Competitive in successive markets : entry and mergers

This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects of entry corresponding to a constant or decreasing returns, free entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency for the input price to adjust to its marginal cost while it does under constant returns. Then, we analyse collusive agreements by stressing the role of upstream linkage on the profitability of horizontal mergers à la Salant, Switzer and ReynoldsOligopoly, entry, horizontal collusion, foreclosure

Product differentiation and vertical integration in presence of double marginalization

In this paper, we present a model of endogenous vertical integration and horizontal differentiation. There exists two output brands and two versions of the input. The only mean for output differentiation is the input version used in output production. Firms may choose to vertically integrate to produce internally the required input version at marginal cost, rather then to buy it at the market price, if that version is made available. We show that vertical mergers increase the possibility that output goods are differentiated. Moreover, this occurs when the cost to differentiate the input is high. On the other hand, vertical integration is detrimental for brand variety if the cost to differentiate inputs is negligible.horizontal differentiation, vertical agreements, successive Cournot oligopolies

Review of Traveling Salesman Problem for the genetic algorithms

Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are an evolutionary technique that uses the operators like mutation, crossover and the selection of the most fitted element as solution for problems optimization. The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) finds a path with minimal length, closed within a weighted graph in all its nodes and it visits each of them once. This problem is found in many real world applications and where a good solution might help. There are applied many methods for finding a solution for the TSP, but during this study GAs are used as an approximate method of TSP

Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example considered in the literature, namely, a constant returns technology.successive oligopolies, vertical integration, technology.

On tax competition, public goods provision and jurisdictions’ size

tax competition, public goods competition, spatial competition, foreign direct investments, country size

A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers

In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the countrary holds when the technology is constant.successive oligopolies, vertical integration, technology, foreclosure

Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns

In this paper we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example considered in the literature, namely, a constant returns technologysuccessive oligopolies, vertical integration, technology

Environmental innovation under Cournot competition

In this paper, we address the incentives to invest in environmental innovation of enterprises that exercise market power in the output market and also buy and sell pollution permits. Differently from the existing literature, using a market approach we explicitly model the interaction between the output market, where firms play A la Cournot, and the permits market. We find that, in the new equilibrium firms behave symmetrically, that is, they either both innovate to protect their market share in the output market or they both choose not to innovate. Whether the innovation equilibrium arises or not depends on the output demand and on the productivity enhancement and not on the distribution of permits among firms. Finally, we show that, under this market configuration, collusion can be welfare enhancingenvironmental innovation, tradable permits, interaction à la Cournot

Clean technology adoption and its influence on tradeable emission permit prices.

In this paper we give an example in which the price of tradeable emission permits increases despite firms' adoption of a less polluting technology. This is in contrast with Montero (2002) and Parry (1998), among others. If two Counot players switch to a cleaner technology, the price for permits may increase due to an increase in the net demand for permits and a decrease in net supply of permits after the clean technology is adopted. This is only the case when output demand is elastic.environmental innovation, tradable emission permits, Cournot interaction