Incentive and stability in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game: an experimental investigation

In a two-person Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, if we set a loss worth nothing and a tie worth 1, and the payoff of winning (the incentive a) as a variable, this game is called as generalized RPS game. The generalized RPS game is a representative mathematical model to illustrate the game dynamics, appearing widely in textbook. However, how actual motions in these games depend on the incentive has never been reported quantitatively. Using the data from 7 games with different incentives, including 84 groups of 6 subjects playing the game in 300-round, with random-pair tournaments and local information recorded, we find that, both on social and individual level, the actual motions are changing continuously with the incentive. More expressively, some representative findings are, (1) in social collective strategy transit views, the forward transition vector field is more and more centripetal as the stability of the system increasing; (2) In the individual behavior of strategy transit view, there exists a phase transformation as the stability of the systems increasing, and the phase transformation point being near the standard RPS; (3) Conditional response behaviors are structurally changing accompanied by the controlled incentive. As a whole, the best response behavior increases and the win-stay lose-shift (WSLS) behavior declines with the incentive. Further, the outcome of win, tie, and lose influence the best response behavior and WSLS behavior. Both as the best response behavior, the win-stay behavior declines with the incentive while the lose-left-shift behavior increase with the incentive. And both as the WSLS behavior, the lose-left-shift behavior increase with the incentive, but the lose-right-shift behaviors declines with the incentive. We hope to learn which one in tens of learning models can interpret the empirical observation above.Comment: 19 pages, 14 figures, Keywords: experimental economics, conditional response, best response, win-stay-lose-shift, evolutionary game theory, behavior economic

Learning neural trans-dimensional random field language models with noise-contrastive estimation

Trans-dimensional random field language models (TRF LMs) where sentences are modeled as a collection of random fields, have shown close performance with LSTM LMs in speech recognition and are computationally more efficient in inference. However, the training efficiency of neural TRF LMs is not satisfactory, which limits the scalability of TRF LMs on large training corpus. In this paper, several techniques on both model formulation and parameter estimation are proposed to improve the training efficiency and the performance of neural TRF LMs. First, TRFs are reformulated in the form of exponential tilting of a reference distribution. Second, noise-contrastive estimation (NCE) is introduced to jointly estimate the model parameters and normalization constants. Third, we extend the neural TRF LMs by marrying the deep convolutional neural network (CNN) and the bidirectional LSTM into the potential function to extract the deep hierarchical features and bidirectionally sequential features. Utilizing all the above techniques enables the successful and efficient training of neural TRF LMs on a 40x larger training set with only 1/3 training time and further reduces the WER with relative reduction of 4.7% on top of a strong LSTM LM baseline.Comment: 5 pages and 2 figure