Can we reform the welfare in times of grey majorities? The myth of an electoral opposition between younger and older voters in Germany

Is there an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena that could lead to the obstruction of welfare-state reforms? This article argues that this notion is a myth and lacks empirical evidence for the case of Germany. It is true that (a) there are imminent majorities of voters aged 50 and older; (b) older voters benefit from many welfare state programs and (c) life-cycle interests shape some attitudes towards single public policies. However, these facts alone do not represent an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena. Firstly, differences in party preferences between age groups are due to generational effects associated with early political socialization. Secondly, life-cycle interests do not shape the German party competition because age is not a political division line (cleavage). Young age/old age is only a transitional boundary that all of us aspire to cross, meaning that material old-age interests are important to everyone. Finally, grey interests parties are notoriously weak and try to become parties for the interests of all age groups.Gibt es bei Wahlen einen Interessensgegensatz zwischen Jung und Alt, der wohlfahrtsstaatliche Reformen erschweren könnte? Der vorliegende Beitrag entlarvt diese Vorstellung als einen Mythos, für den es im deutschen Fall keine empirische Evidenz gibt. Es ist richtig, (a) dass es in Deutschland bald Mehrheiten von Wählerinnen und Wählern geben wird, die 50 Jahre und älter sind, (b) dass ältere Wähler von vielen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Programmen profitieren und (c) dass durch den Lebenszyklus gesteuerte Interessen die Einstellungen zu einzelnen Policies formen. Doch diese Ergebnisse stellen noch keinen Gegensatz zwischen Jung und Alt in der Wahlarena dar. Erstens gehen die unterschiedlichen Wahlergebnisse für einzelne Altersgruppen auf Gegensätze zwischen Generationen zurück, die in früher politischer Sozialisation begründet sind. Zweitens beeinflussen die durch den Lebenszyklus definierten Interessen nicht den deutschen Parteienwettbewerb, weil Alter nicht das Potenzial für eine politische Konfliktlinie (cleavage) hat. Die Kategorien Jung und Alt sind nur durch eine durchlässige Grenze voneinander getrennt, die alle Individuen zu überschreiten hoffen. Somit sind auch die materiellen Interessen älterer Menschen für alle wichtig. Drittens sind alle Seniorenparteien schwach und versuchen sich als Parteien aller Altersgruppen neu zu profilieren

Can we reform the welfare state in times of "grey" majorities? The myth of an electoral opposition between younger and older voters in Germany

"Gibt es bei Wahlen einen Interessensgegensatz zwischen Jung und Alt, der wohlfahrtsstaatliche Reformen erschweren könnte? Der vorliegende Beitrag entlarvt diese Vorstellung als einen Mythos, für den es im deutschen Fall keine empirische Evidenz gibt. Es ist richtig, (a) dass es in Deutschland bald Mehrheiten von Wählerinnen und Wählern geben wird, die 50 Jahre und älter sind, (b) dass ältere Wähler von vielen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Programmen profitieren und (c) dass durch den Lebenszyklus gesteuerte Interessen die Einstellungen zu einzelnen Policies formen. Doch diese Ergebnisse stellen noch keinen Gegensatz zwischen Jung und Alt in der Wahlarena dar. Erstens gehen die unterschiedlichen Wahlergebnisse für einzelne Altersgruppen auf Gegensätze zwischen Generationen zurück, die in früher politischer Sozialisation begründet sind. Zweitens beeinflussen die durch den Lebenszyklus definierten Interessen nicht den deutschen Parteienwettbewerb, weil Alter nicht das Potenzial für eine politische Konfliktlinie (cleavage) hat. Die Kategorien Jung und Alt sind nur durch eine durchlässige Grenze voneinander getrennt, die alle Individuen zu überschreiten hoffen. Somit sind auch die materiellen Interessen älterer Menschen für alle wichtig. Drittens sind alle Seniorenparteien schwach und versuchen sich als Parteien aller Altersgruppen neu zu profilieren." [Autorenreferat]"Is there an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena that could lead to the obstruction of welfare-state reforms? This article argues that this notion is a myth and lacks empirical evidence for the case of Germany. It is true that (a) there are imminent majorities of voters aged 50 and older; (b) older voters benefit from many welfare state programs and (c) life-cycle interests shape some attitudes towards single public policies. However, these facts alone do not represent an antagonism between young and old in the electoral arena. Firstly, differences in party preferences between age groups are due to generational effects associated with early political socialization. Secondly, life-cycle interests do not shape the German party competition because age is not a political division line (cleavage). Young age/old age is only a transitional boundary that all of us aspire to cross, meaning that material old-age interests are important to everyone. Finally, grey interests parties are notoriously weak and try to become parties for the interests of all age groups."[author's abstract

