Optimization frameworks and sensitivity analysis of Stackelberg mean-field games

This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to maximize her reward considering the worst-case cost over all possible $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria among followers. A new analytical paradigm is established by showing the equivalence between this Stackelberg mean-field game and a minimax optimization problem. This optimization framework facilitates studying both analytically and numerically the set of Nash equilibria for the game; and leads to the sensitivity and the robustness analysis of the game value. In particular, when there is model uncertainty, the game value for the leader suffers non-vanishing sub-optimality as the perturbed model converges to the true model. In order to obtain a near-optimal solution, the leader needs to be more pessimistic with anticipation of model errors and adopts a relaxed version of the original Stackelberg game