Does Format of Pricing Contract Matter?

The use of linear wholesale price contract has long been recognized as a threat to achieving channel effciency. Many formats of nonlinear pricing contract have been proposed to achieve vertical channel coordination. Examples include two-part tariff and quantity discount. A two-part tariff charges the downstream party a fixed fee for participation and a uniform unit price. A quantity discount contract does not include a fixed fee and charges a lower unit price for each additional unit. Extant economic theories predict these contracts, when chosen optimally, to be revenue and division equivalent in that they all restore full channel effciency and give the same surplus to the upstream party assuming constant relative bargaining power. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the empirical equivalence of the two pricing formats. Surprisingly, both pricing formats fail to coordinate the channel even in a well-controlled market environment with subjects motivated by significant monetary incentives. The observed channl effciencies were significantly lower than 100%. In fact, they are statistically no better than that of the linear wholesale price contract. Revenue equivalence fails because the quantity discount scheme achieves a higher channel effciency than the two-part tariff. Also, division equivalence does not hold because the quantity discount scheme accords a higher surplus to the upstream party than the two-part tariff. To account for the observed empirical regularities, we allow the downstream party to have a reference-dependent utility in which the upfront fixed fee is framed as loss andn the subsequent contribution margin as gain. The proposed model nests the standard economic model as a special case with a loss aversion coeffcient of 1.0. The estimated loss aversion coeffcient is 1.6, thereby rejecting the standard model. We rule out other plausible explanations such as parties having fairness concerns and non-linear risk attitudes.Pricing Format, Two-Part Tariff, Quantity Discount, Channel Efficiency, Double Marginalization, Reference-Dependent Utility, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics

Deadlines in Product Development

Deadlines are common in product development and are often felt to be too harsh—many development efforts are still worth continuing at the time of mandated termination. We examine the value of deadlines from the agency-theoretic perspective. We consider a firm that pays an agent to lead product development activities. The chance of success depends on the viability of the project and the effort of the agent. As the project proceeds without success, doubts grow as to whether the project is viable. To motivate continued effort, the firm must promise the agent a generous reward if success is achieved during the late stage of development. However, rewarding late success undermines effort incentives in the early stage. The firm may find it more profitable to impose a hard, early deadline to eliminate the agent’s dynamic incentive to procrastinate. We derive conditions under which the firm should impose such deadlines

The Perils of Behavior-Based Personalization

“Behavior-based personalization” has gained popularity in recent years, whereby businesses offer personalized products based on consumers' purchase histories. This paper highlights two perils of behavior-based personalization in competitive markets. First, although purchase histories reveal consumer preferences, competitive exploitation of such information damages differentiation, similar to the classic finding that behavior-based price discrimination intensifies price competition. With endogenous product design, there is yet a second peril. It emerges when forward-looking firms try to avoid the first peril by suppressing the information value of purchase histories. Ideally, if a market leader serves all consumers on day 1, purchase histories contain no information about consumer preferences. However, knowing that their rivals are willing to accommodate a market leader, firms are more likely to offer a mainstream design at day 1, which jeopardizes differentiation. Based on this understanding, I investigate how the perils of behavior-based personalization change under alternative market conditions, such as firms' better knowledge about their own customers, consumer loyalty and inertia, consumer self-selection, and the need for classic designs

Long Tail or Steep Tail? A Field Investigation into How Online Popularity Information Affects the Distribution of Customer Choices

The internet has made it easier for customers to find and buy a wide variety of products. This may lead to a "long tail" effect as more customers buy low-volume products. However, the internet has also made it easier for customers to find out which products are most popular. This could lead to a "steep tail" effect as customers flock towards the most popular products. Using data from a field experiment with a website that lists wedding service vendors, we find empirical evidence that a steep tail exists. The most popular vendors become more popular when customers can easily observe previous customers' click-through behavior. Then, we ask whether this steep tail effect "complements" the long tail, by attracting customers who would otherwise have chosen nothing, or "competes with" the long tail, by shifting customers from less popular vendors to popular ones. We find evidence of a complementary effect, where the steep tail indicates new interest in the most popular vendors from outside, with negligible cannibalization of interest for less popular vendors. The findings suggest that popularity information can serve as a powerful marketing tool that facilitates product category growth. They also explain the prevalence of firm practices to highlight bestsellers

Decomposing the Congestion Effect and the Inference Effect of Competition: A Field Experiment

Are firms more or less likely to enter a market if they observe that competitors have entered? This most basic question has received contradictory empirical answers. The normative recommendation to firms that make entry decisions is therefore ambiguous. We reconcile this controversy by introducing demand uncertainty as a moderator of how entrants respond to existing competition. We distinguish between two effects of competition on entry decisions: a negative “congestion effect,” where competition dissipates profit when demand is fixed and is known, and a positive “inference effect,” where firms infer high demand from a large number of competitors. To tease apart these two effects empirically, we use field experiment data from a website that brings together buyers and sellers of used goods. Before each potential seller made a posting request, the website randomized whether to disclose the number of buyers and/or sellers, and the exact number to disclose. We find evidence for a positive inference effect: When the number of buyers is not disclosed, the overall effect of the number of sellers on entry is neutral; when the number of buyer is disclosed, however, a larger number of sellers lowers the entry propensity due to the congestion effect. We discuss how our results should affect the information disclosure strategies of two-sided platforms