Climate Change Meets Trade in Promoting Green Growth: Potential Conflicts and Synergies

To date, border adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements (EAR) under the U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime are the most concrete unilateral trade measure put forward to level the carbon playing field. If improperly implemented, such measures could disturb the world trade order and trigger a trade war. Because of these potentially far-reaching impacts, this paper focuses on this type of unilateral border adjustment, which requires importers to acquire and surrender emissions allowances corresponding to the embedded carbon contents in their goods from countries that have not taken climate actions comparable to that of home country. This discussion is mainly on the legality of unilateral EAR under the WTO rules. Given that the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures is widely considered essential to secure passage of any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions, the paper argues that, on the U.S. side, in designing such trade measures, WTO rules need to be carefully scrutinised, and efforts need to be made early on to ensure that the proposed measures comply with them. After all, a conflict between the trade and climate regimes, if it breaks out, helps neither trade nor the global climate. The U.S. needs to explore, with its trading partners, cooperative sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon technologies and/or concerted mitigation efforts in a given sector at an international level. Moreover, to increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence of the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment provision, there should be: 1) a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures; 2) consideration of alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions; and 3) trade provisions that can refer to the designated special international reserve allowance pool, but should allow importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. The paper concludes by arguing that the major developing countries being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures should make the best use of the forums provided under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol to effectively deal with the proposed border adjustment measures to their advantage.Post-2012 climate negotiations, Border carbon adjustments, Carbon tariffs, Emissions allowance requirements, Cap-and-trade regime, Lieberman-Warner bill,Waxman-Markey bill, World Trade Organization, Kyoto Protocol, Developing countries, United States

Climate change meets trade in promoting green growth: potential conflicts and synergies

To date, border adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements (EAR) under the U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime are the most concrete unilateral trade measure put forward on the table to level the carbon playing field. If improperly implemented, such measures could disturb the world trade order and trigger trade war. Because of these potentially far-reaching impacts, this paper focuses on this type of unilateral border adjustment that requires importers to acquire and surrender emissions allowances corresponding to the embedded carbon contents in their goods from countries that have not taken climate actions comparable to that of home country. Our discussion is mainly on the legality of unilateral EAR under the WTO rules. Given that the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures is widely considered essential to secure passage of any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions, we argue that, on the U.S. side, in designing such trade measures, WTO rules need to be carefully scrutinised, and efforts need to be made early on to ensure that the proposed measures comply with them. After all, a conflict between the trade and climate regimes, if it breaks out, helps neither trade nor the global climate. The U.S. needs to explore with its trading partners cooperative sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon technologies and/or concerted mitigation efforts in a given sector at an international level. Moreover, to increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence of the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment provision, 1) there should be a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures; 2) WTO consistency also requires considering alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions; and 3) trade provisions can refer to the designated special international reserve allowance pool, but should allow importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. The paper concludes by arguing that the major developing countries being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures should make the best use of the forums provided under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to effectively deal with the proposed border adjustment measures to their advantage.Post-2012 climate negotiations; Border carbon adjustments; Carbon tariffs; Emissions allowance requirements; Cap-and-trade regime; Lieberman-Warner bill; Waxman-Markey bill; World Trade Organization; Kyoto Protocol; Developing countries; United States

Is It Fair to Treat China as a Christmas Tree to Hang Everybody’s Complaints? Putting its Own Energy Saving into Perspective

China had been the world’s second largest carbon emitter for years. However, recent studies show that China had overtaken the U.S. as the world’s largest emitter in 2007. This has put China on the spotlight, just at a time when the world community starts negotiating a post-Kyoto climate regime under the Bali roadmap. China seems to become such a Christmas tree on which everybody can hang his/her complaints. This paper first discusses whether such a critics is fair by examining China’s own efforts towards energy saving, the widespread use of renewable energy and participation in clean development mechanism. Next, the paper puts carbon reductions of China’s unilateral actions into perspective by examining whether the estimated greenhouse gas emission reduction from meeting the country’s national energy saving goal is achieved from China’s unilateral actions or mainly with support from the clean development mechanism projects. Then the paper discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-2012 climate regime, thus pointing out the direction and focus of future international climate negotiations. Finally, emphasizing that China needs to act as a large and responsible developing country and take due responsibilities and to set a good example to the majority of developing countries, the paper articulates what can be expected from China to illustrate that China can be a good partner in combating global climate change.Energy Saving, Renewable Energy, Post-Kyoto Climate Negotiations, Clean Development Mechanism, China, USA

