The Coexistence of Fiscal Sovereignties: The Post‐Pandemic European Union in Comparative Perspective

Thanks to the recovery fund Next Generation EU, the EU considerably increased the size of its fiscal capacity by increasing its borrowing power. Yet, the post-pandemic EU has left the key issue of how to distribute fiscal sovereignty across the EU and the member states unsolved. Departing from influential concepts in the political science literature, this article argues that we still lack a thorough analytical framework to operationalise the coexistence of two fiscal sovereignties - the fiscal sovereignty of the centre (here, the EU) and the fiscal sovereignty of the units (here, the member states). By resorting to comparative federalism, the article first operationalises fiscal sovereignty as the power to collect, administer, and spend resources. A level of government (the centre or the units) is fiscally sovereign if it can decide on its revenues, the administration of its resources, and its expenditures alone or together with the other level of government (what I call "fiscal self- or co-determination"). The coexistence of fiscal sovereignties becomes impossible if one level systematically and unilaterally encroaches upon the other ("fiscal out-determination"), as is still the case with the post-pandemic EU. On the contrary, in a union of states by aggregation like the EU - namely, Switzerland - the centre (Confederation) has its own fiscal powers, while the units (cantons) retain most of their fiscal sovereignty: The coexistence of fiscal sovereignties is thus possible. The article concludes by outlining which "fiscal features" of the Swiss system could not work in the EU and which could instead potentially work

The European Council: Actor and Arena of Dominance?

The present report is a part of EU3D’s work on identifying problematic forms of differentiation internally in the EU (WP 2). Of particular relevance in that connection are those aspects of the EU’s distinct ‘differentiation configuration’ that are associated with dominance. This report’s focus on the European Council is a very welcome addition to this line of inquiry. The European Council has taken on a more central role in the ordinary workings of the EU system of governance, and the European Council plays a central role in crisis handling. It is therefore important to understand what this implies for the EU as a system of governance. The report is also very topical given that it assesses the EUCO’s role in three very recent crises and challenges facing the EU, namely the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU’s sanctions against Russia and the rule of law crisis

Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power

This thematic issue examines two main research questions: What are the features, the determinants, and the implications of fiscal integration in a system of multilevel governance like the EU? And, what can the post-pandemic EU learn from established federations when it comes to fiscal integration? We attempt to conceptualize the patterns of EU fiscal integration. In so doing, we identify eight instruments of fiscal integration in a federal or multilevel polity, equally divided between fiscal capacity and fiscal regulation, depending on the side of the budget and the mode of integration (autonomous or dependent). For instance, as part of the fiscal capacity instrument of integration, we propose to distinguish between revenue and expenditure capacity. Revenue capacity is then further divided into tax capacity, based on EU/federal taxes, and budgetary capacity, based on non-independent sources, for instance, contributions from the member states. Expenditure capacity is divided into autonomous spending capacity, meaning direct spending by the EU, and a dependent transfer capacity, where the EU merely distributes resources (both grants and loans) to the member states

A federal union for dealing with the Russian war

Which models of EU polity for dealing with the Russian war can be derived from the Conference on the Future of Europe? Considering the ‘Report on the Final Outcome’ of the Conference, we traced three models: the parliamentary union, the intergovernmental union and the economic community. Because they appear unable to deal with the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this policy brief outlines the contours of an alternative model, the federal union. A description of the Conference on the Future of Europe appears in the factbox

Italy and the European Union: The discontinuity of the Conte Government

This article analyses the approach of the Conte government to the EU and its budgetary and migration policies. Because the Conte government was inaugurated on 1 June 2018, the article will compare its approach to EU policies with the Gentiloni government of the initial five months of the year. On both budgetary and migration policy, the Conte government marked a discontinuity with the previous government, pursuing a declared populist agenda. While the Gentiloni government operated within the EU financial and legal constraints, the Conte government rejected those constraints. However, the populist claims had to face the constraints of interdependence. Particularly in budgetary policy, in fact, the Conte government was forced to find a compromise with the other Eurozone member states and the Commission

Sovereignism and its implication: The differentiated disintegration of the European Union

The research paper aims to investigate nationalism in the post-Brexit period (2016- 2021). Because of the political and economic costs triggered by Brexit, European nationalisms have had to redefine their role remaining in the European Union (EU), a necessity made even more stringent by the pandemic crisis and the Russian aggression of Ukraine. We conceptualize as ‘sovereignism’ the attempt to endogenise nationalism in the EU. The research has thus identified commonalities and differences in the sovereignist narrative of western and eastern EU member states. All sovereignists criticized the supranational character (institutional sovereignism) and the centralized policy system (policy sovereignism) which has developed within the EU. However, sovereignists differed on the rationale of their criticism, based more on an economic discourse (economic sovereignism) in western Europe and more on a cultural discourse (cultural sovereignism) in eastern Europe. The sovereignist narrative had clear opportunistic traits, whose outcome, if successful, would lead to the differentiated disintegration of the EU

Right-Wing Sovereignism in the European Union: Definition, Features and Implications

This article investigates how traditionally anti-European Union (EU) right-wing parties and leaders in four EU member states reinterpreted their relation with the EU in the post-Brexit period (2016–2022). Either for the political opportunity structure's constraints or for the costs triggered by Brexit, right-wing European nationalists had to redefine their role in remaining in the EU. We conceptualize as ‘sovereignism’ their attempt to endogenize nationalism in the EU. Relying on discourse analysis, this article shows that right-wing sovereignism criticized the supranational character and the centralized policy system that developed within the EU. However, right-wing sovereignism differed in the rationale of its criticism, based more on an economic discourse in Western Europe and more on a cultural discourse in Eastern Europe, as well as on the policies to repatriate. The sovereignist approach of nationalist right-wing parties and leaders would lead to the nationally differentiated disintegration of the EU