Metameric surfaces: the ultimate case against color physicalism and representational theories of phenomenal consciousness

In this paper I argue that there are problems with the foundations of the current version of physicalism about color. In some sources laying the foundations of physicalism, types of surface reflectance corresponding to (veridical) color perceptions are characterized by making reference to properties of the observer. This means that these surface attributes are not objective (i.e. observer-independent). This problem casts doubt on the possibility of identifying colors with types of surface reflectance. If this identification cannot be maintained, that in turn threatens representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness: there remains no objective, observer-independent property that color experiences represent - hence no representational content, in terms of semantic externalism, can be attributed to color experiences. I offer an alternative account of color and conclude that further empirical study is required to do justice to the basic claims of color physicalism

Intrinsic colors - and what it is like to see them

This is a commentary on Laurence Maloney’s chapter in Mausfeld R., and Heyer, D. (Eds.): Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. I discuss two related proposals as to the nature of object color formulated by Maloney. On the first proposal colors are photoreceptor excitations; on the second, they are fundamental, universal reflectance characteristics of terrestrial surfaces. I argue that the second proposal is suitable for purposes of color objectivism, whereas the first one is not. However, if we look at Maloney’s – and Brian Wandell’s – models of color vision and color constancy more thoroughly, not even the second version supports absolutist versions of color objectivism, according to which observer-independent reflectance properties determine, or are identical to, the phenomenal character of color experience

The Implementation of Scenarios using DSGE Models

The new generation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models seems particularly suited for conducting scenario analysis. These models formalise the behaviour of economic agents on the basis of explicit micro-foundations. As a result, they appear less prone to the Lucas critique than traditional macroeconometric models. DSGE models provide researchers with powerful tools, which allow for the design of a broad range of scenarios and can tackle a large range of issues, while at the same time offering an appealing structural interpretation of the scenario specification and simulation results. This paper provides illustrations of some of the modelling issues that often arise when implementing scenarios using DSGE models in the context of projection exercises or policy analysis. These issues reflect the sensitivity of DSGE model-based analysis to scenario assumptions, which in more traditional models are apparently less critical, such as, for example, scenario event anticipation and duration, as well as treatment of monetary and fiscal policy rules.Business fluctuations, monetary policy, fiscal policy, forecasting and simulation