La transformation de l’entreprise et du travail dans les sociétés industrialisées

L'auteur analyse la nature, l'origine, la fragilité et la portée des diverses expériences de modifications dans l'organisation du travail ainsi que le contexte dans lequel ces initiatives se sont développées. Elles présagent des changements sans que l'on puisse les prévoir avec précisions. Une chose est certaine, c'est que certaines formes de travail ne seront plus admises.This paper deals with European "experiments" in work organisation. Factual date concerning the content and scope of these experiments are presented. It is pointed out that in certain cases, individual jobs are enlarged or enriched in a rather authoritarian way. In others, some power is recognized to groups of workers permetting them to organize and plan their work and support each other in their occupational role. The number of experiments varies greatly from country to country. The fact that in some countries such experiments are either supported financially by the State or deal with minor changes explains the numerical difference; the industrial relations' and socio-cultural context is another factor to be kept in mind.Many experiments involve only a small proportion of the personnel employed in a given activity, and very few of them permit us to have a comprehensive view of the whole production unit. Several experiments also seem to be vulnerable: a new plant manager or a change in production techniques, for example, could terminate them. The social impact of these experiments would not be assessed only in terms of greater satisfaction or autonomy, but also according to the increase in skills and wages. Many of them however have no or little effect upon skills and wages.The industrial relations and institutional contact can be more or less favorable. In the Scandinavian countries, employers and unions agree more easily than in France or Italy upon common interests and goals. It is generally accepted that such experiments can jointly contribute to the firm efficiency and workers' satisfaction. In general, the fact that collective bargaining in Europe does not imply a clear and fixed description of jobs, and some kind of job property, makes the unions more willing to accept certain changes in job structure. Relevant too are the training and values of administrators and engineers. Most of them have been accustomed to traditional forms of work organization and strongly believe in their superiority. The employment situation is likewise relevant. With an increase in the level of unemployment everywhere in Europe, unions are more interested in obtaining some kind of "work sharing" by reducing time on the job rather than changes in organisation which might mean higher labour productivity and reduction of employment.As a result, many factors should be considered in order to explain the present situation and the reasons for the seeming stagnation in the development of such experiments in Europe. In the long term, however, new forms of work organisation should emerge, mainly in relation to new technological developments. Administrators are aware that some flexibility is now required in the production System to better adjust to a turbulent environment. Young people are no longer willing to accept certain jobs that their fathers would have. The idea that there are alternatives in work organisation is becoming more and more accepted

La loi et la négociation collective en France: réflexion sur l'expérience 1981-1985

Quatre ans après la loi Auroux touchant la negociation collective, l'auteur apprecie ses effets pratiques et s'interroge sur ses pouvoirs et ses limites lorsqu'elle cherche à agir sur les relations collectives du travail.Four years after the adoption of the Auroux laws, the author evaluates the legislation's practical consequences in the areas of collective bargaining and time allocation.The 1982 law on collective bargaining was aimed at stimulating such activities at the industry and above all the firm level, particularly regarding salaries and work time. The law was adopted, though, before government wage and price controls had come to an end.On the salary question, it appears that the legislation did not stimulate collective bargaining on a sectorial level. These negotiations were complète and salary riders concluded, the established pattern set in — in conformity with government and management recommendations. Within the firm, where the legislation created an obligation for the employer to negotiate real salaries, an obvious development is noticeable. Firm-level negotiations, however, only made minor adjustments to sectorial agreements. As regards time allocation and time reduction, sectorial agreements determined the form and results of the hours of work. It is in the area of firm-level collective bargaining that new approaches appeared most clearly. Nevertheless, it should be noted that agreements were so firm specifie that is probable that they could have been reached without reference to the legislation. Thus, collective agreements have evolved since 1982 in a framework clearly defined by the objectives and the recommendations of the government. The legislation certainly contributed to the development of collective bargaining, particularly at the firm-level. It did not create a power of negociation sufficient to validate agreements aimed at upgrading salary conditions to levels acceptable to central government bodies, as far as unions were concerned. Underlying these remarks, of course, are the economic context and union crisis felt in France as elsewhere. Concerning negotiations on time allocation and time reduction, they revealed an offensive strategy by firms preoccupied with creating a more flexible organization as regards work time and production. The legislation proposed certain formulas accepted by firms, but it was not the legislation requiring negotiation which was at the root of what happened — it was the strategy of the firms themselves. Moreover, it is probably this very strategy which is the most significant factor in the development of French industrial relations, making it possible, for example, to profit from the requirements of the legislation — turning a restraint into an advantage

Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle, 1958

Delamotte Yves. Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle, 1958. In: Sociologie du travail, 2ᵉ année n°1, Janvier-mars 1960. pp. 82-84

François Sellier, Stratégie de la lutte sociale.

Delamotte Yves. François Sellier, Stratégie de la lutte sociale.. In: Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations. 17ᵉ année, N. 3, 1962. pp. 615-618

Lettre de Yves Delamotte

Delamotte Yves. Lettre de Yves Delamotte . In: Sociologie du travail, 4ᵉ année n°4, Octobre-décembre 1962. p. 412

Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle, 1958

Delamotte Yves. Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle, 1958. In: Sociologie du travail, 2ᵉ année n°1, Janvier-mars 1960. pp. 82-84

Meyers Frederic, European coal mining unions : structure and function.

Delamotte Y. Meyers Frederic, European coal mining unions : structure and function.. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1962, 3-4. pp. 464-466

Ledrut R., Sociologie du chômage.

Delamotte Y. Ledrut R., Sociologie du chômage.. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1967, 8-2. pp. 251-252

Meyers Frederic, European coal mining unions : structure and function.

Delamotte Y. Meyers Frederic, European coal mining unions : structure and function.. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1962, 3-4. pp. 464-466

Ledrut R., Sociologie du chômage.

Delamotte Y. Ledrut R., Sociologie du chômage.. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1967, 8-2. pp. 251-252