Policies and Measures to Mitigate Potential Environmental Impacts of Cross Border Infrastructure Projects in Asia

While bringing positive impacts and benefits, cross-border infrastructure projects face additional challenges relative to national projects. Moreover, such projects involve a variety of technical, regulatory, institutional, and legal factors, and their obstacles constrain the development of cross-border infrastructure projects. This paper argues that proper technical specifications and well-functioning regulatory, institutional and legislative/legal frameworks with clearer lines of oversight are crucial to getting such projects off the ground in the first place and to ensure that they operate properly and reliably while minimizing their environmental impacts. It is pointed out that many issues in theses areas need to be addressed at the national level. The paper concludes that such domestic efforts, coupled with regional frameworks and arrangements wherever necessary, will promote the further development of cross-border infrastructure projects.asia cross-border infrastructure; environmental impact; asia regional integration

An assessment of the EU proposal for ceilings on the use of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms

The Kyoto Protocol is the first international environmental agreement that sets legally binding greenhouse gas emissions targets and timetables for Annex I countries. It incorporates emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism. Because each of the Articles defining the three flexibility mechanisms carries wording that the use of the mechanism must be supplemental to domestic actions, the supplementarity provisions have been the focus of the international climate change negotiations subsequent to Kyoto. Whether the supplementarity clauses will be translated into a concrete ceiling, and if so, how should a concrete ceiling on the use of the three flexible mechanisms be defined remain to be determined. To date, the European Union (EU) has put forward a proposal for ceilings on the use of these flexibility mechanisms. Given the great policy relevance to the ongoing negotiations on the overall issues of flexibility mechanisms, this paper has provided a quantitative assessment of the implications of the EU ceilings with and without considering the however clause. Our results suggest that such ceilings are less restrictive to the EU than to the US and Japan in terms of levels of restriction on permits imports, and can prevent one third of the amount of hot air from entering the market. Our results also demonstrate that although the US and Japan are firmly opposed to such a restriction, they tend to benefit more from it than the EU which strongly advocates such ceilings, in terms of the reductions in the total abatement costs relative to the no trading case. Moreover, their gains can increase even further, provided that the however clause would operate as intended.Emissions trading; Clean development mechanism; Joint implementation; Greenhouse gases; European Union; Supplementarity restrictions

Trade in Environmental Goods, with Focus on Climate-Friendly Goods and Technologies

Paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates to the liberalization of environmental goods and services. This mandate offers a good opportunity to put climate-friendly goods and services on a fast track to liberalization. Agreement on this paragraph should represent one immediate contribution that the WTO can make to fight against climate change. This paper presents the key issues surrounding the liberalization of trade in climate-friendly goods and technologies in WTO environmental goods negotiations. It begins with discussing what products to liberalize and how. Given that WTO Members are divided by this key issue, the paper explores options to move current negotiations on the liberalization of trade in environmental goods and technologies forward, both within and outside the WTO. Recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all strategy for tariff liberalization for all countries and for all environmental goods, the paper suggests the need for a high degree of flexibility to accommodate different situations and stakes in the liberalization of trade in environmental goods. Given that there are simply not enough environmental markets or these markets are weak in many developing countries, the paper emphasizes that creating markets for environmental goods in developing countries is far more important than just improving market-access conditions for associated goods, and discusses how to best serve the interests and concerns of developing countries.Environmental Goods and Services, Low-Carbon Goods and Technologies, Market Access, Doha Round, WTO, Renewable Energy Technologies