Question order effects: how robust are survey measures on political solidarities with reference to Germany and Europe?

The measurement of political solidarities and related concepts is an important endeavor in numerous scientific disciplines, such as political and social science research. European surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, frequently measure these concepts for people’s home country and Europe raising questions with respect to the order of precedence. Research has shown that the order of asking questions can have a profound impact on answer behavior compromising data quality. In this study, we therefore investigated the occurrence of question order effects in a German-European context using two questions on political solidarities. For this purpose, we conducted an experiment in a German online panel (N = 874) and analyzed response behavior and effort in terms of response times. In contrast to previous research, we found no empirical evidence for question order effects impacting people’s responses. Even though there were no response time differences between the question order conditions, the first question always took longer to respond to than the remaining one. Overall, our findings indicate the robustness of questions on political solidarities against question order effects. One potential explanation is that people have comparatively strong (or crystallized) attitudes when it comes to political solidarities

Political participation of older people in Europe.

This thesis answers two questions: to what extent do older people in Europe differ from younger people in terms of their participation in politics, and why. It tests an age-centred model of political participation that is theoretically supported by prior knowledge about political-psychological thinking processes and the social behaviour of older people. The empirical innovation lies in a combination of quantitative survey analysis and the qualitative analysis of interviews with older people. The evidence comes from 21 European countries that were in the European Social Survey 2002/3, from British and West German national surveys of the post-war era and from interviews with older English protesters. The thesis focuses on voting participation, party choice and non-institutionalised political participation outside of organisations. Older people participate differently from younger people in politics because they have a different endowment of resources and motivation as well as of opportunities and exposure to mobilisation. This fact is due to a mixture of cohort effects, which are linked to the specific generation that the individuals are members of, and life cycle effects, which are grounded on varying social circumstances across the life cycle. Furthermore, older people benefit from a larger pool of political experience and possess a greater commitment to comply with social norms of political behaviour. Their political preferences are primarily shaped by their generational membership, whereas life cycle variations in political preferences are minor. There is also exploratory evidence that older people suffer from social stereotypes about their role in participatory politics. They internalise societal images about older people, one of which is that they should be passive in some forms of participation, such as protest activities. Thus, their participation level is lower than that of younger people even when all other age-related effects are held constant

Adopting the Euro in post-communist countries: an analysis of the attitudes toward the single currency

