The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory

Legal academics often perceive law and economics (L&E) and critical race theory (CRT) as oppositional discourses. Using a recently published collection of essays on CRT as a starting point, we argue that the understanding of workplace discrimination can be furthered through a collaboration between L&E and CRT. L&E\u27s strength is in its attention to incentives and norms, specifically its concern with explicating how norms incentivize behavior. Its limitation is that it treats race as exogenous and static. Thus, the literature fails to consider how institutional norms affect, and are affected by, race. To put the point another way, L&E does not discuss how norms incentivize racial behavior, obscuring that how people present their race (or themselves as racial subjects) is a function of norms. The strength of CRT is its conception of race as a social construction. Under this view, race is neither biologically determined nor fixed. Instead, race is ever evolving as a function of social, political, legal, and economic pressures. A limitation of CRT is that much of its analysis of race as a social construction is macro-oriented. Thus, CRT has paid insufficient attention to the social construction of race within specific institutional settings, like the workplace. Further, CRT has virtually ignored the agency people of color exercise to shape how their racial identity is interpreted - that is say, constructed. Explicitly incorporating L&E\u27s focus on incentives and norms into CRT provides CRT with a means by which to articulate the notion of race as a social construction at the level of individual choice. The basic idea is that people of color construct (present racial impressions of) themselves in response to norms. Norms, in this sense, are racially productive, and individuals are part of the production apparatus. Having set out the basic elements of the collaborative enterprise, we deploy this collaboration to respond to a specific and important question about the workplace: How are modern employers and employees likely to manage workplace racial diversity? We raise this question because we assume that, for institutional legitimacy reasons, most workplaces will strive to achieve at least a modicum of racial diversity. The question, again, is: How will this diversity be managed? Part of the answer has to do with assimilation, an ideological technology for constructing race and a central theme in CRT; and part of the answer has to do with efficiency, an ideological technology for creating incentives and a central theme in L&E. Both ideas - assimilation and efficiency - combine to tell a story about workplace discrimination that derives from what we call the homogeneity incentive. In sum, in order to increase efficiency, employers have incentives to screen prospective employees for homogeneity, and, in order to counter racial stereotypes, nonwhite employees have incentives to demonstrate a willingness and capacity to assimilate. In this sense, the modern workplace discrimination problem may be more about employers requiring people of color to demonstrate racial palatability than about employers totally excluding people of color for the workplace. We discuss whether and to what extent anti-discrimination law can ameliorate this problem

Foreword: Making Makeup Matter

More than a decade ago, Katharine Bartlett, currently Dean of Duke Law School, authored a foundational article on discrimination based on appearance choices.1 The article made a big splash, provocatively raising the question of whether discrimination claims based on dress and appearance standards are cognizable under Title VII, the federal law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of, among other aspects of identity, race and sex. [...] to a large extent, their reasoning centered on two ideas: (1) that employers have broad latitude to define the professional boundaries of their workplaces and that grooming standards are a reasonable way for them to do precisely that; and (2) that Title VII protects identity characteristics that are immutable (for example, phenotype) or that implicate a fundamental right (for example, marriage). Trivial though the subject of makeup supposedly is, the Jespersen litigation garnered an enormous amount of attention as it wound its way from the district court, to a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, and then to the Ninth Circuit en banc

(E)racing the Fourth Amendment

It\u27s been almost two years since I pledged allegiance to the United States of America - that is to say, became an American citizen. Before that, I was a permanent resident of America and a citizen of the United Kingdom. Yet, I became a black American long before I acquired American citizenship. Unlike citizenship, black racial naturalization was always available to me, even as I tried to make myself unavailable for that particular Americanization process. Given the negative images of black Americans on 1970s British television and the intra-racial tensions between blacks in the U.K. and blacks in America, I was not eager, upon my arrival to the United States, to assert a black American identity. My parents had taught me better than that. But I became a black American anyway. Before I freely embraced that identity it was ascribed to me. This ascription is part of a broader social practice wherein all of us are made intelligible via racial categorization. My intelligibility was skin deep. More particularly, it was linked to the social construction of blackness, a social construction whose phenotypic reach I could not escape. Whether I liked it or not, my everyday social encounters were going to reflect standard racial scripts about black American life

After Inclusion

What forms of discrimination are likely to be salient in the coming decade? This review flags a cluster of problems that roughly fall under the rubric of inclusive exclusions or discrimination by inclusion. Much contemporary discrimination theory and empirical work is concerned not simply with mapping the forces that keep people out of the labor market but also with identifying the forces that push them into hierarchical structures within workplaces and labor markets. Underwriting this effort is the notion that, although determining what happens before and during the moment in which a prospective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remains crucial to antidiscrimination theory and practice, significant employment discrimination problems can occur after a person is hired and becomes an employee. These problems transcend racial and sexual harassment. They include a range of subtle institutional practices and interpersonal dynamics that create systemic advantages for some employees and disadvantages for others. We predict that the next generation of race discrimination scholarship will engage these “after inclusion” workplace difficulties theoretically, empirically, and doctrinally

After Inclusion

What forms of discrimination are likely to be salient in the coming decade? This review flags a cluster of problems that roughly fall under the rubric of inclusive exclusions or discrimination by inclusion. Much contemporary discrimination theory and empirical work is concerned not simply with mapping the forces that keep people out of the labor market but also with identifying the forces that push them into hierarchical structures within workplaces and labor markets. Underwriting this effort is the notion that, although determining what happens before and during the moment in which a prospective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remains crucial to antidiscrimination theory and practice, significant employment discrimination problems can occur after a person is hired and becomes an employee. These problems transcend racial and sexual harassment. They include a range of subtle institutional practices and interpersonal dynamics that create systemic advantages for some employees and disadvantages for others. We predict that the next generation of race discrimination scholarship will engage these “after inclusion” workplace difficulties theoretically, empirically, and doctrinally

An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny: Beyond “Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection

For the past forty years, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in University of California v. Bakke has been at the center of scholarly debates about affirmative action. Notwithstanding the enormous attention Justice Powell’s concurrence has received, scholars have paid little attention to a passage in that opinion that expressly takes up the issue of gender. Drawing on the theory of intersectionality, this Essay explains several ways in which its reasoning is flawed. The Essay also shows how interrogating Justice Powell’s “single axis” race and gender analysis raises broader questions about tiers of scrutiny for Black women. Through a hypothetical of a university’s affirmative-action plan that specifically targets Black women, the Essay considers what tier of scrutiny should apply. Because, for the most part, scholars take a race or gender approach to equal-protection law, they have not engaged that doctrinal puzzle and its implications for tiers-of-scrutiny writ large

An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny: Beyond “Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection

For the past forty years, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in University of California v. Bakke has been at the center of scholarly debates about affirmative action. Notwithstanding the enormous attention Justice Powell’s concurrence has received, scholars have paid little attention to a passage in that opinion that expressly takes up the issue of gender. Drawing on the theory of intersectionality, this Essay explains several ways in which its reasoning is flawed. The Essay also shows how interrogating Justice Powell’s “single axis” race and gender analysis raises broader questions about tiers of scrutiny for Black women. Through a hypothetical of a university’s affirmative-action plan that specifically targets Black women, the Essay considers what tier of scrutiny should apply. Because, for the most part, scholars take a race or gender approach to equal protection law, they have not engaged that doctrinal puzzle and its implications for tiers-of-scrutiny writ large