Breaking the Impasse in International Climate Negotiations: A New Direction for Currently Flawed Negotiations and a Roadmap for China to 2050

China’s unilateral pledge to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels raises both the stringency issue, and given that China’s pledge is in the form of carbon intensity, reliability issues concerning China’s statistics on energy and GDP. Moreover, as long as China’s commitments differ in form from those of other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures. In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper will map out a realistic roadmap for China’s specific climate commitments towards 2050, with its main distinguishing features including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 and the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With current international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the targeted date of 2020 that does not accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, the paper suggests a new direction to break the current impasse in international climate negotiations.Carbon Intensity, Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations, Climate Commitments, China

The Kyoto Protocol: a cost-effective strategy for meeting environmental objective?: discussion

This is an invited discussion on the Manne and Richels’ paper “The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental Objective”. It focuses on four issues or questions: distributional realities of the international climate change negotiations, correspondence between geopolitical regional aggregates in MERGE and Annex B countries, implications of the autonomous energy efficiency improvement rates assumed in MERGE on the income elasticity of energy consumption, and market power in an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme.International climate negotiations; energy efficiency; MERGE; market power; emissions trading

Using emissions trading to regulate global greenhouse gas emissions

The inclusion of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol reflects an important decision to address climate change issues through flexible market mechanisms. This Article addresses a number of policy issues that must be considered in designing and implementing an international greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions trading scheme. These include emissions trading models, the initial allocation of emissions permits and its competitiveness concerns, banking and borrowing, the liability rules for non-compliance, and bubbles. The following conclusions emerge from the discussion. First, although emissions trading could take place either on an inter-governmental basis or on an inter-source basis, sub-national legal entities are the best entities to trade emissions permits. Allocating permits to individual emissions sources will facilitate private participation in emissions trading. Moreover, it has been argued that individual governments should be left free to devise their own ways of allocating assigned amounts. Second, it has been pointed out that although national emissions trading systems could be modelled as either upstream or downstream or hybrid systems, the distinguishing features of broad coverage and administrative simplicity would make an upstream system the more attractive approach. Moreover, national emissions trading systems should incorporate the maximum degree of flexibility in banking. Third, the liability rules are essential to the success of an international GHG emissions trading scheme. In general, a seller beware liability works well in a strong enforcement environment. In the Kyoto Protocol, however, it may not always work. By contrast, a buyer beware liability could be an effective deterrent to non-compliance, but the costs of imposing it are expected to be very high. To strike a middle ground, it has been suggested a combination of preventive measures with strong but feasible end-of-period punishments to ensure compliance with the Kyoto emissions commitments. Such measures aim to maximize efficiency gains from emissions trading and at the same time, to minimize over-selling risks.Annual retirement; auction; bubbles; buyer beware liability; carbon taxes; clean development mechanism; compliance reserve; compulsory insurance; emissions trading; grandfathering; greenhouse gases; international competitiveness; joint implementation; Kyoto Protocol; seller beware liability; World Trade Organization

Is China taking actions to limit its greenhouse gas emissions? past evidence and future prospects

As the world’s second largest carbon emitter, China has long been criticised as a “free-rider” enjoying benefits from other countries’ efforts to abate greenhouse gas emissions but not taking due responsibilities of its own. China has been singled out as one of the major targets at the subsequent negotiations after the Kyoto curtain had fallen. By an¬alyzing the historical contributions of inter-fuel switching, energy conserva¬tion, economic growth and population expan¬sion to China’s CO2 emissions during the period 1980-1997, this article first demonstrates that the above criticism cannot hold its ground. Then the article envisions some efforts and commitments that could be expected from China until its per capita income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries. By emphasizing the win-win strategies, these efforts and commitments could be unlikely to severely jeopardize China’s economic development and, at the same time, would give the country more leverage at the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations.Carbon tax; carbon dioxide emissions; China; CGE model; policies and measures; Kyoto Protocol; emission commitments