"Unter gewaltigen Anstrengungen haben es die postkommunistischen Regierungen in Ost- und Mitteleuropa geschafft, ihre Länder sicher zum EU-Beitritt zu führen. Als Nächstes sehen sie sich mit der Einführung des Euro als Gemeinschaftswährung konfrontiert. Infolgedessen wird für demokratische Politiker die öffentliche Meinung über die Euro-Einführung enorm wichtig. Die Autoren testen drei theoretische Schulen (ökonomisch, politisch und historisch) in Bezug auf ihre Erklärungskraft für das Verständnis individueller Einstellungen zum Euro. Als empirische Evidenz dienen individuelle Umfragedaten aus acht Ländern. Die Autoren stellen fest, dass bei dem kombinierten Modell aller Theorieschulen der Verständnisgewinn am größten ist. Im Kontext postkommunistischer Volatilität haben auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene die wirtschaftlichen und historischen Faktoren den größten Einfluss. Auf der Individualebene haben die Variablen, die materielles Eigeninteresse messen, nur geringe Aussagekraft. Folglich sind nicht die wirtschaftlichen Verteilungswirkungen der Euro-Einführung und diesbezügliche Erwartungen, sondern die nationale Performanz und historische Erfahrung von Bedeutung. Politische Parteien sollten sich deswegen bei ihren Versuchen, demokratische Unterstützung für die Euro-Einführung zu sammeln, auf wirtschaftliche Konsolidierung und politische Stabilität konzentrieren und nicht eine Konfliktlinie zwischen Gewinnern und Verlierern der Euro-Einführung politisieren." (Autorenreferat)"The new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe achieved an economic and political tour de force on their way to EU accession. Their next challenge is the entry to the eurozone. Thus, the dynamics of public opinion toward the euro become crucial for political leaders. We test three perspectives - economic, political, and historical-ideational - with individual-level survey data from eight countries and conclude that the combined model best explains variations in support for the euro. In an environment of volatility in post-communist Europe, macro variables of economic and historical ideational factors have the strongest impact on individual attitudes, while micro-variables of economic self-interest do not further our understanding of euro support. Thus, distributional issues matter less than the aggregate national performance and experience. Political parties that garner support for the euro should therefore concentrate on economic consolidation and political stability rather than politicizing a winner-loser cleavage." (author's abstract

Demands for redistributive policies in an era of demographic aging: the rival pressures from age and class in 15 OECD countries

"Dieses Discussion Paper untersucht den relativen Einfluss von Alter und Klassenposition auf die individuellen Einstellungen zu wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politiken in entwickelten Industrienationen. Welcher Faktor trägt mehr zur Erklärung von sozialpolitischen Präferenzen bei: die sozioökonomische Klassenposition oder der Eintritt ins Rentenalter? Welche Faktoren erklären unterschiedliche Muster in einzelnen Ländern? Diese Fragen werden unter Verwendung des ISSP-Datensatzes 'Role of Government' beantwortet, der Daten zu fünfzehn Ländern enthält. Hieraus ergibt sich erstens, dass der Übertritt ins Rentenalter einen Erklärungsbeitrag leisten kann, besonders, wenn man unterschiedliche Dynamiken in einzelnen Politikfeldern miteinander vergleicht. Im Fall Bildung zeigt sich, dass der Alterseffekt einen größeren Erklärungsbeitrag leistet als die sozioökonomische Klassenposition. Darüber hinaus weisen einige Länder, wie zum Beispiel die USA, in der Altersdimension ein insgesamt höheres Konfliktpotenzial auf als andere. Daraus folgt, dass selbst in einem gemeinsamen Politikfeld Länderunterschiede wichtig bleiben, denn es zeigt sich ein hoher Grad an Variation der relativen Erklärungskraft der Altersvariablen zwischen Ländern. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ein einfaches 'Rational-Choice'-Modell die Ausprägung der Alterskonfliktlinie nicht ausreichend erklären kann. Die Autoren schlagen vor, stattdessen ein komplexeres Erklärungsmodell zu entwickeln, das den Einfluss der institutionellen Struktur von alternden Wohlfahrtsstaaten berücksichtigt." (Autorenreferat)"This paper is about the relative impact of retirement and social class on individual attitudes towards welfare state policies in advanced industrial democracies. Which factor is more important in explaining individuals' social policy preferences: socio-economic background or retirement? How can differences in patterns between countries be explained? These questions are explored using ordered logistic regression models on the 1996 ISSP Role of Government data set for fifteen countries. First, it is shown that retirement matters; there are consistent differences between policy areas that can be explained by life-cycle salience. Particularly in the case of preferences regarding education spending, being retired matters more than the socio-economic background. Second, some countries, such as the United States, show a higher salience of the age/ retirement cleavage across all policy fields; age/ retirement is a more important line of political conflict in these countries than in others. Third, country characteristics matter. Although the relative salience of retirement varies across policy areas, a large variance within each of the policy areas across countries is evident. Most interestingly, the more generous the state provisions are in a given policy area, the stronger the age/retirement cleavage is (with the exception of pension policies). Overall, the findings of this study are not in line with simple rational choice models. Instead, the explorative results call for more complex theoretical models, including institutional structures, in order to gain a better understanding of individuals' attitudes towards the welfare state in aging societies." (author's abstract

