Mental States Are Like Diseases

While Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well-known, his Kant Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a modest view that is against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining ‘a good measure of behaviorist discipline…to keep [our mental] terms under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s Kant Lectures to reconstruct his position. I distinguish three types of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind: ontological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, and epistemological behaviorism. I then consider Quine’s perspective on each of these views and argue that he does not fully accept any of them. By combining these perspectives we arrive at Quine’s surprisingly subtle view about behaviorism in psychology

Behaviorism Makes Its Debut: A Review of Lattal and Chase's Behavior Theory and Philosophy

Behavior Theory and Philosophy, masterfully edited by Lattal and Chase, is a collection of 21 papers by major behaviorists, presented and discussed at a conference on the intersection of philosophy and behavior analysis held at West Virginia University in 2000. The chapters in Part I are devoted to philosophy of science (causality, constructs, theory, explanation, reductionism) and the relations among behavior analysis and several contemporary philosophical movements (humanism, empiricism, pragmatism, selectionism, analytic philosophy). Part II examines behavior-analytic interpretations of mentalistic concepts (intention, imagination, ethics, cognition). Part III presents extensions and applications of basic research in behavior analysis (verbal behavior, creativity, development, education, disability, and corporate culture). The publication of this book signals that behaviorism has developed mature philosophical foundations