the agriculture. It provides information about the physical functioning of agrarian systems over time and their spatial differences. It also sheds light on how the industrialisation of agriculture occurred; in other words, how the Socio-Ecological Transition (SET) took place in agriculture. The paper begins defining the characteristic features of the Organic Agrarian Metabolism (OAM), the starting point of Sociecological Transition. The next section examines the main changes there been in agrarian metabolism until its complete industrialization. This analysis is enriched by the concept of the SET since, by showing the paths followed by industrialisation from a physical perspective, it establishes the research agenda or points out a series of issues that should be prioritised in research; it facilitates identification of the driving forces for change that interact between social and environmental factors; and it establishes special scales in which transition occurs and the relationship between them. The paper ends with the application of this conceptual fremework to teh First Wave of industrialization in European Agriculture during 19th century.Social Metabolism; Socio-Ecological Transition; Preindustrial Agriculture; Industrialised Agriculture; Agricultural Change

RISK-SHARING AS A DETERMINANT OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE: INTERNAL FINANCING, DEBT, AND (OUTSIDE) EQUITY

This paper proposes a historically-grounded mechanism-design model of corporate finance, with two-side risk aversion under limited contract enforceability, where (inside) equity held by entrepreneurs, debt and (outside) equity coexist. This capital structure shares optimally the non-diversifiable risk associated with costly and risky ventures. Furthermore, it uniquely sustains the optimal risk allocation if agents' personal wealth is contractible at a higher enforcement cost than the projects' returns. Otherwise, the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller applies. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we observe that (i) risk-averse merchants-entrepreneurs financed part of their ventures (hold inside equity) and raised additional funds from risk-averse investors through debt-like sea loan and equity-like commenda contracts when long-distance medieval trade was indeed highly costly and risky and that (ii) maritime insurance, with higher protection against the non-diversifiable "risk of loss at sea or from the action of men" but higher enforcement costs, did not develop until the mid-fourteenth century, when the ventures' costs and risk had decreased significantly. Whereas the model emphasizes the entrepreneurs' equity holdings and the limited-liability aspects of debt and equity, the choice between debt or equity derives from simple, although historically backed, information assumptions. The analysis is therefore complementary to other capital-structure theories based on agency costs, information asymmetries, signalling, transaction costs and incomplete contracting.debt contracts, capital structure, creditworthiness, enforceability, inside and outside equity, insurance, limited liability, private information, risk-sharing

THE SECRET OF VENETIAN SUCCESS: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS

The commercial success of Venice hinged on her merchants¿ ability to do business with borrowed money. However, to raise other people¿s capital, merchants needed to commit not to embezzle the capital received. Despite this commitment problem, the evidence indicates an active financial market through which the Venetians, by and large, mobilized their savings to investments. What were the institutional foundations of this market? This paper claims that neither reputation-based institutions that did not rely on the state nor a coercive legal system provided such foundations. Instead, the state generated the rents and information required to induce merchants to refrain from acting opportunistically.Institutions for Contract Enforcement; State Formation; Financial Markets; Late Medieval Venice

Vortex configurations in the large N limit

We study the properties of vortex-like configurations which are solutions of the SU(N) Yang-Mills classical equations of motion. We show that these solutions are concentrated along a two-dimensional wall with size growing with the number of colors.Comment: 13 pages, 4 postscript figure

Exact Bethe Ansatz solution for An−1A_{n-1} chains with non-SUq(n)SU_{q}(n) invariant open boundary conditions

The Nested Bethe Ansatz is generalized to open and independent boundary conditions depending on two continuous and two discrete free parameters. This is used to find the exact eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the $A_{n-1}$ vertex models and $SU(n)$ spin chains with such boundary conditions. The solution is found for all diagonal families of solutions to the reflection equations in all possible combinations. The Bethe ansatz equations are used to find de first order finite size correction.Comment: Two references adde