Channel Strategies for the Two-Period Closed-Loop Supply Chain with E-Commerce

The aim of this paper is to choose the effective selling channel and reverse channel for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with the e-commerce. The authors formulated six single-selling and dual-selling channel two-period CLSC models in which the manufacturer manufactures new products in the first period and then collects used products by itself, outsourcing to or cooperating with the retailer in the second period. Some interesting and new insights obtained from comparison analysis and numerical experiments are as follows: (1) The leading manufacturer ought to add e-commerce channel, and customers’ e-commerce preference can increase the market demand, collecting rate, and manufacturer’s profit. (2) With the e-commerce channel and the retail channel, dual-collecting channel is the best for the manufacturer and system while the manufacturer collecting channel becomes the best when the collecting competition is relatively large. When the collecting competition exists, retailer collecting channel is the best for the retailer. (3) The market demand, collecting rate, the profits of all members and system will rise by increasing the remanufacturing level and discount coefficient

Channel Strategies for the Two-Period Closed-Loop Supply Chain with E-Commerce

The aim of this paper is to choose the effective selling channel and reverse channel for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with the e-commerce. The authors formulated six single-selling and dual-selling channel two-period CLSC models in which the manufacturer manufactures new products in the first period and then collects used products by itself, outsourcing to or cooperating with the retailer in the second period. Some interesting and new insights obtained from comparison analysis and numerical experiments are as follows: (1) The leading manufacturer ought to add e-commerce channel, and customers’ e-commerce preference can increase the market demand, collecting rate, and manufacturer’s profit. (2) With the e-commerce channel and the retail channel, dual-collecting channel is the best for the manufacturer and system while the manufacturer collecting channel becomes the best when the collecting competition is relatively large. When the collecting competition exists, retailer collecting channel is the best for the retailer. (3) The market demand, collecting rate, the profits of all members and system will rise by increasing the remanufacturing level and discount coefficient.</jats:p

Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain

The potential broad market of green consumption has encouraged an increasing number of enterprises to carry out green technology innovation activities. This paper examines a two-stage supply chain of e-commerce sales channels under different cooperative models. We find that consumers’ green preferences are the main factor that affects green product market demand. The manufacturer and the retailer can raise the levels of green technology innovation and extend green promotional services to expand product market demand in online and offline channels. However, consumers’ e-commerce preferences and online free-riding behaviors affect the manufacturer’s sales channel choice. The retailer can improve the level of green promotional services to hold offline channel market demand, while promotional behaviors have a positive/negative spillover effect on online market demand if the level of free riding falls above/below consumers’ e-commerce preferences. The higher the cooperative level is, the later the manufacturer will open the online channel and close the offline channel to ensure a high level of green promotional service from the cooperative retailer. The results show that the stronger the level of cooperation among all members is, the better the economic, ecological, and social benefits will be. Therefore, we design a revenue-cost sharing contract that can effectively motivate green technology innovation and green promotional services and afford all members win-win profits.</jats:p

Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain

The potential broad market of green consumption has encouraged an increasing number of enterprises to carry out green technology innovation activities. This paper examines a two-stage supply chain of e-commerce sales channels under different cooperative models. We find that consumers’ green preferences are the main factor that affects green product market demand. The manufacturer and the retailer can raise the levels of green technology innovation and extend green promotional services to expand product market demand in online and offline channels. However, consumers’ e-commerce preferences and online free-riding behaviors affect the manufacturer’s sales channel choice. The retailer can improve the level of green promotional services to hold offline channel market demand, while promotional behaviors have a positive/negative spillover effect on online market demand if the level of free riding falls above/below consumers’ e-commerce preferences. The higher the cooperative level is, the later the manufacturer will open the online channel and close the offline channel to ensure a high level of green promotional service from the cooperative retailer. The results show that the stronger the level of cooperation among all members is, the better the economic, ecological, and social benefits will be. Therefore, we design a revenue-cost sharing contract that can effectively motivate green technology innovation and green promotional services and afford all members win-win profits

Green R&amp;D Financing Strategy in Platform Supply Chain with Data-Driven Marketing

Platform enterprises can improve green R&amp;D efficiency by data-driven marketing (DDM) activities and can also provide financing assistance to manufacturers. In this context, for a platform supply chain consisting of one manufacturer facing a shortage of green R&amp;D funds and a one third-party platform, this paper develops four game models under two financing channels (bank financing channel and platform financing channel) and two selling modes (agency selling mode and reselling mode). The equilibrium results of different models are derived and compared, and then the choices of selling mode and financing channel from the perspectives of both the manufacturer and the platform are analyzed. The conclusions show that the consumers&rsquo; sensitivities to green R&amp;D and DDM activities, as well as service commission fee, are major factors influencing green R&amp;D level and both parties&rsquo; choice of selling mode and financing channel. In most cases, a platform financing channel can promote the green R&amp;D level better and is more beneficial to the manufacturer and the platform. Only in a few cases, the two parties prefer the reselling mode and bank financing channel. However, agent selling with bank financing will never be their optimal strategy. There exists four situations in which the manufacturer and the platform can agree on a same strategy on selling mode and financing channel

Green Technology Investment with Data-Driven Marketing and Government Subsidy in a Platform Supply Chain

Expanding green consumption market and precise data promotion advantages make the platform economy have a significant effect on influencing manufacturers to carry out green R&amp;D and production activities, and government subsidies have a positive incentive effect. In this context, for the studies about platform supply chain management with manufacturer’s green production and the platform’s marketing activities simultaneously are rare, we consider that a manufacturer invests in green technologies to produce products and sell them through a smart platform supply chain by an agency selling or reselling strategy, in which the platform provides data-driven marketing technology to promote green products. Four game models are constructed to study the operational efficiency of the platform supply chain considering selling strategy difference and government subsidy. The results show that: (1) The manufacturer’s green technology and the platform’s data-driven marketing levels, as well as all member’s profits are all influenced by the potential market demand of green products, the sensitivities of consumers to green product attributes, and data analysis technology. (2) The service commission rate charged by the platform plays a main role on the manufacturer’s selling strategy choice, when the service commission rate is low, the manufacturer chooses an agency selling strategy and can obtain more profit, but now the green technology level is not necessarily better than that in the reselling system. With the service commission rate increases, a manufacturer that chooses the reselling strategy can obtain more profit, and the green technology level is better than in the agency selling system. (3) Government subsidy can effectively encourage the manufacturer to improve the green technology level, and now the platform will improve the data-driven marketing level. There is a threshold range of the service commission rate charged by the platform in which the government can guide the manufacturer and the platform to reach an equilibrium selling strategy by regulating the subsidy level.</jats:p