What explains ethnic organizational violence? Evidence from Eastern Europe and Russia

Why do some ethnopolitical organizations use violence? Research on substate violence often uses the state level of analysis, or only analyzes groups that are already violent. Using a resource mobilization framework drawn from a broad literature, we test hypotheses with new data on hundreds of violent and non-violent ethnopolitical organizations in Eastern Europe and Russia. Our study finds interorganizational competition, state repression and strong group leadership associated with organizational violence. Lack of popularity and holding territory are also associated with violence. We do not find social service provision positively related to violence, which contrasts with research on the Middle East

Improving Responses to Protracted Conflict: Why Borderlands Matter for Upstream Engagement

How do borderlands matter for upstream engagement, aiming to reduce threats to global stability and security that arise from the world’s increasing interconnectedness? I show that border areas in vulnerable regions are hubs of protracted conflict that undermine security not just locally, but across the globe. Violent non-state groups take advantage of these spaces to engage in cross-border operations through which they strengthen transnational networks. They also benefit from deficient state capacities in these zones to impose illicit governance structure. Borderlands thus host long-term drivers of instability: they.are strategic corridors for transnational organised crime, sites of retreat for conflict actors, and safe havens of terrorists. Employing a transnational borderland perspective, I conclude that upstream operations currently follow an approach that is ill-equipped to address the security threats that emanate from such regions: first, they are guided by state-centric concepts of security that focus on borderlines rather than borderlands; and second, they prioritise governance functions provided by the state, thereby neglecting how governance functions are taken over by violent non-state actors. The article draws on empirical data from a seven-year study including over a year of fieldwork in and on Colombia’s borderlands