Polynomial bounds for decoupling, with applications

Let f(x) = f(x_1, ..., x_n) = \sum_{|S| <= k} a_S \prod_{i \in S} x_i be an n-variate real multilinear polynomial of degree at most k, where S \subseteq [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}. For its "one-block decoupled" version, f~(y,z) = \sum_{|S| <= k} a_S \sum_{i \in S} y_i \prod_{j \in S\i} z_j, we show tail-bound comparisons of the form Pr[|f~(y,z)| > C_k t] t]. Our constants C_k, D_k are significantly better than those known for "full decoupling". For example, when x, y, z are independent Gaussians we obtain C_k = D_k = O(k); when x, y, z, Rademacher random variables we obtain C_k = O(k^2), D_k = k^{O(k)}. By contrast, for full decoupling only C_k = D_k = k^{O(k)} is known in these settings. We describe consequences of these results for query complexity (related to conjectures of Aaronson and Ambainis) and for analysis of Boolean functions (including an optimal sharpening of the DFKO Inequality).Comment: 19 pages, including bibliograph

One Password: An Encryption Scheme for Hiding Users' Register Information

In recent years, the attack which leverages register information (e.g. accounts and passwords) leaked from 3rd party applications to try other applications is popular and serious. We call this attack "database collision". Traditionally, people have to keep dozens of accounts and passwords for different applications to prevent this attack. In this paper, we propose a novel encryption scheme for hiding users' register information and preventing this attack. Specifically, we first hash the register information using existing safe hash function. Then the hash string is hidden, instead a coefficient vector is stored for verification. Coefficient vectors of the same register information are generated randomly for different applications. Hence, the original information is hardly cracked by dictionary based attack or database collision in practice. Using our encryption scheme, each user only needs to keep one password for dozens of applications