Für die Kleinen ist uns nichts zu teuer? Kindergartengebühren und ihre Determinanten in Deutschlands 95 bevölkerungsreichsten Städten zwischen 2007 und 2010

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die polit-ökonomischen Determinanten der Elternbeiträge für kommunale Kindergärten und diskutiert die Steuerungsfunktion und Politisierung der Beiträge. Erstens erklären strukturelle Rahmenbedingungen wie die Ausgaben des Landes für Kinder im Vorschulalter, das Schuldenniveau und die Bevölkerungsdichte die Beitragshöhe gemäß einer einfachen Ressourcenthese: je mehr Mittel zur Verfügung stehen, desto geringer sind die Elternbeiträge. Demographische Faktoren, die gerontokratische Dynamiken oder die Nachfrageintensität nach Plätzen einfangen, haben hingegen keinen nennenswerten Einfluss. Zweitens sind linke Mehrheiten mit höheren Gebühren für mittlere und höhere Einkommensgruppen assoziiert. Drittens können Muster substanzieller Repräsentation durch weibliche Abgeordnete festgestellt werden, wonach ein höherer Anteil von Frauen im Gemeinde- bzw. Stadtrat mit niedrigeren Gebühren für höhere Einkommensgruppen verbunden ist. Es liegt somit eine parteipolitische Konfliktlinie entlang der sozioökonomischen Links-Rechts-Dimension vor, die in kommunaler Politik selten zu finden ist. Zudem reagieren die Gebühren auf die politische Repräsentation von Betroffenen in den Entscheidungsgremien.This article examines the political-economic determinants of fees for municipal kindergartens and discusses the influence of these fees on demand and their level of politicization. Firstly, fees are a function of available resources. These resources are determined by federal investments in pre-schoolers, cities’ level of debt and population density. The more resources are available, the lower is the average fee. Demographic factors that would capture gerontocratic dynamics and demand for spots in kindergartens have no clear effect on fees. Secondly, left council majorities are associated with higher fees for middle and higher income groups, revealing a classic left-right cleavage that is rarely visible at local level. Thirdly, there is evidence for substantive representation by female councilors. The larger the proportion of women in the city council, the lower is the average fee, especially for higher family-income groups from whom female councilors are likely to come. In sum, the evidence points towards a socioeconomic left-right party-political cleavage rarely found in German local politics. Also, fees react to the political representation of those profiting from childcare facilities in local councils

Why do immigrants support an anti-immigrant party? : Russian-Germans and the Alternative for Germany

By reaching a vote share of 12.6 percent in the 2017 federal election, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) ended Germany’s rare status as a Western European polity lacking a significant Populist Radical Right Party (PRRP). Some of this support comes from a group not usually expected to vote for PRRPs: immigrant-origin voters. Recent survey data shows high levels of support for the AfD especially within the group of Russian-Germans – immigrants from the former Soviet Union and its successor states. What motivates these immigrant-origin voters to support an anti-immigrant party? This article argues that support for the AfD – besides immigration-related preferences – can be best explained by their levels of assimilation or incorporation for different domains regarding the mainstream German society. Especially low levels of economic and social integration, and in particular a strong ethnic identity, relate positively to favouring the German radical right

Surveying immigrant-origin voters in a post-migrant society : The first Immigrant German Election Study, 2017

This paper introduces the Immigrant German Election Study (IMGES) as the first survey that explicitly targeted immigrant-origin voters in Germany. IMGES fills the gap of insufficient data in the field of immigrant-origin voters with a combination of proven and novel survey measures of the electoral behavior of people with a background from either Türkiye or from the former Soviet Union or its successor states. The study was carried out in a post-election, cross-sectional survey in 2017. Its compatibility with the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), and the Dutch Ethnic Minority Election Study (DEMES) allows for in-depth comparative analyses between immigrant-origin voters and natives across different countries. In addition to standard measures of electoral behavior, the data include measures of immigrant-specific factors relevant to voting behavior. Moreover, the dataset is not limited to voting behavior in Germany, it also includes transnational voting behavior in the respective countries of origin